Filling in some gaps in the cited article...
I’m not surprised to find this article here, and I really have to say something about it. Aside from the melodramatic tone, it is a really striking piece, not for what it says, but for what it does not say. Right at the heart of the story Bowden is telling is one of the most bizarre and controversial incidents in the bizarre and controversial history of the Abu Sayyaf – and Bowden doesn’t even mention it. He had to have known about the incident, which features prominently in every other account, and it’s something that one would expect to put a journalist’s salivary glands into overdrive, but in Bowden’s account it simply didn’t happen.
The omission starts with a factual error. Bowden writes (of ASG leader Aldam Tilao):
His target that spring morning was Amanpulo, the most expensive diving resort on the southern coast of Palawan, where he and the others hoped to harvest a crop of wealthy foreign hostages. They would extort large ransom payments from the victims’ families and employers, and shatter the friendly calm vital to the Philippine tourism industry. Palawan was considered completely safe. The trouble in recent years had been confined for the most part to the southern islands. This thrust across the Sulu Sea was a bold move by Abu Sayyaf, and something of a stretch. Indeed, when Tilao and his men arrived in the unfamiliar waters off Palawan, in the predawn darkness, they got lost. The plan called for them to strike before sunrise and set off on the long return trip while it was still dark. But with dawn rapidly approaching, they grabbed several local night fishermen off their boats and pressed them into service as guides. Abandoning their primary goal, the raiders settled for a resort called Dos Palmas.
This sounds all well and good, except that Amanpulo isn’t on “the southern coast of Palawan”. It’s not even close to the southern coast of Palawan. It is in fact in the Cuyo Islands, northeast of Palawan, over 300km from where Bowden places it. That’s not a minor error, for reasons that become clear as we review the rest of the omissions.
Now we get to the truly bizarre bit:
On the fifth night, the kidnappers and their captives slipped off the boat into the warm, chest-high water off Basilan and walked ashore through the lazy lapping of the tide. Behind them, the spotlights of fishing vessels dotted the horizon. Islanders lived along the shoreline, but like these guerrillas, they knew how to move inland along narrow trails that pushed uphill into the black jungle. By straying just ten feet, a person could vanish into the dense vegetation.
The first time I read this I was so astonished that I went back and clicked around, thinking somehow I’d missed a page. I hadn’t.
Here’s what was left out:
The ASG and the hostages did not “move inland along narrow trails that pushed uphill into the black jungle”. On June 1st, shortly after landing, they were engaged by AFP units in the town of Tuburan. The ASG commandeered a vehicle, abandoned 3 hostages that wouldn’t fit into it, and withdrew, with the AFP in pursuit. At about 11pm, they entered the town of Lamitan, where they took over the Jose Ma Torres Hospital, taking more hostages in the process. The hospital was surrounded by an AFP force of 2000-3000 men (accounts vary) supported by armor and helicopters.
Late the next morning, three hostages left the hospital in what was officially described as an escape, a “dramatic dash to freedom” one writer called it. One was Reghis Romero, a businessman who had amassed a fortune estimated in the billions of pesos, primarily through government contracts. The others were his mistress Rizza Santos and an 8 year old boy named RJ Recio. Their exit was made from the hospital’s front door.
Later that day, the troops at the rear of the hospital left the area. Military officials do not deny the troop movement, but describe it as tactical redeployment.
At about 5pm, a vehicle with arms and ASG members arrived through the front entrance of the hospital compound. Hostages claim that they heard the ASG arrivals state that they gained access by claiming to be bodyguards of Basilan Governor (and later Congressman) Wahab Akbar, a man with the dubious distinction of having at various times held leadership positions in the MNLF, MILF, ASG, and the Philippine Government. (After several interviews I personally concluded that through this chain of affiliations Akbar had served, with fanatical loyalty, a single cause: the ascension and prosperity of Wahab Akbar.) There are also several eyewitness accounts claiming that Akbar visited the hospital during the siege, which Akbar denied.
At about 5:30pm, the ASG and the hostages left by the back gate, unmolested. Hostages later claimed that the ASG appeared unprepared for combat during the exit and unconcerned with the possibility that they might have to fight their way out. Well outside the compound, there was a brief firefight with a small group of police and civilian volunteers, in which two hostages were wounded and left behind.
At about 1am the AFP launched an all-out assault on the hospital compound, which by that time had been empty for over 6 hours.
There are some obvious questions here. Reghis Romero was the big ticket item among the hostages, it seems odd that he would have been given an opportunity to escape, especially through the front door, where according to accounts by other hostages the bulk of the ASG contingent was placed. The arrival of arms and additional ASG forces during the siege is inexplicable. The “tactical redeployment” that left the rear of the hospital unguarded is beyond inexplicable.
Here’s the unofficial version:
The ASG were never headed for Amanpulo, they were going to Dos Palmas from the start. This is why Bowden’s geographical error is significant. If Amanpulo were in fact on the southern coast of Palawan, the diversion story would be credible. Given the actual location, the account becomes absurd.
The ASG went to Dos Palmas for a reason: Reghis Romero. Romero had been using the resort as a love nest for some time, the ASG had a tip from an inside contact. They knew he was there and they went and got him. Ransom negotiations began by satellite phone immediately after the kidnapping, and the ransom was prepared and a private aircraft made available before the group even landed. The ransom (varied reports say 17 or 25 million pesos) was delivered, negotiations were held, the money was divided. Romero, Santos, and Recio were released, and as part of the deal the ASG and the hostages were permitted to depart unmolested.
That’s a nasty story, but if you ask just about anyone in the Philippines and it’s what you’ll hear. It also seems more consistent with events than the official story. Questions, of course, were asked. An inquiry by the Philippine Senate concluded that there was strong circumstantial evidence to support allegations of collusion, and recommended court martial for 3 officers. No court martial was ever held.
It should perhaps be noted that there is a long history of allegations that Philippine civilian, police, and military officials are routinely involved in collusion and profit sharing with kidnappers, bank robbers, drug dealers, illegal loggers, etc, ad infinitum, and that there is strong circumstantial evidence suggesting that this does occur on a regular basis.
I have other questions about the article, most notably about the allegations of Aldam Tilao’s AQ connections and training abroad, but this post is way too long already.
Getting back to Bowden and his article… given the attention the Lamitan incident has already achieved, I cannot begin to imagine how Bowden and the Atlantic, both with fairly credible reputations, could completely exclude it from their account. The only explanation I can think of is that it is not quite compatible with the rather heroic tone taken by the rest of the story… but is that reputable journalism? What ever happened to “warts and all”? If Bowden had reviewed events and concluded, citing some deep dark source in the intel community, that all was above board, that I could understand… but to omit the events entirely?
It strikes me that Bowden clearly depended heavily on military and intel sources for his inside information, and that these sources may have insisted as a precondition for participation that the incident not be discussed. That idea does not paint a very pretty picture of Bowden or the Atlantic – in fact it would make the article something approaching disinformation. It’s the only explanation I can think of, though.
If anybody here has a better one, I’d love to hear it.
JI/ASG "merger": Dueling Experts...
On one hand, this story has been getting a fair bit of play in Manila:
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/67043/j...iterror-expert
Quote:
Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf now merged, says antiterror expert
The Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) regional terror network and the local Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Sulu Archipelago are already so integrated they operate almost as one organization, according to an international counterterrorism expert.
The link between the JI and the ASG is “almost complete,” said Professor Rohan Gunarathna, head of the management staff of the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research in Singapore...
And for the other side:
http://www.philstar.com/nation/artic...ticleid=732196
Quote:
Expert: No Abu Sayyaf, JI merger yet
A counter terrorism expert today denied the accuracy of a report that the notorious Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and regional terror group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) have already merged in Mindanao.
In an interview with philstar.com, Rommel Banlaoi, chairman of the board and executive director of the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR), said the two groups have not yet reached the level of unification.
““It is not accurate to say that there is a merger of the two groups as of this moment,” Banlaoi said, but cited that the two terror groups have been attempting to join their forces in the south...
I'll be curious to see if and how some of the experts I listen to (notably Zachary Abuza and Sidney Jones) weigh in on this one.
My own take is that neither ASG nor JI have sufficiently coherent leadership to "merge" in any meaningful way: both are more diverse collections of splinter groups than coherent organizations. For JI in particular, it's a bit over the top to refer to their "forces" in Mindanao.
Still, while the thought of a "merger" between ASG and JI may be a bit melodramatic, there are ASG splinter factions that are undoubtedly cooperating with the scattering of JI operatives who have taken refuge in Mindanao, and they could certainly make a mess. I don't see some new super organization emerging, but in many ways a small cell of core JI people and members of the fairly small Islamist faction within ASG would be a greater threat in the terror sphere than something larger and more visible. The bigger an organization is the more likely it is to be penetrated and compromised.
In the past, military pressure on the ASG has shut down the profitability of the criminal operations, greatly reducing manpower (most are in it for the money and have little if any concern for political agendas). Paradoxically, that has made the organization more dangerous even as its overt force and footprint are reduced, as the core members remaining are more inclined to ally with more political organizations (such as JI) and to make their presence felt by acts of terrorism.
Philippines say arrested hackers funded by Saudi group
Once the smoke clears and the story becomes clearer I'll probably roll it up another thread. A "possibility" this may belong to the LeT thread, but simply too early to say.
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/1...7AP06A20111126
Quote:
Philippine police and the FBI have arrested four people that Manila said were paid by a militant Saudi Arabian-based group to hack into U.S. telecom AT&T's system, but the company said it was neither targeted nor breached.
Quote:
The Philippines' Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) said those arrested in Wednesday's operation in Manila with the Federal Bureau of Investigation were paid by the same group the FBI said had funded the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai.
"The hacking activity resulted in almost $2 million (1 million pound) in losses incurred by the company," the CIDG said in a statement.
This may be another example of where organized crime and terrorist converge, and they assumed the Philippines would be present an easy operating environment? Interesting claim that a group in Saudi funded the LeT attack in Mumbai. Suspect we'll more, perhaps a lot more in the days to come.
Mumbai attack Saudi funded?
Bill,
Quote:
Interesting claim that a group in Saudi funded the LeT attack in Mumbai.
I'm reading and enjoying Stephen Tankel's book on LeT and he makes it clear some of their funding did come from private parties in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia. Not got to the Mumbai chapter yet and will report back.