First off, Mike, it's not a legal question ...
as I tried to point out in the titles of each of my three posts. What we have is a question of Politik (politics and policy in the CvC sense). Once, Politik makes up its mind, the law and the military will follow (as instruments of policy). No doubt that one could come up with factual situations where legal or military constraints limit Politik. However, in R2P, the legal and military constraints are not usually determinative - cuz, in both institutions, there are such a wide range of choices that are within the doctrinal frameworks material to "Peace Enforcement".
Now, to the real Politik issue you raise -
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Can R2P become the thread that draws us into future conflict much like the treaties between various states brought on WWI with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria?
Of course, it can - cuz UN Chapter VII Peace Enforcement involves real armed conflict. The first UN Chapter VII PE action of any consequence was the Korean War. At several points, that armed conflict could have developed into a much wider conventional conflict (e.g., involving Taiwan, Japan and China), or even into a nuclear WWIII. The participants made policy choices that foreclosed those escalations, but they certainly were "legal" options.
Now, it may well happen that a UN member elects not to go along with Chapter VII PE based on R2P. E.g., Germany in the recent Libyan venture - and, of course, Russia and China, as further removed spectators. The UN Charter (and all the associated treaties, compacts and resolutions) are indeterminate enough to allow disassociation with what the rest of the pack decides to do. It does require a certain amount of national will to do that.
In fact, the various pre-WWI treaties allowed wiggle room for states to decline participation in the resulting bloodbath. So does Article 5 of NATO contain the same wiggle room if you read it close ("... such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force ..."):
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If the conditions are met for the application of Article 5, NATO Allies will decide how to assist the United States. (Many Allies have clearly offered emergency assistance). Each Ally is obliged to assist the United States by taking forward, individually and in concert with other Allies, such action as it deems necessary. This is an individual obligation on each Ally and each Ally is responsible for determining what it deems necessary in these particular circumstances.
Given that kind of indeterminacy, I don't see law as especially "material" (that is, as carrying much real weight) in the R2P arena - although it seems "relevant" (that is, it must be of some probative worth because some lawyers are always asked to write a justification for whatever decision is made by their policy-making masters :eek:).
Hey Mike, good to be talking to you again. :)
Regards
Mike
Do I understand you correctly?
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Originally Posted by
jmm99
The R2P arena is marked by Politik (politics and policy); and cannot be validly claimed (in my opinion, obviously) as an area governed by a determinative international law. That came home to me in connection with our (USAian) Libyan venture based on the UN Resolution and Presidential "Non-War Powers". While a number of voices shouted non-compliance with the War Powers Resolution and outright unconstitutionality, the salient fact was that Congress took no action opposing the President's actions. Thus, the President did not act illegally (since Congress did not act at all).
Unlike many others, but apparently in agreement with you, I also did not focus upon the "Constitutional question." However, I did see an international law issue. The Charter gives the UNSC the authority to act in cases of breach of international peace. Thus, action to eject Iraq from Kuwait had the sanction of international law. Although the UNSC did indeed act with respect to Libya, there use of this same clause was without legal justification. International law requires that a breach of peace cross international borders. Since that did not occur with respect to Libya, the UNSC had no authority to act. The question here is whether R2P has now expanded that authority.
Part 2: in looking at the Canadian input on R2P I see something broader than that set forth in the UN material. The UN material specifically sets forth genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity as a precursor to action. However, the Canadian material is worded a little broader. It seems to indicate authority for preemptive or preventive action, which doesn't seem to be the case with the UN wording. I believe the Canadian stuff came first, so one could look at the UN material as curtailing the Canadian position. Even so, the two positions demonstrate the inherent problems with R2P. Again, the Libyan action would indicate a much more liberal interpretation of R2P.
Of course, I may still have fog on the brain as I just completed the US-Kuwait-Bagram transient process from R&R. :eek: However, I am seriously trying to understand this R2P issue and its potential effects. You have a better grasp of these issues than I so I look forward to your thoughts.
True. However the paradox is
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Originally Posted by
MikeF
The planner has no right to be wrong.
He or she often will be... :wry:
Who is the Final Decider ?
LawVol:
With respect to the US, three branches are potentially involved in deciding constitutional and international law issues. With respect to decisions to go to war (jus ad bellum), the Supreme Court has made it clear that it won't get involved in second guessing those political questions, leaving them to Congress and the Executive. If the Executive acts and Congress does not act, the Executive's actions will stand (in practical effect, will be "legal"), regardless of what you, I and the woman down the street think of them. UNLESS, and this may or may not be a big "unless", UNLESS the people then take action to cause the Executive to change course.
In the case of the UN, the SC is the Final Decider as to "peace", "international security" - and to Chapter VII actions. Given the concurrence of the permanent members and the acquiescence (or silence) of the General Assembly, the SC actions will be the "law", regardless of what you, I and the woman down the street think of them.
While the velvet glove has been used by the UN versus the iron fist in Chapter VII matters, the latter is available under Arts. 48 & 49 to a greater extent than, say, under Art. 5 of NATO:
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Article 48
1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.
Article 49
The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.
Of course, if you are a permanent member (or a functional equivalent, such as Germany), you have less to fear from Mr Hiss' well-drafted arrangement.
Like Zhivago, you might say to the UNSC: "That only gives you the Power, it doesn't give you the Right." But, I find that of little comfort.
Regards
Mike
That, sadly is also my impression of too many today.
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Originally Posted by
carl
...Our leadership classes characteristically will charge ahead and lie. They will never acknowledge a mistake.
I hope I'm wrong. I am occasionally... :o
It has been my observation over the last 30 plus years that Planners -- who typically do not have to make quick, leader decisions are even more reluctant to admit mistakes -- or change their plan. In my experience the system that works best is to not have a Plans cell, but rather two Ops cells who rotate in planning and executing and will have the responsibility for executing the plan they designed -- tends to focus them admirably.
At the risk of moving this thread too far down the off topic road…
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
That would entail Congress emphasizing competence instead of pseudo-fairness (and it is very pseudo...) and 'objectivity,' :rolleyes: . It would entail dumping the 1917 Personnel system (as amended in 1940, 1963, 1980, etc.); dumping the terribly flawed Task, Condition and Standard based BTMS system; removing grade creep (there are too many Officers, especially FlagOs, too many senior NCOs -- I'm fully aware of Mob requirements but there better ways to get there and improve quality in the process); testing people for promotion; rigorously testing units for performance and removing incompetent leaders from the service (acknowledging that Congress and HRC truly hate that idea for very different reasons...) and a few other things. You want it fixed, all that is necessary but any one item remediated would bring some improvement, two would help a lot. Good luck with any of it.
Is there anywhere that a model other than up–or–out is used? If so, is it/are they any more effective than the U.S.’s?