Not quite. Something with pre-, but neither preemptive nor preventive.
Printable View
Not quite. Something with pre-, but neither preemptive nor preventive.
I don't quite agree with your view of reconnaissance - recce. While precision fires will only become more common, making every scout with a radio much more lethal, I think future battlefields will still place a premium on recon forces at all echelons below corps. PGMs may not be a viable option in an area with sensitive infrastructure or civilians, weather may make delivery of PGMs impossible, and the mission make dictate a task other than 'destroy.' In these cases, scouts may need to maintain eyes on the target and battle handover to another unit. I think we also need to keep in mind the role of reconnaissance forces as an economy of force. The old model had a RGT (a US BDE) cover a corps, a SQDN cover a DIV, etc. In this context, the old forces were economies of force relative to their parent unit.
As a company commander in Iraq, I would routinely use a squad or fire team as a recon force; I found eyes forward to be valuable even at my low level. Reconnaissance at all levels can be decisive - same for counter-recon.
Your first disagreement is a misunderstnading. I separate the lareg area recce in armored cav squadrons and LRS. The LRS are meant for stealthy, slow work - especially observation.
The Cav would be agile, combat-worthy to some degree (against support/recce troops and against combat troops with the advantage of surprise/ambush) and fully capable of "maintain eyes on the target and battle handover to another unit. I think we also need to keep in mind the role of reconnaissance forces as an economy of force.".
I don't think that brigades need to be fully capable stand-alone forces, though. They should swim in an ocean of recce troops.
"As a company commander in Iraq, I would routinely use a squad or fire team as a recon force; I found eyes forward to be valuable even at my low level. Reconnaissance at all levels can be decisive - same for counter-recon."
Of course, but the timely recce effort of an infantry company in a major war has an effective radius that equals maybe ten minutes of driving (unless we talk about very, very open and featureless terrain).
I expect a degree of agility and I fear that enemies might have a degree of agility that necessitates an early warning more on the order of at least an hour for you'd otherwise be surprised when relatively unfit to fight.
again: "The real recce should be a Corps thing and should provide ~90% of the non-combat info on the enemy."
A little off topic, but as you are talking reconnaisance, is a vehicle like the small and agile British Scimitar, able to defeat light armour and soft skin vehicles, a good reconnaissance vehicle on the battlefield. I ask this because the People's Liberation Army have at least trialled their ZDB03 airborne combat vehicle as a reconnaissance vehicle. Besides having a 30mm automatic cannon, it can squeeze four paratroopers with small arms only in a rear compartment.
I would often deploy recon assets up to 24 hours prior to an operation. Of course, I had a static zone I was responsible for, but I think the idea is the same. On a more fluid battlefield where larger maneuver is the norm, recon at the company level may not be as important since it won't fight in a vacuum. I still think scouts at the BN and BCT are still necessary.
I also think aviation can play a critical role. The Army doesn't have too many helicopters, but they aren't employed in the most effective manner. I would argue that the Army should view ATK AVN in the same way the USMC views its air wings - as fire support platforms. But the Army should take it step further and consider them as an extension of reconnaissance and security forces as well.
This is a great topic.
Now you mention it I remember that the scout and MICV were melded for cost savings; I always had a soft spot for the XM-808 "Twister" (doable, IMO, with todays composite, hybrid drive, digital technology), although the XM-800T was probably more suitable. I only asked because I know the Danish army scout platoon had two tanks (tank section) and a light vehicle section (2 VW I think) and a single mortar vehicle. Apparently, they did very well at NATO training meets combining stealth with survivability (based on the firepower and protection of the tanks). Anyone who knows about the travils of Britain's FRES programme (essentially jumping on the US "medium weight" Stryker bandwagon) knows that the British Gov have just chosen a 30tonne MICV (that's pushing the "medium wieght" bit, IMO); personally I would have liked to have seen the UK go with the TRACER programme (which see half way down the article). I think the German/Dutch Fennek is probably one of the better light recon platforms.
I think a large part of the problem is that the reconnaisance function/role tends to blur into the advance guard function/role which then confuses force design or, as in the case of Iraq, S/BCT recon elements are often used as a de-facto third manouvre element...so who's doing recon? Separating the two functions fully (stealth for the former and brawn for the latter) is probably going to the near impossible given actual rather than theoretical battle conditions and the fiscal and doctrinal problems of force design.
The "third manoeuvre element" thing is a consequence of designing cavalry as a de-facto brigade instead of as many small autonomous units (Coy).
That's one of the reasons why the ACR concept is strange.
German WW2 doctrine gave the fast division's recce detachment some combat tasks, too. They were only capable of small combat missions, though.
Standard doctrine was to send small teams of armoured cars ahead and to increase their density in areas of interest. Those armoured cars would avoid combat if possible.
The recce detachment was reinforced with a fast-moving infantry Bn (initially motorcycle troops), though. They were able to punch through screening lines or to grab an important hill or bridge if necessary. Organic artillery and AT guns helped them (they did later go for long 75mm cannons on lightly armoured AFV for both direct fire support and AT support).
That wasn't enough to be misunderstood as an additional manoeuvre element. It was enough for small combat missions (especially against unprepared opposition) and was often mis-used as emergency reserves in times of crisis (this happened to everybody in uniform, though - engineers and recce troops were merely the first to be called upon).
IMO, Scimitar is an abysmal recce vehicle. Spartan was far better. You could at least deploy 4 guys to actually clear corners, wood lines and ridges.
What were you commanding and what were your recce assets?
Concur, but I think the AVN community really needs to think long and hard about how to address this. The Aussies are using Tiger, in an Armed Reconnaissance Role, and I know there are some muttering about this.Quote:
I also think aviation can play a critical role. The Army doesn't have too many helicopters, but they aren't employed in the most effective manner. I would argue that the Army should view ATK AVN in the same way the USMC views its air wings - as fire support platforms. But the Army should take it step further and consider them as an extension of reconnaissance and security forces as well.
There used to be more!Quote:
This is a great topic.
Personally, I think almost every aspect of reconnaissance needs scrutiny, because there is far too much hold over from horse mounted cavalry thinking, and almost nothing from men on horses can be read across into the proto-modern warfare.
Bill,
Thank you for your reply. The ZDB03 was designed from the Russian BMD-3, and combines many of the features of the Spartan and Scimitar but no thermal imaging or small battlefield radars have been observed on this vehicle. They could of couse be shoehorned inside the vehicle.
...…the following theses may be of interest regarding S/BCTs and the reconnaissance/third manoeuvre Bn conundrum;
Maj. C. D. Taylor, The Transformation of Reconnaissance: Who will Fight for Information on the Future Battlefield?, MMAS thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2005;
Maj. D. Mark, Effective or Efficient: The Conundrum of the Armed Reconnaissance Squadron, MMAS thesis, USMC Command and General Staff College, 2009;Quote:
This research seeks to determine if reconnaissance operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom required engaging the enemy in close combat in order to be effective. Qualitative examination of the interviews from the Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group yielded seven consistent themes that impact on this primary research question. Those seven themes are summarized below:
1. Tempo drives reconnaissance
2. The movement to contact is the most common form of the offense
3. Adaptive enemies often do not fit doctrinal templates
4. Commanders required human intelligence more than imagery
5. Most useful intelligence is bottom up
6. Lightly armoured scouts cannot support high tempo operations
7. Divisional heavy cavalry squadrons tend to fight as independent manoeuvre units. (p.40)
Quote:
Brigade level reconnaissance units exist solely to allow the primary warfighting organization in the Army, the Brigade Combat Team, to have perfect Situational Awareness and Situational Understanding (SA/SU). However, much of the doctrine, organization, and technologies required to pursue RDO simply do not exist within the Army today. The Army's answer to the capability gap is the modular force and the centrepiece organization, the Brigade Combat Team. However, one of the primary failings of the modular
design was that the HBCT traded a manoeuvre battalion for a cavalry squadron. Although the ARS proves far more capable than the BRT it replaced, the ARS has lost its identity and has become a poorly resourced third manoeuvre element. As a result, the ARS does not even perform
reconnaissance missions well. Under the current construct, the ARS does not provide the brigade any unique capabilities (p. 23).
Maj. M. A. Dooley, Ignoring History: The Flawed Effort to Divorce Reconnaissance from Security in Modern Cavalry Formations, MMAS thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006;
Maj. M. R. Howell, A CRITIQUE OF THE U.S. ARMY FORCE REDESIGN OF CAVALRY FORMATIONS WITHIN THE BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS MMAS thesis, USMC Command and General Staff College, 2009;Quote:
For all of the optimistic discussion in the latest version of FM 3-20.96 about making contact with sensors and developing a situation out of direct fire contact, there is little difference now between the realities of brigade reconnaissance squadron techniques and the capabilities of World War II ground reconnaissance. Other than the fact that reconnaissance squadrons no longer have the organic helicopter assets or armoured firepower formerly common to division cavalry, cavalry scouts must still execute their reconnaissance and security missions much as they have for the past sixty-five years. As a result, the newest reconnaissance squadrons no longer possess the critical assets historically required to bail themselves out of trouble once it is encountered.[...]
It seems the sensor troops that were to have sufficed as a replacement for organic combat power in the original FCS proposals are not controlled by the very reconnaissance forces that were to depend upon them. So long as the sensor systems remain controlled by brigade headquarters, the concept of sensor-to-sensor target handover, in most cases, will require constant coordination through multiple echelons of command. Without physical possession or operational control of sensor assets at the reconnaissance squadron level, the new HBCT and IBCT reconnaissance organizations technically do not even qualify to be labelled as “RSTA,” because they have no ability to acquire targets beyond the short range capabilities of normal ground recon troop assets. The much vaunted application of joint and precision fires, proclaimed in the latest version of FM 3-20.96 as a substitute for organic combat power, is thus not likely to occur efficiently if at all. (p. 72-4)
Quote:
First, the new modular cavalry formations have severe flaws in their design. Second, the current mindset, doctrinal foundation and leader training focus of these cavalry formations have severe flaws in some of its key concepts. Finally, and most importantly, these new formations cannot perform the full spectrum of reconnaissance and security missions that cavalry formations doctrinally executed in the past. The combined effect of these flaws is likely to cause a serious capability gap to develop within BCT cavalry squadrons. These changes signalled a significant shift in the doctrinal roles and missions of the majority of current U.S. cavalry formations (excluding the 3d Armoured Cavalry Regiment). In sum, the transformation and modularization of the U.S. Army's BCT cavalry squadrons has had a negative impact on their effectiveness.(p. 1)
What's the difference (if any) between armoured infantry and mechanised infantry?
In US usage, mechanized infantry is mounted in Bradley IFVs. We no longer use armored infantry, that is a WW2 term for the 1/2track mounted infantry of the armored divisions.
My understanding of UK usage (I'm willing to be shown otherwise) is that armored infantry is mounted in Warrior IFVs (equivalent to US mechanized infantry), while mechanized infantry is mounted in wheeled Saxon APCs.
I've popped in and out of this discussion for a couple of weeks...
I have heard several different rules of thumb regarding force ratio vis a vis security mission... Of course it is all METT-TC dependent (especially enemy, troops, and terrain), but...
Cover Guard Screen
Corps DIV Regiment/BDE+ Squadron/BN+
Div Regiment/BDE+ Squadron/BN+ Troop/CO+
BDE Squadron/BN+ Troop/CO+ PLT+
Source FM 17-95
My opinion is basically that recce results should be available before a commander even thinks about moving towards some grid coordinates.
The only assets that can flood a theatre with observation & reporting capability at reasonable costs and effort and provide that kind of coverage are either aerial (SAR/GMTI radar, Sigint), orbital (electro-optical, IIR, SAR/GMTI, Sigint) or LRS.
Aerial and orbital sensors have limitations that cannot be overcome without scouts on the ground, therefore I believe that an appropriate share for LRS would be a strong battalion per corps (unless the terrain is too open or the warfare too static or force densities in the theatre too high).
In an era/organization of zero-sum, you are not going to be able to add something in one place without a corresponding reduction somewhere else.
From that, I propose the following organizational changes to the existing HBCT MTO&E
1. Consolidate all M3 CFVs into 6-vehicle recon/scout platoons. With 29 CFVs inside a HBCT there are enough for 4 platoons of 6 + 2 CFVs in Recon Sqdrn HQs + 1 (X2) in each of two Heavy Recon Troops. One CFV left (hold for now)
2a. Reduce number of tank companies in each CAB to one with 4 platoons of 4 tanks + 2 Co HQs tanks + 2 CAB HQs tanks for a total of 20 per CAB (down from 29). This also leaves 1 M2/M3 (S3 vehicle) from the CAB HQs left, Hold for now.
2b. Move remaining 9 tanks per CAB (total of 18) over into Heavy Recon Troops. I think you can see where this goes...
3a. Consolidate all recon HMMWVs for a total of 40. Re-org into four platoons of 6 HMWWVs (plus 4 reminder, hold for now). Assign four 6-HMWWV platoons to Light Recon Troop of Recon Sqdrn.
3b. Assign a 6-HMWWV scout platoon to each CAB.
4. "Re-organized" Recon Sqdrn now has two Heavy Troops and 1 Light Troop, all with four platoons.
5. Take reminder vehicles from above and create an "Escort and Security Company" under the STB. Create using personnel from eliminated Tank HQs and reduced need for FISTs in CABs. E&S Co gets: M2/M3 Co HQs with BFIST, HBCT MP PLT, NBC Recon PLT, the 4 remaining HMMWVs as Escort PLT, and a new/re-inforced Security PLT using the two left over M2/M3 and the 2 from the HBCT Security Section.
Some of the results:
Starting = 8 Companies manned, trained and equipped to conduct Full Spectrum Operations (FSO)
Re-org = 6 Companies and 2 Heavy Recon Troops manned, trained and equipped for FSO.
Start = 8 recon/scout platoons (3X5)
Re-org = 6 HMWWV scout platoons + 4 CFV scout platoons = 10
Increases the number of recon/scout platoons by two and moves towards standardizing Recon/scout platoons at 6 vehicles.
HBCT Recon Sqdrn should now be capable of acting as the 3rd maneuver element of the HBCT and still retain is primary role of recon. It can now guard, attack, defend, delay etc. By being able to occuplish thsse task/missions, it can also begin to address the enemy's INTENTIONS, a capability absent in the current organization.
Start = seperate/orphan platoons/sections 3 (MPs, NBC & Security)
Re-org = New Co HQs with 4 platoons (MPs, NBC, Security & Escort)
A company now resourced to enable the HBCT to begin to solve its area security concerns on its own. Also, addresses the issue of orphan platoons within the HBCT.
Down-side is a less capable recon/scout platoon in each CAB and smaller CABs (10 combat/maneuver platoons versus 12 in the original organization)
Comments?
TAH
So its really more of an ACAV Sqn (as per the ACAV regiments) than a recon outfit right? Can it manouvre and conduct recon or only accomplish one mission at a time; me thinks the latter. Although it could dominate a movement to contact pretty well while guiding in the other two true manouvre bns in for the kill-hunter-killer style. In non MW scenarios however, like, for instance in Iraq, you've already got rcon sqns being used in manoevre roles to make up for the short-fall but become so ensconsed in that mission that they often can't perform their primary one...i.e., recon. Still, I can see from the simple reorganisation you propose that one could get greater bang for ones buck without needing to drastically shake up the entire system. But you really need to address the above problem.