How do we ensure proficiency in the Military-Technical field while simultaneously pri
1. Put the loggies, bean-counters and HR 'experts' The more we go down the HR path, the more we treat our humans as simply resources) back in their respective boxes. Yes, we all need to be 'fiscally prudent' and apply due diligence to our use of the tax-payers coin. OK, got that, we're a professional organisation and there are many other branches of government that need to tighten up their belts before the military gets squeezed anymore. Don't allow the 'efficiency' experts focussed on saving bucks to rationalise changes to to training that affect effectiveness e.g. yes, simulation has its place and is a useful tool but it should not one second be a replacement for time in the field/on the job. Similarly online learning has its place but is still not a substitute for face to face engagement between both peer groups and students/instructors.
2. Let soldiers (in this discussion soldiers = all members in uniform, NCO and commissioned) do what they want to do which is train. Give them every opportunity to apply and develop both their technical skills and experience, and their leadership ability at all levels from the newest soldier upwards. Along the same lines of professional development, encourage soldiers to read and talk about what they are reading - this may be somewhat deflating for some more senior staff as they get trounced in discussion with junior members.
3. Encourage them to follow the military as a career: 3-4 year hitches are not enough to development a smart professional soldiery that understands the contemporary environment - if this is to be an era of persistent conflict, then we don't want that experience walking out...
4. I think the experimentation with wikis, etc at CAC is a good thing (a damn good think even) as it both promotes soldier buy-in and engagement and also seeks to capture the knowledge and experience of the workface. This programme needs to be expanded as does the other side of the coin in making sure that soldiers have the best access to that current information that we can give them (I like the comments in the Sep 10 C4ISR Journal here).
On a much smaller scale...
As a battery commander, I had a sign right in my line of sight (LBWA)... constant reminder that if i was in my office odds were that there was something more important I should be doing... BN CDR got it... S3 didn't... he wanted to know why he could always get in touch with my XO but it took up to 2-3 hours to get a return call from me... I'd ask what he wanted, I'd then answer didn't my XO answer your question... then he'd say hem and haw and say yes, but I wanted an answer from you... to which I would respond for the umteenth time... Bob is empowered to answer your questions, that is why I've chained him to his desk... specifically to run the admin of the battery and answer staff questions... he knows his left and right limits and will tell you if he has to talk to me first... I will live with whatever he commits the battery to doing... but I will not sit at my desk on the off chance that you or the commander might call...
Two different S3s, each took 6 mths to train... and I can assure you it wasn't always comfortable knowing exactly what actually was going on... but if necessary I could adjust the azimuth before the BN or BDE CDR did so for me... only two rules of communication in my unit... rule 1) Never say, "I can't believe" for there is nothing we can't believe... can't fathom, don't understand, inconeivable... maybe, but everything is believable. Rule 2) never start a sentence with a disclaimor... e.g. "I don't want to sound like a smart ass" stop stop stop because no matter what you will sound like a smart ass... figure out what you need to say as constructively as possible... "Sir this is f@cked up beyond all recognition, we need to do x, y, and z first" that is perfectly acceptable and desired communication...
This approach was met with some significant push-back internally as well... PSGs, PLT LDRs and others were won't to hover and Soldiers were hesitant at first, but within 2 mths the culture had been changed... never been or were ever happier
The most important "new" thing the army needs is probably Perspective
Quote:
Originally Posted by
ChipColbert
OK, so here comes the question. Our Army is faced with the dual challenge of winning our current wars while simultaneously preparing for future armed conflict. #Due to the past nine years of war, we've obviously and necessarily placed a great deal of emphasis and priority on tactical and operational assignments and experience - or to use this lexicon, the military-technical field of knowledge. Accordingly, I think we've devalued our professional military education system, ACS opportunities, and other broadening experiences that take people out of the fight - the Human Development field.
Try looking at the past nine years as:
1. Not being war, and
2. Not being a problem that can be "won" through military action.
Then re-look both of your stated problems of dealing with the here and now while preparing for the potential armed conflicts of the future.
If not war, what is this and what should he military role be, and how should that role be framed?
- How can changing the context lead to shaping more effective engagement rather than simply simplifying the problem so that I can quit and go home?
What are the potential challenges that could both truly threaten us and be either deterred or defeated by military action?
- What threats can we deter, and how must we posture to do so?
- How does the military contribute to deterring those that are currently seen as "non-deterable" by most? Are there indirect ways that rob such organizations of the base of their support that can mitigate the problem? Conversely, are there ways that though well intended, will actually exacerbate the problem through engagement?
- What threats must we be prepared to defeat if not deterred, and are we postured to defeat those threats?
- What problems are cast as threats currently, but really don't pass the common sense test in today's environment? Are there policy solutions? If yes, come up with COAs and take them to the policy guys to consider. Use design to develop your position.
- What programs are crushing us with their cost, or diverting funding from programs that are arguably more important? Are there policy positions such as those described above driving these programs? Don't argue programs, assess policy.
The army is in the middle of a very tough problem-set. Being saddled with a large family of expectation driven by out-dated Cold War policies; along with a family of poorly conceived GWOT policies makes the problem-set tougher yet. Assess both, and then go back to higher and demand that they clarify what they really want, and what they really need you to do. We can't do it all, we can't buy it all. So lets buy and do what we really need.
Trade and not a profession?
KEN White quote:
Quote:
Our training and education does not inculcate the basics of our trade -- and it is a trade, not a profession IMO
I'm interested in hearing more about why you see it as a trade and not a profession.
Re: the most important "new" thing we need is perspective
While I agree with much of what you posted, I see that as being a much larger issue than the one I'm thinking of. Reframing how we view our challenges and how we see military force being employed to meet them is vitally important for the debate. However, while I can see how that process may alleviate optempo and may decrease our role and rate of employment, I don't think it changes the fact that - IMO - the Army still needs to reassess how much emphasis we place on tactical and operational assignments vice broadening and educational experiences.
In a recent interview with American Interest, Eliot Cohen said the Army is doing a good job of producing "capable brigade commanders" but that doesn't mean we're developing the next generation of strategic thinkers and general officers. I think this is due in large part because we are so focused on tactical assignments. Link to the interview is here:
http://www.the-american-interest.com....cfm?piece=857
Pardon some of us for being cynical...
Chip the dynamic of which you speak has very little to do with the Army's current OPTEMPO and the subsequent focus on tactical/operational assignments. While that may accurately describe the current atmospherics (not sure it does - but I'll accept it because it doesn't matter).... it has little to do with why the Army isn't producing "strategic thinkers"
Simply put, long before the current engagements, the Army was obcessively focused on tactical assignments... whether green tab or CTC O/C... and routinely weened out anyone who thought beyond the final 300m...
Don't get me wrong, those types of assignment and that type of focus is important... but it was virtually the only path to greater levels of responsibility...
I'll defer to some of our more "seasoned" members, but it is not uncommon to refer to a LTC/COL who couldn't get promoted as too smart for their own good.
That said... how many strategic thinkers do you really need??? You certainly need them in the right spaces, but I'm not entirely certain you need a bunch of strategic thinkers...
Get past the organizational bias that you have to have been IN/AR/Arty to be able to think big thoughts and you might find you have a whole lot more strategic thinkers that may seem appearant...
Thoughts?