Slap, Stu, Whatever, as my old squad leader use to say “I get paid the same no matter what”. Seriously though your point about ’91 reminds me of what Col. Hackworth use to say about C.R.S. Can’t Remember ####
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Slap, Stu, Whatever, as my old squad leader use to say “I get paid the same no matter what”. Seriously though your point about ’91 reminds me of what Col. Hackworth use to say about C.R.S. Can’t Remember ####
20 May Washington Post commentary - An Army Against the Clock by David Ignatius.
Quote:
America set a long clock ticking when it decided to spend $300 million to rebuild the sprawling military base here as a logistical center for the new Iraqi army. This was to be the soldier's version of nation-building -- maintenance depots, orderly barracks and professional schools for Iraqi officers and NCOs.
But the political clock in Washington is running on a different speed. Congress is impatient with the slow work of building a modern army -- especially in a country where sectarian violence is destroying any semblance of normal life outside the confines of well-guarded compounds such as this one...
This U.S. training mission in Iraq was the heart of the Baker-Hamilton report's recommendation last December. And it still seems to me the right way forward. American troops cannot stop a civil war in Iraq, but they can teach soldiers how to fix drive shafts, maintain engines and order spare parts. That's a basic mission that Congress should reaffirm, even as it questions the surge of more U.S. troops into Baghdad. Time is the strategic resource now; Congress and the administration need to agree on ways to add some minutes to the clock.
27 May Washington Post - White House Considers Next Steps in Iraq by Michael Abramowitz and Peter Baker.
Quote:
President Bush and his top aides have signaled in recent days that they are beginning to look more closely at a "post-surge" strategy that would involve a smaller U.S. troop presence in Iraq and a mission focused on fighting al-Qaeda and training the Iraqi army.
Even as the final installment of the nearly 30,000 additional U.S. troops has yet to arrive in Iraq, the officials are talking publicly and privately about how U.S. strategy might change if the additional forces are able to stem sectarian violence in Baghdad.
"I would like to see us in a different configuration at some point in time in Iraq," Bush said at a news conference Thursday. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Peter Pace offered similar comments that day, telling reporters that military leaders would be reviewing a new approach as they await a September report by Gen. David H. Petraeus on the progress made by the additional troops...
31 May Washington Post commentary - Time for 'Plan B-H' in Iraq? By David Ignatius.
Quote:
President Bush said publicly last Thursday what his top aides have been discussing privately for weeks. He talked about a transition to "a different configuration" in Iraq after the surge of U.S. troops is completed this summer. When pressed on whether he was talking about a post-surge Plan B, Bush answered: "Actually, I would call that a plan recommended by Baker-Hamilton, so that would be a Plan B-H."
Let's make sure we've got that right: This would be the same Baker-Hamilton plan whose authors were lampooned by the conservative New York Post in December as "surrender monkeys"? The same Baker-Hamilton report that seemed to be all but buried by Bush's January embrace of a surge of 30,000 U.S. troops into Iraq?
Yes, that same Baker-Hamilton plan now seems to be official White House policy. Administration officials insist that the president supported it all along, though you could have fooled me. Now it's back -- six months later than it should have been, with six extra months of political poison to corrode its bipartisan spirit. But better late than never...
I'd like to contribute to this discussion ... As far as I can tell Plan "A" started in March 2003 ... we have had very similar force levels in Iraq since that time, approx 150,000 men. We plussed up in Late 2004 to defend the elections, then rotated troops out without replacements and went down to 130,000 ... now in Jan 2007 we go back to the 2004-2005 force figures but with a stronger, smarter and more skilled threat force. So in essence we are calling everything we have been doing since OEF-1 ended ... what? Plan Zeta?
This is not Plan "A" ... the surge is a one in a long series of quarterly chances to let MNF commanders do something to stop the AIF daily combat increases and sectarian violence ... to let General Petraeus have a chance at stabilizing Baghdad and key areas according to his plan. To do that he needed troops back at the previous force level at a minimum. In fact, he needs 50,000 more, and when that news hits the public response will be awesome... and not in a good way.
There has to be an alternate plan. Especially an active strategy which can stop the growing "Hizballah-ization" of the Mahdi Militia and use of the Iraqi Army to secure/confront them in the south. Thus far Plan A only does what we've been doing for four years ... in a cleverly focused way... we'd better have a Plan B (for the third Mahdi Army uprising), a Plan C (full Iranian resupply to said Militia) and a Plan D (MM and AIFs join forces to push us out in a combined March 2004-like uprising).
Here is the problem right here ... Denial from Policy makers ... "It's bad policy to speculate on what you'll do if a plan fails when you're trying to make a plan work."- Condoleezza Rice, 11 Jan 2007 :rolleyes:
31 May Wall Street Journal - Can the Iraq 'Surge' Be Salvaged? by Greg Jaffe (SWC member) and Yochi Dreazen.
Much more at the link.Quote:
When the Bush administration decided to send tens of thousands of additional troops to Iraq, the strategy rested on an unspoken trade-off: U.S. troops would risk greater casualties to tamp down violence and buy the Baghdad government time to make the political compromises needed to reconcile the country's warring factions.
But a resurgence of sectarian violence and attacks on U.S. troops, coupled with little to no progress on crucial Iraqi political goals, is already spurring discussion about whether the current strategy can succeed.
In the near term, senior American military officials in Baghdad are wrestling with how to increase the effectiveness of the "surge" strategy between now and September, when Gen. David Petraeus, the top commander in Iraq, is supposed to give Washington a progress report. U.S. officials here and in Baghdad are also waging a parallel debate over how long the "surge" should last -- and whether the U.S. needs to begin planning for an alternative approach that would scale back both U.S. troop levels and American ambitions in Iraq...
Looks like a coordinated review (maybe led by a new war czar) is in order to determine if the terms of "victory" remain what they were 1, 6, or 12 months ago.
4 June NY Times - Commanders Say Push in Baghdad Is Short of Goal by David Cloud and Damien Cave.
Quote:
Three months after the start of the Baghdad security plan that has added thousands of American and Iraqi troops to the capital, they control fewer than one-third of the city’s neighborhoods, far short of the initial goal for the operation, according to some commanders and an internal military assessment.
The American assessment, completed in late May, found that American and Iraqi forces were able to “protect the population” and “maintain physical influence over” only 146 of the 457 Baghdad neighborhoods.
In the remaining 311 neighborhoods, troops have either not begun operations aimed at rooting out insurgents or still face “resistance,” according to the one-page assessment, which was provided to The New York Times and summarized reports from brigade and battalion commanders in Baghdad...
I have read the threads on the troop surge and how it is not the strategy, but only part of the bigger strategy of engaging the population. With KIA per day averaging 3.52, which is the highest it has been since the beginning of the war according to icasualties.org, I have to ask this question. Is the surge really helping us reach the goal of engaging the population? I think one could argue that there has been successes in Anbar and Baghdad which is great news, however it appears that all that what we have essentially done is push the enemy into a different area. With the recent presidential debates it is obvious to me that the enemy has succeeded in breaking the American with most of the candidates (our elected representatives) speaking out against the war. I don't know....Just lost another friend the other day and it has got me thinking. Please enlighten me. I would like to hear some professional opinions on how affective we are right now in Iraq. If not what do we (both strategically and at the unit level) need to do differentially. Thanks
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...lan-b-in-iraq/
Plan B in Iraq
Beyond the Surge: Keeping the Military Relevant in an Asymmetric World
Fernando Martinez Luján
Quote:
The Surge: Mission Impossible?
While public opinion is still radically divided regarding the ongoing plan to “surge” 21,500 additional American troops into Iraq, there can be little argument that the next 12 months will be decisive to America’s future. Despite attempts by the administration to portray the new plan as only one option out of many remaining, most media outlets are now describing the troop increase as a “last chance” for American and Iraqi forces to “secure the country.” As a result, insurgents and death squads can win by not losing. They understand that in a war that is being fought largely in the news, any major attack conducted during the surge discredits the US and helps mark this “last chance” as a failure. Even if the attacks occur in less defended areas outside of Baghdad and Anbar—away from where the surge is targeted—the insurgents know that the resulting 10-second news sound bites will make no distinction.
I think it is a bit early to determine if the surge is really working, stabilizing a mess like Iraq will take time (20 years?). This being said I’ve always seen the idea of a stable democratic Iraq as unlikely surge or no surge.
At 10 AM EST. Should be webcast .
Witnesses are Tony Cordesman, Fred Kagan, and MG Batiste.
(I seem to get about an equal amount of email from Tony and from Nigerians wanting to help make me rich. In other words, a LOT).
Iraq: Is Escalation Working”
Anthony H. Cordesman
Mr. Chairman, let me begin by thanking you, the ranking member, and the Committee for the opportunity to testify today. I have prepared a formal review of the Department of Defense’s latest report on the surge and overall progress in Iraq to date, and I request that it be included in the record.
More broadly, there are many elements of the current US campaign in Iraq that are impressive. The US military has steadily shifted from a force oriented towards conventional war to one that can also fight counterinsurgency campaigns. It has greatly improved its tactical, intelligence, and targeting skills to attacked dispersed networks of insurgents like the Sunni Islamist extremists that include Al Qa’ida’s various affiliates. It has shown it can win tactical battles with a surprisingly low ratio of forces to opponents.
Yet, it is all too clear that the US, its Coalition allies, and the Iraqi government cannot win any form of security and stability if insurgent movements can keep large areas of Iraq unstable and constantly provoke Iraq’s civil conflicts. Tactical success is an important element of victory.
Tactical Victory or Stretching Too Thin and a New Form of “Whack a Mole?”
The present campaign in Iraq may be a tactical success, but there are serious serious issues regarding its strategic value. One key problem was raised during the debate over the surge strategy before President Bush adopted it and announced it in January 2007. It was always clear that an operation in Baghdad would simply lead many insurgents to leave the city and operate elsewhere and that most Sunni militias might simply stand down, let the US-led forces defeat the insurgents, watch a Shi’ite dominated government gain power, and resurface once the US was gone. Baghdad was important. It never made sense to see it as a decisive battlefield or center of gravity.
This is now all too clear even in a narrow military sense. The US is having to expand its counterinsurgency operations broadly outside Baghdad in ways that can steadily disperse limited US and combat-capable Iraqi military forces. Baghdad is still only 30-40% secured, but the fighting not only is dispersing limited US forces into the Baghdad ring cities, but into a troubled zone of provinces ranging from Anbar to Diyala. The US has learned it cannot ignore growing Shi’ite tensions and Iranian pressure in the south, and still faces serious potential problems with Arab-Kurdish tensions in the north.
(cont'd next post)
It is too early to judge what is happening in Baquba, and the use of far more intense combat tactics coupled to broader efforts to seal and secure urban areas after tactical victories may have a more lasting effect. There is, however, an obvious risk that the US will simply end up playing “Whack a mole” on a steadily rising scale.
So far, the claims of success have often been tenuous to meaningless. As of June 23rd, MNF-I claimed that, “at least 55 al-Qa’ida operatives have been killed, 23 have been detained, 16 weapons caches have been discovered, 28 improvised explosive devices have been destroyed and 12 booby-trapped structures have been destroyed.” These figures are far too low to matter.
Limited tactical successes really dosn’t matter unless such casualties include substantial cadres of leaders and experts that cannot be easily and rapidly replaced. The insurgents can simply disperse, stand down, and regroup. The domestic political realities in the US also make it clear that unless the US is successfully taking out cadres and structure, the US is now so sensitive to US casualties that tactical victories can be the same kind of political and strategic defeat that occurred in Vietnam.
This risk is all too clear from the recent statements of Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, the second-ranking American commander in Iraq. If, as the general said on June 22nd, some 80 percent of the top Qa'ida leaders in the city fled before the American-led offensive began, it is not clear that it matters if “80 percent” of the recruits who were there when the offensive remained in the western half of the city. It also is pointless to call the leaders and cadres who leave “cowards.” Iraqis are not foolish and they understand that such actions are an inevitable insurgent reaction to US military superiority and a key element of asymmetric warfare.
Not only have such estimates of “stay behinds” been badly exaggerated in past fighting, along with the capacity to keep them from infiltrating out or hiding, it is all too easy to move on to the next area and city and recruit more, and exploit the hostility following urban combat operations and large-scale detainments. Moreover, no major US-led or Iraqi operation will ever take place without enough signs, leaks, and infiltration to provide leaders and cadres with advanced warning.
The Critical Importance of Political Conciliation
The tactical problem, and stretching a limited pool of US forces too thin, is also only part of the problem. As both General Petraeus and Secretary Gates have made clear, none of this matters unless the Iraqis can move towards political conciliation – or at least a relatively stable form of coexistence. So far, there is only a limited promise of potential legal action by the government.
If anything, the use of Sunni tribes in the West has created new forms of Sunni vs. Shi’ite polarization, Shi’ite on Shi’ite fighting and feuding has gotten much worse in the south and central government, and the uncertainties over oil and a regional referendum on federalism in the north are increasing Kurdish, Arab, and Turcoman tensions.
Creating an Effective Bridge between Tactical Victory and Lasting Strategic Impact
There also is the problem of creating an effective bridge between tactical victory and lasting strategic impact even if political conciliation does move forward, and so far the Coalition has been virtually silent on progress in Baghdad, much less how such progress can be made in the new fighting outside it. Giving tactical victories lasting meaning requires the following additional elements:
1. Iraqi Army forces must begin to take over meaning operations without US embeds and US partner units, and dependence on US reinforcement and support. There does seem to be increasing Iraqi Army capability here, but Coalition reporting does not provide a meaningful picture of progress – merely grossly inflated figures on areas of responsibility and total numbers of battalions in the lead.
2. Iraqi police and local security forces must establishing a lasting security presence in the areas where tactical victories are won, and do so credibly in ways that give ordinary Iraqis security. There can be no “win” without “hold.” So far, the US has made claim after claim to have secured cities after winning tactical battles to control them, and has never actually established lasting security in even one of them. The most critical problem has been the lack of active, combat-capable police, without corruption and sectarian and ethnic ties. Falluja and Samara are only the most obvious cases of such failures.
Coalition reporting so far talks about the number of police posts established or with US embeds. It has not said a word about the ability provide lasting security using Iraqi police in parts of Baghdad or anywhere else. It also has not talked about the ability to support police efforts with an effective local criminal justice and court system or to screen detainees in ways that do not breed local hostility.
The Coalition also needs to start talking about who actually does provide local security, and stop treating militias, local security forces, and police hired locally without Coalition training, as if it was always hostile or did not exist. In the real world, these forces and not the “trained and equipped” police are the real local security force in most of Iraq. There has to be a credible plan to use, absorb, or contain them.
3. The Iraqi government must follow-up security with a meaningful presence and by providing steady improvements in services. “Winning hearts and minds” doesn’t come from public information campaigns and propaganda. It comes from providing real security for ordinary Iraqis, and showing the government cares, is present, and can steadily improve services. Once again, promise after promise has been made in past campaigns, and the central government has not yet shown it can follow up in even a single case. If this is happening even in the “secured” areas of Baghdad, no one has yet said so. How it can happen in Diyala or other high threat areas is even unclear.
4. There must also be effective local government. The liberation of various areas often has seen the emergence of local leaders willing to work with the Coalition – although often with little faith in, or ties to, the central government. In most cases, however, they have become targets, and the effort has broken down in local faction disputes or because of a lack of effective government support and problems in Coalition civil affairs efforts. Once again, if there is progress in creating stable, survivable, effective local government; none of the details are clear.
5. There has to be economic aid and progress. Iraqis have to give priority to physical security and key services, but unemployment , underemployment, and shut or failed businesses affect some 60% or more of Iraqis nationally and the figures are even higher in high threat and combat areas. The strategy President Bush advanced in January 2007 advanced proposals for accomplishing such an effort in Baghdad. Once again, there has been no meaningful Coalition reporting on broad progress in such efforts in the secured areas of Baghdad, and past promises such aid would be provided in “liberated” cities like Samara and Falluja were not kept.
6. There must be an end to sectarian and ethnic cleansing and displacement. There is no near and perhaps midterm answer to suicide bombings and atrocities, to attacks on sacred shrines and critical facilities. No mix of security forces can stop even small cadres of extremists from occasional successes. No tactical victory has meaning, however, unless Iraqis can be secure in neighborhoods and areas where they are in the minority, and can reach across ethnic and sectarian lines and barriers in ordinary life.
One of the greatest single failures of the current approach to fighting in Iraq is that it does not track sectarian and ethnic separation and displacement and make ending this on a local and national level at least as important as halting major attacks and killings. It may take years to make Iraqis secure from Islamist extremists and the worst elements of Shi’ite gangs and militias. There can be no meaningful tactical success, however, unless Iraqis can be safe from their own neighbors and begin to lead ordinary lives in their own neighborhoods.
Metrics, Benchmarks, and Real Victory
The late Colonel Harry Sommers summed up the US defeat in Vietnam in a brief exchange he had with a North Vietnamese officer after the war. Sommers pointed out that the US had won virtually every tactical encounter with both the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces. The Vietnamese officer replied, “Yes, but this was irrelevant.”
The new US Army manual on counterinsurgency, which is the result of an effort led by General Petraeus recognizes this reality, and virtually all of the points made above. It also m ay well be unfair to judge progress in Baghdad even in September, much less now. Historically, any campaign that has had to begin with as weak a foundation as the surge strategy began with took at least a year to seriously take hold and often several years. An Iraq in political turmoil, in local economic collapse, and without security even for senior officials and members of parliament, will not move quickly – especially in a Baghdad summer.
The fact remains, however, that tactical success will remain largely meaningless in Baghdad, Baquba, the other areas cover by Operation Ripper, and in Iraq as a whole unless it can be linked to political conciliation and progress in the other six critical elements of victory listed above. The US team in Iraq and Bush Administration need to show the American people and the Congress that they understand this, are acting on the basis of these realities, have sound plans, and are making real progress. “Spinning” the importance of tactical success does not do this.
At the same time, both the media and outside analysts need to focus far more on the full range of actions it takes to win, and do so with patience and objectivity. No strategy or campaign could possibly achieve significant success in all of these elements by this fall, or even ensure a successful start. It is reasonable to demand credible plans and transparent and meaningful reporting – something that the Administration has not yet provided in a single critical area.
It is not reasonable to demand instant progress or focus solely on the level of US troops in Iraq or casualties in the fighting. It should also be clear from the above list that US military tactical victories are almost certain to be meaningless if the US political system cannot adapt to the reality that broad success – albeit with what may be much lower US troop levels – will require an effort that extends at least several years in to the next Administration and which cannot take place without bipartisan support. The odds are bad enough given the problems in Iraq; they are hopeless if the political environment in the US offers no hope of the necessary time and bipartisanship.
We civilians don't know how much in-house disagreement there is within our defense forces over Iraq and war in general against insurgents and militants. I think it is a well kept secret. The general Public sense of it is one of assumed unanamity. Yet on the other hand, if Americans spend 15 billion a year on cosmetic procedures and potions: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19445564...wsweek/page/2/
perhaps the appearance of progress and everyone being on the same page is all we need for the time being. I don't see these hearing addressing in any substantive way the issues and problems of in-house turf wars and bickering and philosophical differences and how this impacts our strategic well being and real-time, in-the-field progress in Iraq and Afghanistan. Heroic warriors can become handy scapegoats about as fast as you can say "botox" you know. My sense is that the COIN camp is somewhat in the minority and I sincerely hope that is not an understatement.
transcripts from the 27 Jun 07 hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: Iraq: Is the Escalation Working?
MG (R) John Batiste
Anthony Cordesman, CSISQuote:
Our national strategy for the global war on terror lacks strategic focus; our Army and Marine Corps are at a breaking point with little to show for it; the current “surge” in Iraq is too little, too late; the Government of Iraq is incapable of stepping up to their responsibilities; our nation has yet to mobilize to defeat a very serious threat which has little to do with Iraq; and it is past time to refocus our national strategy and begin the deliberate withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. Indeed, it is time to place America’s vital interests first. Our troops are mired in the complexity of a brutal civil war and we have lost sight of the broader objective of defeating world-wide Islamic extremism. The following testimony will address the current situation and recommend a way-ahead. Iraq and Afghanistan are the first two chapters in a very long book and we are off to a terrible start....
Frederick Kagan, AEIQuote:
...The present campaign in Iraq may be a tactical success, but there are serious serious issues regarding its strategic value. One key problem was raised during the debate over the surge strategy before President Bush adopted it and announced it in January 2007. It was always clear that an operation in Baghdad would simply lead many insurgents to leave the city and operate elsewhere and that most Sunni militias might simply stand down, let the US-led forces defeat the insurgents, watch a Shi’ite dominated government gain power, and resurface once the US was gone. Baghdad was important. It never made sense to see it as a decisive battlefield or center of gravity.
This is now all too clear even in a narrow military sense. The US is having to expand its counterinsurgency operations broadly outside Baghdad in ways that can steadily disperse limited US and combat-capable Iraqi military forces. Baghdad is still only 30-40% secured, but the fighting not only is dispersing limited US forces into the Baghdad ring cities, but into a troubled zone of provinces ranging from Anbar to Diyala. The US has learned it cannot ignore growing Shi’ite tensions and Iranian pressure in the south, and still faces serious potential problems with Arab-Kurdish tensions in the north....
Quote:
...To say that the current plan has failed is simply incorrect. It might fail, of course, as any military/political plan might fail. Indications on the military side strongly suggest that success—in the form of dramatically reduced violence by the end of this year—is quite likely. Indications on the political side are more mixed, but are also less meaningful at this early stage before security has been established....
Even though I disagree with him, I thought Fred did an outstanding job defending his position before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs yesterday. His prepared statement may be on the American Enterprise Institute's home page. I can't confirm that because I'm currently at work and the U.S. Army, in its infinite wisdom, blocks access to the AEI site (long story--this is one instance where my personal life strategy, which I call the "power of positive whining"--has not paid off).
Military Review, Jul-Aug 07: The Surge Can Succeed
Quote:
....Protecting the population in Baghdad neighborhoods
is a top priority, and it can be achieved by increasing security forces in the city’s neighborhoods and conducting aggressive patrols from joint security stations and combat outposts. Deployed en masse in Baghdad, the combined combat power of U.S. and Iraqi security forces can limit the enemy’s influence and, by so doing, set the necessary security conditions for political reconciliation and economic progress. Plans with these elements have already worked in Mosul, Samarra, and Ramadi. If we can do the same in the capital, the heart and soul of Iraq, we could significantly weaken the insurgency and set the stage for an Iraqi recovery.