More thoughts on Post Bin Laden AQ
Here are some of my thoughts on a post Bin Laden AQ based on the poll I put together in this original post.
“Other AQ member in AF/Pak becomes new leader of AQ Central” ended up being my selection. This was a tough decision but here was my logic in relation to the other choices.
1. Zawahiri is 'no fun'
Zawahiri might make a good “#2”, but I’m not sure other AQ members, the Taliban or the Haqqani network will let him ascend. I’m uncertain why exactly. However, I get the feeling that Zawahiri is always trying to outshine Bin Laden, lacks Bin Laden's charisma, and finds it hard to make friends amongst other AQ members. Zawahiri is also from the North African (EIJ) strain of AQ. Despite his legacy with the group, I think AQ Central will turn to someone from the Gulf or Central/South Asia to take the reins. Zawahiri may be talented from a terrorist sense but he has a 1990’s Al Gore feel to him and thus I believe will never rise above #2. This poses another question, if Zawahiri were not to assume the top job post-Bin Laden, would this fracture AQ’s base of North African support? Would there be damaged relations between AQIM and AQ Central? Would love to hear opinions in this!
2. Haqqani protection won't extend forever to Zawahiri
My guess is the Haqqani network will not provide protection for a Zawahiri-led AQ post-Bin Laden. While the Pashtunwali code for protecting guests has served Bin Laden well, I suspect that his death will bring the end of what has been an amazing level of Haqqani support. I also estimate that the Haqqani’s would not like to see Zawahiri emerge as the new leader of AQ Central, instead preferring someone with local interests (AF/PAK) of equal or greater priority than global jihad. Will the Haqqani’s support an AQ led by Zawahiri? Would love to hear opinions on this!
3. New AQ leader needs to be AF/PAK capable
To maintain safe haven in Pakistan, AQ Central must maintain Haqqani support, placate ISI members, retain AQ group initiative, and sustain global funding. To accomplish these four things, a current AQ member from AF/PAK other than Zawahiri will emerge to lead AQ Central. I do not believe Zawahiri will be able to do these four things post-Bin Laden. A Gulf Arab or South Asian AQ leader will have an easier time gaining local support, sustaining resource flows from donors and illicit networks, and cooperating with the ISI.
4. AQ Central shifts focus
Sustaining local support for AQ in AF/PAK will require AQ Central to focus on ‘near enemies’ as much as ‘far enemies’. Bin Laden’s death and the emergence of an AF/PAK centric AQ leader will bring renewed focus on central/south Asian insurgencies. AQ Central will not forget the need to attack the far enemy, but their base of popular support and wealth of recruits post-Bin Laden will come from countries in the larger AF/PAK region more than abroad.
What am I missing?
CWOT
Defining the enemy & focus
Hi Ray,
Nice to see that you have resumed posting - providing us with content shaped by your Indian Army career.
As to your comment:
Quote:
from Ray
Hence, maybe the focus of the WOT should not only focus on the AQ, but also on the various other factions that are operating and the synergy that they created in tandem with the AQ operating in the background.
you are in good company. Our domestic legal mandate to use armed force against AQ is flexible enough to cover associated groups - as well as nations and persons.
The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), passed by Congress and signed by President Bush, provides in most pertinent part:
Quote:
...That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.
Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
At times, our focus has strayed from the AUMF.
We also have some times overemphased aspects of the ideology involved (Islam), and other times have underemphased that ideology. One might also question whether we have overemphasized some AQ associates (or alleged AQ associates) at the cost of underemphasing other groups.
Regards
Mike
A timely judicial comment
Judge Silberman's brief comment in Esmail v Obama (see Another brick in the wall for the entire court's findings) reinforces the suggestions made above by Ray and me;
Quote:
SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring:
......
First, to note that the government at oral argument agreed that even if petitioner could show he resolutely declined to “join” al Qaeda or the Taliban, and thus could not be said to be a part of either, so long as evidence showed he fought along side of al Qaeda, the Taliban, or with associated forces he would be covered by the Authorization for Use of Military Force. District courts, in that sort of case, need not strain to find a petitioner is “a part of al Qaeda.” See Hatim v. Gates, --- F.3d ---, 2011 WL 553273, at *1 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 9 n.1 (D.C Cir. 2010); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871-72 (D.C. Cir. 2010). [1]
[1] Of course, “the purely independent conduct of a freelancer” – one who does not fight alongside of, or actively support, al Qaeda, the Taliban, or an associated force – “is not enough” to justify detention. Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
While this is "dicta" in this particular case, it does provide guidance for a plausible argument in a case where a loosely associated group is involved.
Regards
Mike
Crowdsourcing AQ's Strategy 2011-2012
I think the summer of 2011 through the end of 2012 will be the most important period for al Qaeda (AQ) and Western Counterterrorism (CT) efforts since 2002-2003.
I've been working on analysis for what AQ might do over the next year and been examining crowdsourcing as an alternative for anticipating terrorist group strategies. I've been a huge fan of Small Wars over the past few years since I started writing short articles here and I really appreciate the feedback and insights I get from readers. I'm trying to figure out a way to use these feedback systems to narrow down on key terrorism questions. If I am certain of anything, it's that I alone will not be able to anticipate all of AQ's actions correctly. So I ask for your help! I'd truly like to capture the perspective of those that read and visit Small Wars.
This week, I set up a crowdsourcing poll trying to answer the following question:
“What will be al Qaeda’s strategy from the summer of 2011 through the end of 2012?”
I set up a poll of 11 questions which I think will take less than 3 minutes to answer. If you can spare the time to vote, I would appreciate any and all insights.
Here is the link to the poll:
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/selectedwisdomAQstrategy
And if you think the poll is a worthwhile effort, please forward to any and all that might be interested. Crowdsourcing takes a crowd, so all are welcome.
I'll hopefully start publishing the results in about ten days when I aggregate the data. And I'll make sure to post the results here as well. Goal is everyone gets the collective insights from the collective efforts of voters. Thanks in advance to those that take the time to vote and please let me know here if you think I can improve the survey/process in any way.
BTW, nothing in it for me. No money, hidden agenda, etc. My wife calls my poll the "Household Chore Avoidance Project", which is probably true and thus worth the effort.
Thanks.
CWOT
Thanks for the feedback in this thread
Folks, thanks for the feedback on this initial thread.
I've used it to help set up a crowdsourcing experiment on AQ's future strategy and just started a new thread on that concept in this folder called.
"Crowdsourcing AQ's Strategy 2011-2012"
Would like to get your feedback and thanks in advance for any and all thoughts.
Vote: What will terrorism be post Bin Laden?
All,
Thanks for your support on recent discussions with regards to Bin Laden.
In light of today's events, I'm returning to the questions. I asked here back in January.
What will be the consequences of Usama Bin Laden's death?
I've launched an automated survey and would very much enjoy any and all opinions. Here is the link to the survey:
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/aqafterbinladen
Thanks in advance for any and all responses and I will make sure to cross post the polling results here in about a week.
RLTW,
Clint
Here's a preview of the first question on the poll:
Quote:
Overall theme of the poll:
If Usama Bin Laden were killed in 2011, would it matter to the global jihadi movement?
Question #1:
What will be the chief consequence of Usama Bin Laden’s death to the global jihadi movement? (Only pick One!)
-Status Quo- No substantial change in AQ activity
-AQ Central directed plots against U.S. and its Allies decrease substantially
-AQAP becomes new AQ Central
-Some other AQ member in AF/PAK becomes leader of AQ Central
-AQ Central loses its chief sponsor, the Haqqani network
-AQ fundraising increases substantially
-AQ fundraising diminishes substantially
-Taliban more reluctant to make peace with Karzai
-AQ-inspired recruitment slows substantially
-AQ-inspired recruitment accelerates substantially
-AQ Central directed plots against U.S. and its Allies increase substantially
-Taliban pursue a peace settlement with Karzai
-AQ Central shifts focus to pursue guerilla warfare in Central Asia
Here's more background on the first version of this poll.
Does Bin Laden Matter?
By Clint Watts on January 2, 2011