Is there a proverb that says "He who looks for a three block war will find one?"
If there is not there should be. Seems to me that the object should be to get the Politicians educated so that they do not have to commit armed forces to three block wars because sensible diplomacy and aid applied by well educated and trained civilian specialists in their fields obviate the need for or desirability of a war. War brings in folks who are specialists in their field and that field is the conversion of urban blocks to rural terrain...
That said, Coined's suggestions are, as I meant to say in my first post on this thread, nothing new. As others here have pointed out, even the evil old US has adopted all those techniques. Re adopted, actually -- we used them all before and just let them fall away. Way of the world...
Been my observation that Cops do not fight fires well. Also noted that firefighters do not do police chores well. Soldiers can of course do both jobs and have done so for years -- they just don't do either very well. My bet is that will not change. Diplomacy, successfully applied has halted a need for troops many times -- that seems a better alternative than any kind of war. Or any commitment of military force that can be avoided -- such commitments have a way of escalating things.
Spend too much time training a person to be nice and you will succeed, spend too much training him to be destructive and you will succeed. It is possible to achieve a balance and we should strive for that but we should never forget that any compromise brings shortfalls in some areas. Military forces can, if necessary, do a marginal job in stability operations; they will never do a good job, it simply is not their field. Nor should it be.
I know their is a proverb about horses for courses... :wry:
Be glad to provide a contructive comment...
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Originally Posted by
Coined
Let us go back to rethink the way we can train ourselves and our troops better than we do now.
No one is disagreeing with that. What we're awaiting is your providing some fresh thinking. Thus far, as Van said; "This reads like a "best practices" approach to Small Wars (COIN, low intensity conflict, SASO, pick your buzzword). You are trying to assemble the concepts that have worked in Latin America in the 1930s, Malaysia in the 1950s, Viet Nam in the 1960s-70s, the hords of Middle Eastern expats that are employed by the U.S. Army National Training Centers right now, etc? If so, you've put together a good framework.". To cap that, you even provide a link to the US army Combined Arms Center for backup of your position even though you offered several criticisms of US practices.
You did make this valid statement:
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"For the last part. The only thing I like to stress is that we have to get a broader view at conflicts, the "hardware" aproach is just a (minor) part of conflicts."
I can't speak for others but I do not question that. My guess is that most here would agree. Thus my comment above; ""Seems to me that the object should be to get the Politicians educated so that they do not have to commit armed forces to three block wars because sensible diplomacy and aid applied by well educated and trained civilian specialists in their fields obviate the need for or desirability of a war. War brings in folks who are specialists in their field and that field is the conversion of urban blocks to rural terrain...""
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And dear Ken and William, I would appreciate it that you do not to lift words out of a sentence to react on.
The whole is more than the sum of its parts.
I would be happy to comment on anything new that is the sum of any parts. Thus far, you have provided nothing new that I have seen and no sum.
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Ready for some constructive and additional coments. :)
I though I had supplied some constructive comment which apparently you missed. Let me sum up my comments:
You so far as I can tell offer nothing new or innovative, instead say we need to incorporate best practices identified by many over the years -- and which are already being applied. No one has disagreed with that, many merely pointed out that is being done.
You propose to retrain military forces for a stabilization role. My experience and observation over a good many years and involving troops from many nations tells me this is an acceptable plan if there is no alternative; if there is any way to preclude such a military commitment, it should be pursued because military forces NEVER do a good job at stability operations; there are better ways.
My view is that the problems cited in that last statement will not change regardless of training UNLESS you completely move the force away from combat operations; I doubt this is a good idea.
Stabilization of problematic nations will without be required. Identification and evaluation of such a problem should be followed by rapid and adequate application of civilian efforts to preclude the necessity of a military deployment.
Two comments to add to all that; rapid and timely civilian intervention has been precluded and deterred by several factors. It worked for Colonies; it works less well in a post-colonial world where sensitivities to 'help' are a major problem that does not change the fact that civil is better and a military effort can create as many problems as it solves. Secondly, Europeans live in smaller, more homogeneous nations with strong central governments and have a colonial history and thus are more adept at providing such aid than are Americans. We know that and we accept it. We cannot for several reasons adopt European practices in totality. Size and breadth of necessary view being but two.
That's my summation, If I'm wrong in my assessment of your proposals, please tell me precisely what is wrong and I'll adjust.
I've attempted to follow this thread ...
for the past two days. I have a question:
Are the OP and additions thereto intended to provide any guidance to civilians who are interested in the non-military aspects of stability operations (nation building) ?
If so, the OP etc. have failed to reach this member of that audience. I have no idea of exactly what is being proposed or why.
Since the proposals are unclear to me, I cannot assess whether they are aimed at force structures, training, intra-agency co-ordination, inter-agency co-ordination, or something else.
Where does the OP etc. fit into something like James Dobbins' construct in The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building (p.27):
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Setting Priorities
The prime objective of any nation-building operation is to make violent societies peaceful, not to make poor ones prosperous, or authoritarian ones democratic. Economic development and political reform are important instruments for effecting this transformation, but will not themselves ensure it. Rather, such efforts need to be pursued within a broader framework, the aim of which is to redirect the competition for wealth and power, which takes place within any society, from violent into peaceful channels.
The first-order priorities for any nation-building mission are public security and humanitarian assistance. If the most basic human needs for safety, food, and shelter are not being met, any money spent on political or economic development is likely to be wasted. Accordingly, this guidebook is organized around a proposed hierarchy of nationbuilding tasks, which may be prioritized as follows:
Security: peacekeeping, law enforcement, rule of law, and security sector reform
Humanitarian relief: return of refugees and response to potential epidemics, hunger, and lack of shelter
Governance: resuming public services and restoring public administration
Economic stabilization: establishing a stable currency and providing a legal and regulatory framework in which local and international commerce can resume
Democratization: building political parties, free press, civil society, and a legal and constitutional framework for elections
Development: fostering economic growth, poverty reduction, and infrastructure improvements.
This is not to suggest that the above activities should necessarily be initiated sequentially. If adequate funding is available, they can and should proceed in tandem. But if higher-order priorities are not adequately resourced, investment in lower-order ones is likely to be wasted.
Feel free to treat me as a three-year old in response - consise and definite statements are helpful to us infants.
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PS: Ken, you mean for 34 years I've been saddled with the boxed set of Bob Asprey's Shadows, when I could've been using an abridged edition ? And referring to that work, is it true that you introduced the gladius to the Legions in one of your training sessions ? :D