The Consequences of Abuse (real or perceived)
No doubt:
Quote:
from Dayuhan
I realize that in your hypothetical situation you would not condone or tolerate abuse of the populace. My point was that given the realities of most places with active insurgencies you would probably have to deal with the legacy of events that happened before you arrived… and that trust once broken is difficult to restore.
where the "legacy of events" shortly or long past (consider No. Ireland) determine the present; and that lack of trust (lack of "legitimacy") (lack of "good governance"), for whatever reason(s) and attribution or not of particular fault, underlie discontent growing into the level of violence that becomes unacceptable.
So what ? You still have to find an acceptable way to deal with the problem(s).
I suppose that one possible way would be to always walk away from the problem(s) - "Walk away, Dryden. Walk away. Always walking away, aren't you?" ;)
So, what are your positive suggestions ?
Regards
Mike
Makes no fun being an eternal pessimist ...
and makes no sense being an eternal optimist. ;)[*]
Buying in part, not buying in part, as to this:
Quote:
from Dayuhan
Ok, assuming your populace is armed and intends to remain armed, the real question is whether or not those arms pose an immediate threat to you and to your plans. [1] If they do, my best suggestion would be to walk away or change sides. [2] If not, I say agree to ignore. Let it be known quietly that as long as personal arms aren't used against you or in criminal activity, you're not interested.
[rationale for 2] Registration creates the impression of an intrusive presence that wants to hold the option of confiscation, and is likely to add to distrust and suspicion. It doesn't even gain much: the guns will still be out there, and the chances are the vast majority will never be registered, turning ordinary citizens into at least rule-breakers, if not outright criminals. I just don't see how it gets you anywhere.
Taking point [1], if an armed force poses an immediate threat to me and if I have the means to overcome that armed force, my morals and ethics (as well as law) suggests that, all else being equal, shoot center mass - and there will no longer be an immediate threat. There may be reasons (besides my inferiority in opposing force) to withdraw in the face of an immediate hostile armed force, but I better have worked that out before the immediate threat develops.
From how you describe the community, it will remain neutral so long as its semi-autonomy is respected. OK with me; so long as the neutrality is genuine and I am not dealing with a Laos-Cambodia situation on my flanks (which is somewhat akin to what Jon Custis described with his villagers).
So, situation [1] (an immediate hostile armed force) is not likely to come from your community, but from either the insurgents or criminals.
I can't argue with your [rationale for 2] cuz I believe pretty much the same thing. Someone else will have to dispute that point. BTW: Knowing who has what firearms and/or munitions does not have to involve a formal, overt process.
Now how would you go about getting information about the firearms and/or munitions held by the insurgents and criminals, who are very likely to be an immediate hostile armed force against me (and possibly against the otherwise neutral community) ?
Regards
Mike
-----------------------
[*]
If you're not a commie at age 20,
you have no heart.
If you're still a commie at age 30,
you have no brain.
No original scenario ....
survives the first round, even if it's a blank. ;)
What has been added is a large population, armed but nominally neutral unless its ox is gored by someone. They seem not to be sheep. If they present a problem, it would seem to be a political problem; that is, they don't want the central government there.
The insurgents and criminals would be fringe elements, presenting a military or paramilitary problem only to whoever has to deal with them.
What are the reasons for the central government to be so interested in this area - so that it has to deal with insurgents, criminals and concerns about firearms and munitions ?
What reasons (if any) are there for the central government and the local population to cooperate on issues - if so what are the co-operative areas (what are the win-wins) ?
I'm a lousy fiction writer.
Cheers
Mike
Hey Steve, hijacking allowed ...
cuz I ain't Isaac Asimov. I do better on analysing a given data set, present or historical.
Quote:
from you
Quote:
JMM: What are the reasons for the central government to be so interested in this area - so that it has to deal with insurgents, criminals and concerns about firearms and munitions ?
JMM: What reasons (if any) are there for the central government and the local population to cooperate on issues - if so what are the co-operative areas (what are the win-wins) ?
If we're talking about my neighborhood, I could tell you
Obviously what I'm looking for are any useable "bridges" from the central government to your "Obstinentinians", but also what "dams" separate the central government from them.
As I see the scenario, your large, neutral unless gored, armed group is the political key to the area. The armed insurgents are not in the mobile warfare phase, but can bite. I'm also including some renegade criminal gangs (you might not have them; but they were in the SF author's OP scenario and could be expected in an area of unrest) that can bite. I'm positing that the insurgents and criminals are part of your population group; and that whatever problems they present will be finally resolved only if your population group is involved.
An historical example (which provides no cookbook answers; and your population might not like some of the recipes actually used), on a macro level, of a new national government (saddled with excess baggage from the past) having to deal with armed insurgents, armed criminals and armed semi-autonomists, was SVN ca. 1955. Briefly, over 100K of the Viet Minh military and political cadres had gone North (temporarily) as regroupees, leaving perhaps 10-15K cadres in the South. Diem's initial problems were the Saigon Mafia and two well-armed religiious sects near Saigon (Wiki):
Quote:
Diệm's position at the time was weak; Bảo Đại disliked Diệm and appointed him mainly to political imperatives. The French saw him as hostile and hoped that his rule would collapse. At the time, the French Expeditionary Corps was the most powerful military force in the south; Diệm's Vietnamese National Army was essentially organised and trained by the French. Its officers were installed by the French and the chief of staff General Nguyen Van Hinh was a French citizen; Hinh loathed Diệm and frequently disobeyed him.
Diệm also had to contend with two religious sects, the
Cao Dai and
Hoa Hao, who wielded private armies in the Mekong Delta, with the Cao Dai estimated to have 25,000 men.
The Vietminh was also estimated to have control over a third of the country.
The situation was worse in the capital, where the
Binh Xuyen organised crime syndicate boasted an army of 40,000 and controlled a vice empire of brothels, casinos, extortion rackets, and opium factories unparalleled in Asia. Bảo Đại had given the Binh Xuyen control of the national police for 1.25 m USD, creating a situation that the Americans likened to Chicago under Al Capone in the 1920s.
In effect, Diệm's control did not extend beyond his palace.
So, nothing new under the sun - the problem of firearms and munitions "control" (over groups not overtly "enemies") has been, is and will be with us in "small wars" in many guises.
Two other adds to the scenario.
1. The local population has members in the police (how about the higher grades, "Os" and "NCOs"), but apparently not in the military. Reasons for that ?
2. What is the relationship between the local population elites and the national power elites ? E.g. (not saying it's this), semi-feudal, neo-colonialist, comprador bourgeoisie (as one type), or something different.
Feel free to ruminate.
Mike
the stars my defenestration
Quote:
It's becoming clear that Asimov's psychohistory reflects an undoubtable truth that all the world's different social networks interact in multiple ways to generate a single future. From people to corporations, cities to governments, all the pieces of society must mesh. What appears to be the madness of crowds must ultimately have a method, a method that science can discover.
From a brief article on Asimov's meshing of psychology and math in Foundation for those who have an interest.
Asimov's 'Foundation' theories on society move from fiction to academia - Jewish World Review, July 16, 2004.