Treading Softly in the Philippines
Max Boot and Richard Bennet discuss why a low-intensity counterinsurgency strategy seems to be working in the Philippines at The Weekly Standard.
Quote:
The war on terror that the Obama administration is inheriting comes with a decidedly mixed record. Stopping attacks on the American homeland since 2001 has been the Bush administration's biggest accomplishment. Turning around the war effort in Iraq, which was on the verge of failure in 2006, has been another signal success. But, as the Mumbai attacks remind us, the threat of Islamist terrorism has hardly been extinguished...
Almost forgotten amid these major developments is a tiny success story in Southeast Asia that may offer a more apt template than either Iraq or Afghanistan for fighting extremists in many corners of the world. The southern islands of the Philippines, inhabited by Muslims known as Moros (Spanish for "Moor"), have been in almost perpetual rebellion against the Christian majority ruling in Manila...
Quantifying Success in the Philippines Part 1
Part 1
I think we can agree that the limited press the JSOTF-P/AFP operations in the Southern Philippines has received has been largely positive. The strategy is working and there has been definable progress. I would like to offer some specific examples of how and why the operation was successful.
I recently graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School where I wrote a thesis that examined the recent US/GRP operations in the Southern Philippines, specifically Basilan and Sulu. The paper outlines the strategy that SOCPAC and the JSOTF-P developed to assist the AFP and improve their capacity to counter the ASG while addressing the conditions of relative deprivation on Sulu and improving the perceived legitimacy of the GRP. I also have the benefit of having served at the JSOTF-P during Operation Ultimatum in 2006-2007.
Laying the ground work:
Concerned by indications of a significant Al Qaeda presence in Mindanao and increased terrorist activity, PACOM and SOCPAC began working on a plan to improve the capacity of the GRP to address this internal challenge.
The first step in developing the strategy to combat terror in the Southern Philippines was to reestablish the US/RP mil to mil relationship that had been virtually severed in 1992. In February 1999, the Philippine government ratified the Visiting Forces Agreement which restored protections to U.S. military personnel deployed to the Philippines. This was the first step in renewed cooperation between the U.S. and GRP and was essential in paving the way to reestablishing U.S./RP military exchange training. The seven years of little US military exchange and aid had taken a toll on the AFP and degraded their capacity.
The next step was to coordinate the legal justification for U.S. assistance.
To reinforce and demonstrate U.S. respect for Philippine sovereignty, PACOM and SOCPAC planners worked with the GRP to develop the legal justification to support the presence and assistance of US forces. Fortunately, the U.S. and RP had previously signed a Mutual Defence Treaty (MDT). The U.S. is the only country with which the RP has a MDT. As planning progressed, this document became the framework on which the future strategy would be built. The importance of this document cannot be overstated. The MDT was the cornerstone document that supported U.S. military assistance to the Philippines, but there was a problem. The MDT was written to address outside threats and the Philippines was facing internal threats of insurgency and terrorism. Opponents to U.S. involvement within the GRP were adamant that U.S. involvement was not supported by the Philippine Constitution or the MDT. In response, PACOM representatives and the Arroyo administration drafted the Terms of Reference (TOR) for Balikatan 02 which outlined and clarified the extent of U.S. assistance. The TOR stated that the U.S. presence in the Southern Philippines would not exceed six months; U.S. forces would not participate in combat operations although they were authorized to defend themselves if attacked; all operations would be AFP-led; and U.S. personnel would always be accompanied by AFP personnel. This agreement was followed by the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement and Kapit Bisig which further reinforced the legal justification and extended the US presence.
During my thesis research, I interviewed Undersecretary Edilberto P. Adan, Executive Director for the Office of the President, Presidential Commission on the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFACOM), who told me that these documents have withstood close scrutiny and frequent challenges by members of the Philippine Congress. The establishment of the US Task Force and its continuing efforts depend on these agreements.
By 2000, with the kidnapping of several U.S. citizens by the ASG and an overall increase in attacks by terrorist and insurgent groups, President Arroyo approved a SOCPAC plan to address the threat. The plan included improving the counterinsurgency capacity of the AFP as well as establishing a counter-terrorism capability which included establishing the Light Reaction Companies (LRC) a counterterrorism force, A Naval Special Operations capability, Security Assistance funding and training for Army units in Mindanao and the establishment of a Joint Special Operations Group (JSOG) to coordinate the efforts of Philippine Counter Terrorism Forces. These forces played a significant role during Operation Ultimatum in targeting the ASG and have proven a highly capable force.
These initiatives pre-dated September 11, 2001 and the GWOT and set the conditions for the deployment of US forces to Basilan as part of JTF-510 and later the establishment of the JSOTF-P and operations on Sulu Island.
The Sulu Strategy:
The COIN model that was developed for Sulu expanded on the Basilan Model and included valuable lessons learned during the previous three years.
The strategy included four lines of operation:
• PSF Capacity Building: The JSOTF expanded assistance and advice to include not only the AFP, but also Philippine police and other security forces. The goal was to assist them in providing a secure environment for the Sulu residents.
• Targeted CMO: The JSOTF assisted the RP in conducting engineering, medical, dental, veterinarian projects as well as fund and facilitate major projects to improve local quality of life and demonstrate GRP concern for regional citizens.
• Intelligence Operations: Collected, fused, and disseminated timely and accurate intelligence to the right agencies.
• Information Operations (or influence ops): Emphasized the success of GRP efforts in the first 2 lines of operation to change perceptions about GRP legitimacy.
The desired end-state was that “the increased capacity of the PSF in combination with reduced local support to terrorists will deny the enemy sanctuary in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago as well as the use of vital Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCS).
I won’t go into a blow by blow on Operation Ultimatum here for fear of making this so long that no one will read it but I would like to cover some key indicators of the success of the Indirect Strategy on Sulu and Mindanao.
*Continued in next blog*
Quantifying Success in the Philippines Part 2
Part 2
Capacity Building: The JSOTF-P set out to improve the capacity of the AFP to conduct both kinetic and non-kinetic operations.
Preparing the AFP units on Sulu for Operation Ultimatum presented the JSOTF-P with some significant challenges. In late 2005, before the JSOTF-P had arrived on Sulu and Special Forces detachments had not begun exchange training with the AFP, the AFP launched Operation Shadow, an offensive on Sulu to destroy the ASG. The offensive involved artillery and aerial bombardment of areas on Sulu believed to be ASG safe havens and caused significant damage to property as well as the population’s approval of the government. The AFP operation also experienced significant logistical challenges and after just 12 days, unable to resupply combat units, the AFP returned to their bases and ended the offensive.
Once you compare that outcome with the performance of the AFP during Operation Ultimatum you begin to get a sense of just how much progress the JSOTF-P had made in increasing the capacity of the AFP to conduct combat operations. Op Ultimatum lasted 8 months during which time the AFP remained largely in the field in pursuit of the ASG. On D-Day, of Op Ultimatum, the AFP conducted two simultaneous, nighttime, beach landing assaults and over land movement to 5 separate ASG targets, hitting them simultaneously. The AFP sustained themselves in the field while receiving some transportation support from the JSOTF-P. The JSOTF-P also assisted in the development of a partnership between MIG9 (the AFP intelligence unit organic to WESMINCOM) and the LRC which resulted in several highly successful raids.
The AFP also demonstrated dramatic improvements in conducting Joint Operations including air and maritime assets. Initially hesitant to employ OV-10s in conducting close air support, the JSOTF-P worked with pilots, improving their bombing accuracy. The improved accuracy of these strikes led the AFP ground forces, especially JSOG units, to employ these assets more frequently. The JSOTF-P also assisted the AFP in developing basic NVG capabilities which greatly enhanced the AFP's ability to conduct nighttime infil and Medevac operations.
The Bottom line is that the AFP was able to keep the ASG under tremendous pressure which in turn significantly disrupted their operations, movement and ability to conduct attacks on Sulu or in other parts of the Philippines.
Civil Military Operations:
As planning began for Op Ultimatum, the AFP was concerned with the MNLF on Sulu becoming involved in the fighting. The AFP had fought a major war against the MNLF in the 1970’s and tensions were still high. Through negotiations with MNLF leaders the AFP was able avoid a confrontation with the MNLF. This achievement is significant because it kept the thousands of MNLF members out of the fight and allowed the AFP to pursue the ASG. A similar agreement with the MILF in Mindanao called for the MILF Central Committee to denounce the ASG and JI as bandits and outlaws, clearing the way for the AFP to conduct operations in MNLF and MILF areas against ASG and JI targets. I would argue that the ongoing peace negotiations between the GRP and the MNLF and MILF contributed significantly to the success of these agreements to not interfere with AFP operations. The MNLF/MILF desire to resolve their claims for independence and continue to participate in the peace process forced them to become more moderate, or at least publicly. This meant that they had to distance themselves from more extreme members of their groups. While the MNLF likely still provided some support to the ASG/JI on Sulu during Op Ultimatum, they avoided any implication of major support which allowed AFP to more effectively pursue and target them. The situation with Commander Kato and Bravo is similar in that the MILF Central Committee publically distanced themselves from the “Rogue Commanders” which effectively split the MILF and allowed the AFP to target them.
After the successful operations on Basilan, the AFP, who in the past had sometimes employed a more heavy handed approach, embraced the effectiveness of the Indirect Approach. Although they admit in after action reports that they underfunded CMO initiatives during Op Ultimatum, they are working hard to correct this shortcoming. In September 2007, the AFP established the AFP National Development Support Command (NDSC). This command was established to centralize government, non-government, and military efforts to conduct civil-military operations. The establishment of the NDSC institutionalized the valuable lessons learned during the Basilan, Bohol, and Sulu. The NDSC is a unified command and has become the Philippine government proponent for CMO, development, and disaster response. The
NDSC also has operational control of all AFP engineer units as well as the authority to establish task forces to operate in support of regional unified commanders. This command will also coordinate the efforts of all Civil Affairs, SOT, and SALAAM teams in the specific region to maximize synchronization of effort. The NDSC mission “is to undertake development projects in support of national development programs to establish a physically and psychologically secure environment conducive to socio-economic growth.”
The success of the CMO approach had not gone unnoticed by the MILF
who had begun to conduct their own MEDCAPS and CMO projects in Central Mindanao.
The effectiveness of the JSOTF-P’s indirect strategy is illustrated by the quote from the Deputy Chairman of the MILF Committee on Information, Khaled Musa, who stated in an article posted on the Central Committee website April 2007, that the AFP/U.S. Indirect Approach
was “more lethal than brute force.”
*Continued in next blog*
Quantifying Success in the Philippines Part 3
Part 3
Information Operations:
SOCPAC and JSOTF planners developed a comprehensive IO strategy to
support the deployment of AFP and U.S. forces to Sulu. This phased strategy had been
effective in driving a wedge between the foreign fighters and the local population by
publicizing the manipulative and self serving nature of the foreign fighters by
highlighting the brutality they used on the populace. In the next phase, the information
strategy was able to separate the population from the insurgents by advertising the
improved socioeconomic conditions due to the improved security situation. It also
discredited the ASG by highlighting their brutal attacks on the population. The JSOTF
also developed excellent rapport with many RP journalists and gave them a direct line to
the JSOTF Commander and his staff. By doing this, the JSOTF staff encouraged
journalists to contact the JSOTF directly to get the Commander’s explanation of
developing situations. In this way, the AFP/JSOTF was able to get the correct story out
quickly and effectively. The JSOTF developed iron clad credibility by providing quick
responses to media inquiries and quantifiable proof to support the JSOTF position.
Media analysis conducted by the SOCPAC MOST team and Brand Labs
demonstrates a significant trend in Philippine media coverage of the Sulu operation. In
late 2005, when the U.S. first began deploying to Sulu, the media carried mostly negative
stories about the U.S. involvement. By August 2006, less than one year later, the number
of negative stories had dropped to a minority percentage. In April 2008, MOST
reported media coverage of Balikatan 2008 consisted of 306 articles of which the
majority (58 percent) were neutral and viewed as objective. Thirty percent were
assessed as negative and 11 percent were positive. This was a significant improvement
over the 2005 media coverage.
In September 2007, an ASG pamphlet was found on Sulu that illustrated that the IO themes were reaching the ASG leadership. The pamphlet bore the publishers mark of H.I. Media Bureau and had been prepared by Abu Hamid Al-Luzoni. Abu Hamid Al-Luzoni was otherwise known as Ahmed Santos, the leader of the Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement (RSIM), a group known to have assisted the ASG in conducting the Superferry bombing in 2005. In the pamphlet, titled in
English, “Frequently Asked Questions,” the ASG leadership defended their actions and
provided a counter-argument to the themes distributed by the AFP/JSOTF. The ASG
document asserts that their jihad was legitimate and they make a feeble attempt to support
this assertion with quotes from the Koran. In a series of questions and answers, the
ASG explained why it was necessary to kill fellow Muslims and civilians describing
them as not being true Muslims because they work with the enemy (Shaytan forces)
against the Mujahadeen. They also explained their rape of women as their right and choice under “Sabaya,” that was defined in the pamphlet as taking a woman as a concubine. The pamphlet goes on to explain why Al Harakatul (the original name for the ASG) conducts kidnap for ransom, will not accept peace negotiations, and does not do drugs. The pamphlet provides a thoroughly unconvincing argument and an excellent example of a product intended to counter a successful information campaign.
I hope that this information sheds some light on how and why the Indirect Approach strategy was and continues to be successful in the Southern Philippines. I think the important lesson to take away from this operation is that SOCPAC and the JSOTF-P did not apply a template from some previous campaign but instead recognized that the strategy had to be built around the context of the local conditions. Developed from in-depth assessments and analysis, the strategy was constantly reassessed and modified to address the specific conditions where effects were needed. Lines of Operations (The Joint Pubs definition) were applied and sequenced differently from area to area and from island to island. While the Indirect Strategies of Basilan and Sulu do not offer a template for other areas they do provide some significant lessons learned and a starting point for developing a successful counterinsurgency strategy in other conflict areas.
Major Jonathan Hastings
Student, CGSC
Soldiers killed in the Philippines
On 30 SEP 09, two US Service members were killed in the Philippines. This marks the first time in 7 years that a US Service member has been killed there.
What are everyone's thoughts on how this will change how the US operates in the Pacific Theater. In addition, don't forget that the Philippine Senate is attempting to get the VFA re-negotiated, while others are calling to remove US Soldiers from the country all together.
Unfortunately we lost two SF NCOs
DoD Identifies Army Casualties
Thu, 01 Oct 2009 20:11:00 -0500
IMMEDIATE RELEASE No. 763-09
October 01, 2009
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DoD Identifies Army Casualties
The Department of Defense announced today the death of two soldiers who were supporting Operation Enduring Freedom. They died Sept. 29 in Jolo Island, the Philippines, from the detonation of an improvised-explosive device. The soldiers were assigned to the 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group, Fort Lewis, Wash.
Killed were:
Sgt. 1st Class Christopher D. Shaw, 37, of Markham, Ill.
Staff Sgt. Jack M. Martin III, 26, of Bethany, Okla.
The incident is under investigation.
For more information media may contact the U.S. Army Special Operations Command public affairs office at (910) 432-6005; after hours (910) 689-6187, or visit http://news.soc.mil .
New group BNLA claims responsibility for killing US commandos in Jolo
New group BNLA claims responsibility for killing US commandos in Jolo
Sunday, 04 October 2009 0 0:00
By Al Jacinto, Reporter
ZAMBOANGA CITY: A previously unknown group has claimed responsibility for the roadside bombing that killed two US Special Forces soldiers and a Filipino Marine in Jolo on September 29 and alleged that American troops have been engaged in combat operations in the southern Philippines.
Madarang Sali, who identified himself as deputy supreme commander of the Bangsamoro National Liberation Army (BNLA), said the attack in Indanan town that claimed the lives of Sergeant 1st Class Christopher Shaw of Markham, Illinois, 37; and Staff Sergeant Jack Martin 3rd of Bethany, Oklahoma, 26, was in retaliation for what he said were continued operations by American and Filipino troops against the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in Sulu province.
Even before the attack, allegations have been raised of US involvement in combat operations in the country, a violation of both the Philippine Constitution and the Visiting Forces Agreement.
The MNLF signed a peace deal with the government in September 1996, but many of its members remain disgruntled with the accord and have accused the government of failing to uplift their living standards.
Shaw and Martin belonged to the 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group, the US Department of Defense said, contrary to earlier pronouncements by the Philippine military that the two were members of the Seabees, the US Navy’s construction battalion.
Sali said in a statement that MNLF and BNLA fighters planted the improvised explosive device that killed the three soldiers and wounded two more Philippine Marines.
“The BNLA and MNLF members planted the bomb. The US forces are really involved in the operations in Sulu. The landmine used in the attack was that of the BNLA,” Sali said, belying statements by Marine Maj. Gen. Benjamin Dolorfino, chief of the Western Mindanao Command, blaming the Abu Sayyaf for the attack and the subsequent bombing of bridges in Sulu.
Dolorfino earlier said government forces were tracking down 200 Abu Sayyaf fighters led by four senior commanders—Dr. Abu, Albader Parad, Isnilon Hapilon and Yasser Igasan—and two operatives of the Southeast Asian terror network Jemaah Islamiaah, Mauiya and Quayem.
“It is purely the operations of the BNLA and the MNLF, not the Abu Sayyaf or the Jemaah Islamiah,” Sali said.
The BNLA is led by Lt. Gen. Abdulnasser Iskandar, and the MNLF fighters are under the command of
Ustadz Habier Malik, Khaid Ajibun and Tahil Usman, Sali said.
Sali, who also described himself as the spokesman of the Bangsamoro Federated States of Sulu Archipelago, said fighting again broke out on Saturday afternoon in Bunot village in Indanan.
It was also in the town where Marines assaulted what authorities claim was the main Abu Sayyaf camp in
Sulu on Eid’l Fitr, which marks the end of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.
There has been talk that US Special Forces troops joined this operation, which the military said left 42 combatants dead.
Sali last week said the military offensive actually targeted the MNLF in Sulu. He said Ajibun escaped a military raid last week.
Sali said only 10 MNLF rebels had been killed in the fighting—seven under Malik and three under the command of Ajibun.
He warned of more attacks against the Americans if they continue participating in combat operations in Sulu. The US and the Philippine government maintain that no Americans are engaged in combat despite persistent reports from civilians and civil society groups.
“Fighting again erupted and they will suffer defeat. The Bangsamoro revolutionary forces have declared a jihad [holy war] against the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine government for the Bangsamoro homeland,” said Sali.
The clashes erupted after the rebels bombed a bridge in Bunot on Friday, the third time in two weeks they have attacked a bridge.
On Thursday, the rebels ambushed Marines in Panamao town, sparking a fierce firefight that left one soldier and three rebels dead. Nine soldiers were also wounded.
http://www.manilatimes.net/index.php...mandos-in-jolo
MNLF ally owns up to attack on US troops
MNLF ally owns up to attack on US troops
10/03/2009 | 07:10 PM
ZAMBOANGA CITY, Philippines – A group claiming to be allied with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) of Nur Misuari claimed responsibility on Saturday for a roadside bombing that killed two US Navy personnel and a Filipino marine in Jolo Island last Tuesday.
Madarang Sali, deputy commander of the Bangsamoro National Liberation Army, said the attack on the American soldiers was in retaliation for the continued operations of the US and Philippine military against the MNLF in the southern province of Sulu.
“The BNLA and MNLF members planted the bomb. The US forces are really involved in the operations in Sulu. The land mine used in the attack was that of the BNLA," Sali said in a statement.
The MNLF, chaired by former Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) governor Nur Misuari, has maintained its armed units despite its after the group signed a peace agreement with the Philippine government.
The MNLF signed a peace deal with Manila in September 1996, but many of its members were disgruntled with the accord and accused the government of failing to uplift their living standards.
Sali last week said the military offensive targeted the MNLF in Sulu. He said Ajibun escaped a military raid last week in the province.
Sali said fighting between rebels and government troops broke out again late Saturday afternoon in the village of Bunot in Indanan town.
“Fighting again erupted (in the village) and they will suffer defeat.The Bangsamoro revolutionary forces have declared a jihad (holy war) against the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine government for the Bangsamoro homeland," said Sali, who is also the spokesman for the Bangsamoro Federated States of Sulu Archipelago.
The clashes erupted after rebel forces bombed a bridge late Friday in the village of Bunot. It was the third time rebels bombed bridges in Sulu in a span of two weeks.
Maj. Gen. Benjamin Dolorfino, chief of the military’s Western Mindanao Command, blamed the Abu Sayyaf for the bombing of the bridges and the attack on the US forces.
Dolorfino said troops were tracking down at least four most senior Abu Sayyaf leaders – Dr Abu, Albader Parad, Isnilon Hapilon and Yasser Igasan – including two foreign Jemaah Islamiya terrorists Mauiya and Quayem and some 200 followers.
But Sali said Dolorfino was just engaging in propaganda. “It is purely the operations of the BNLA and the MNLF, not the Abu Sayyaf or the Jemaah Islamiya," he said.
He said the BNLA is headed by Lieutenant General Abdulnasser Iskandar, while the MNLF are under the command of Ustadz Habier Malik, Khaid Ajibun and Tahil Usman.
The killing of the two US Special Forces soldiers further bolstered suspicions that American troops are often engaged in counterterrorism operations in Sulu, where 42 militants and soldiers were killed in recent clashes in Indanan town.
The Philippine military previously blamed the extremist Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah for the attack on the US soldiers. It said those killed in the roadside bombing were non-combatants, but members of the US Navy Seabees who were involved in humanitarian missions in Sulu.
US Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney earlier said the soldiers “lost their lives serving others and we will always be grateful for their contributions to improve the quality of life on Jolo."
The military did not immediately respond to Sali’s claim.
Sali said only 10 MNLF rebels were killed in the fighting – seven under Malik and three more under the command of Ajibun. He warned of more attacks against US troops if they continue participating in combat operations in Sulu.
US troops have been are deployed in Sulu since 2006 and assisting the Philippine military in defeating the Abu Sayyaf. Although security officials deny US forces were directly involved in combat operations, there were numerous reports from civilians and various civil groups that American soldiers actually participated in the operations aimed at capturing or killing militant leaders in Sulu and other parts of Mindanao.
On Thursday, Moro rebels ambushed Marines in Sulu’s Panamao town, sparking a fierce firefight that left one soldier and three gunmen dead. Nine soldiers were also wounded in the clashes. - Geonarri Solmerano, GMANews.TV
http://www.gmanews.tv/story/173747/m...k-on-us-troops