Brief overview of Jedburg's link to KYBER - Voice of Pashtuns, June 2009
I have "read over" Jedburg's recent posting of the link to KHYBER, THE VOICES OF PASHTUNS, JUNE, 2009.
Summary comments: Exact same cast of names and personalties who have been among the frequent posters on GLOBAL HUJRA ONLINE a subdivision of KHYBER WATCH.
My abbreviated partial reviews now are critical in nature, there are some good points made by some of these writers:
1. M. Bilal Khan Yousafazai, article "Code of Pashtunwali", key point in his opening remarks is that this is an unwritten law and ideology, i.e., custom and practice open to widely differing interpretations. Conservative, oligarical...it in his view has developed into an "accepted constitution." It is under this unwritten constitution that Osama bin Laden is given protection under the guise of hospitality by those Pashtuns who are members of the Taliban. The Jirga system evolves from this "constitution" also. Jirgas are an old practice or custom, my remark (George)...the late King of Afghanistan in 2001-2002 returned briefly to Afghanistan to convene a Grand Jirga of the tribes of Afghanistan, most of whom are ethnic Pakhtuns numerically, to help the Allies restart a new government under Karzai.
2. Dr. Nbi Misdaq, who currently works for the US Department of State, Foreign Language Institute in Arlington, VA, leads off the listed articles advocating in a softly worded fashion an attempt to sell the secession of Pakhtuns from both Pakistan and Afghanistan to create a new nation-state of Pakhtuwana.
3. Mohammad Naeem, who is a young Canadian graduate student (told to me to be working on a Masters in Canada, but could as easily be a doctoral student there) is a regular posters on GLOBAL HUJRA ONLINE and has on occasion been verbally violent on line, cursing, etc., which that website has consistently overlooked at allowed (HUJRA). Here again is an activist damning the government of Pakistan, no matter who or which party is in power, and adocating secession.
4. Jahznzel & Fatima Ahmed (she is a Masters degree student in Canada, where both reside) offer some more of the same general remarks.
5. Samin Jan Kekah, one of the Islamic religiously focused Pahtun writers on this new site, talks about the Islamic angel Shaytaan as being the biggest scholar and most educated among the angels, among the chose of God, sort of describing this angel as the, my wording, "Patron Saint" of Pashtun separatism and secession to be a new stand alone ethnically based (racial) nation created out of Pakistan and Afghanistan. This writer is from Quetta and is a university student at Balochistan University.
It needs to be understood that some of the Paskthun folks I am commenting on here represent a reverse racial superiority point of view, and have repeatedly told me in open forum of their disdain for "lesser" tribes and elites. Those who profess Islam are Sunnis, not Shiites, and they are not entirely friendly to Shiites as a matter of fact.
You find mixed messages and differeing opinions among these and other writers on the new and existing sites. This site, to me, is an attemt to create a direct forum with the world which supercedes their existing sites but builds on it and is in tandum with it.
You find here and there in these various writings mentioning of the Durand Line, the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This is a major object and purpose of their writing, to eventually undo the 100+ year old border separating Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Finally, the article about IDP (Internally displaced persons) by a free lance Pashtun journalist does provide some helpful statistical tables of where and how many IDPs are accommodated during the fighting.
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Quraysh Khattak is a Pashtun Journalist who worked with many prestigious newspapers including The News. He is a freelance writer and works as a Program Manager in an Islamabad-based NGO. He writes in part:
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Peshawar, Charsadda and Swabi.
The Ministry of Community Development (former Social Welfare Department) has conducted off camp registration in various areas. According to their record 77516 families of 462528 persons was living in rented houses or with their relatives in 11 districts of the province. But after the peace deal most of the IDPs went back to their home towns.
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Quraysh Khattak is a Pashtun Journalist who worked with many prestigious newspapers including The News. He is a freelance writer and works as a Program Manager in an Islamabad-based NGO.
IDP’s updates on 8-5-2009
Aryana Insitute for Regional Research and Advocacy (AIRRA)
The ongoing militancy in Swat and the operation against the militants in the area has resulted in insurmountable hardships for a huge population of the area. The Islamic militants have imposed their own version of Islamic rules and regulations. They have occupied the houses, property and other places of the common public. The Army has come to rescue situation. But after the lapse of two long years, one of the strongest military in the Muslim world has yet to show the results. Frustration and disappointments compelled the population of the area to move to safer places in other parts of NWFP.
The controversial peace deal gave an opportunity to the militants to reorganize and regroup. They expanded their influence to District Buner,Shangla, Dir upper and Dir lower. They openly challenged the writ of the government and started militant activities in the areas. The liberals and opinion makers of the society welcomed the recent counter insurgency stance of the government, albeit with a caution. The people of the conflict zones are of the opinion that the supply lines, network and command and control structure of militants would need a ground assault on the part of the military but till now gun ship helicopters and jet aircrafts are used to target the militant hideouts.
The newly launched military operation resulted in huge migration of masses to down districts of the province and other parts of the country. Displacement of almost one million has taken place till now. Majority of the people have shifted to district Mardan, Nowshera, Peshawar, Charsadda and Swabi.
The Ministry of Community Development (former Social Welfare Department) has conducted off camp registration in various areas. According to their record 77516 families of 462528 persons was living in rented houses or with their relatives in 11 districts of the province. But after the peace deal most of the IDPs went back to their home towns. *George note: This refers to the on again, off again jirga and Government of Pakistan attempts to negotiate a settlement with the Taliban which we know then blew up and failed.
Experience tells us on SWJ that any displacement of a few million folks will have tons of problems, as was the case with the earth quakes in the Kashmir zone of Pakistan a few years ago. People gripe, sometimes genuinely, but massive logistics and resettlement and support is a horrendous job never suitable fixed to everyone's satisfaction, witness our Katrina on going repairs and resettlements here in the US.
End of "George's opinions" of the Pakhtuns, several of whom have dialogued with me since Nov. 2006 when I was invited to be a Member of KHYBER WATCH, sub set being GLOBAL HUJRA ONLINE. I was separately invited to be a contributor, free will, up to me to contribute, on PAKHTUN WOMEN website, being told by the founder of that site that women in general were treated too rudely and hostilly on GLOBAL HUJRA ONLINE and thus set up their own blog site, separately. Such negative cultural norms toward females is a part of the unwritten Pukhwatawana "constitution."
Things to do first please
WMThomson,
Welcome to SWC.
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I am new to the SWJ forum but an avid reader. I am beginning the research for small writing project I have created for myself on Afghanistan and COIN ops I have found research easy except for information on Pashtun tribes, peoples and most importantly Pashtunwali any one have any suggestions?
There are some first steps:
1. Use the Advanced Search option: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=6813
2. A few lines of introduction always help others understand, with OPSEC and abonymity if req'd on 'Tell Us About You' thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...t=1441&page=51 . Now done (mins later: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...t=1441&page=51 Post 1018.
I know there are some maps of the tribes and links to the Pashtun honour code, for example for maps: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=6643 Post 7 and Pashtunwali: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=4165
There's a starter and hopefully helpful.
davidbfpo
Is McChrystal Going To Loose.
He will according to this Article from the new Military Review! he dose not have the right Strategy to win according to this article.
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Military...231_art004.pdf
Is there any merit to this article?
From Yadernye:
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I am curious to hear other opinions about the analysis of the Af/Pak insurgency published by Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason in the Nov/Dec edition of Military Review.
Johnson and Mason article
I'll leave aside the accuracy of their recollections of Vietnam. They point out the near-FUBAR state of the political effort in Astan. Their DRT concept seems a level too high. If Vietnam is any lesson, it is that security and political action must be solid at the village level. There are roughly 40,000 villages in Astan. That is the magnitude of the political action problem. No solution within our capabilities has been presented by anyone I've read.
Actually I take a different lesson from 'Nam
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Originally Posted by
jmm99
I'll leave aside the accuracy of their recollections of Vietnam. They point out the near-FUBAR state of the political effort in Astan. Their DRT concept seems a level too high. If Vietnam is any lesson, it is that security and political action must be solid at the village level. There are roughly 40,000 villages in Astan. That is the magnitude of the political action problem. No solution within our capabilities has been presented by anyone I've read.
The lesson I take is that when a couple of outside actors waging a much larger competition use the populace of some smaller state to wage their contest in a form of pawn warfare don't be so blinded by your own ends that you are oblivious to those of the populace involved.
We propped up a series of three different ass-hats in Nam because we didn't want the Soviets to go "+1" in the global pawn warfare game that defined much of the Cold War; while the Soviets backed the side seeking freedom from the widely hated scourge of Western Colonialism.
Today there are a large number of populaces across the Middle East also seeking to get out from under the remnants of Western Colonialism and the governments imposed by the West during the Cold War to assure "friendly" relations and the flow of oil...
Once again, I believe we have picked the wrong side, and that is a hard hand to play. This is why I strongly recommned that we co-opt the majority of the AQ message and ussurp them as the champions of the populaces of the Middle East in their quest for better governance. Such a move would sweep AQ's feet out from under them and bring the U.S. into line with our national principles.
But one'll never see this with their nose pressed against Afghanistan; or with their brain obsessed with rhetoric of the ideology AQ employs. Afghanistan is just one of many states in play, and ideologies are like socks, you need them, but you can change them too. Step back and the picture gets clearer.
Assessment of Pashtun insurgency
I am curious to hear other opinions about the analysis of the Af/Pak insurgency published by Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason in the Nov/Dec edition of Military Review:
The point they made that leaped out at me was this:
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Insurrections are hardly new phenomena in Afghanistan.10 Previous Afghan leaders have had varying degrees of success in subduing rural religious insurrection. The degree of that success depended on how much of the population viewed the regime as legitimate and how much it stayed out of the daily lives of the people. And Afghan history demonstrates conclusively that legitimacy of governance comes exclusively from two immutable sources: dynastic (monarchies and tribal patriarchies) and religious, or sometimes both.11 These equate to the traditional and religious sources cited by noted sociologist Max Weber.12
Unfortunately, the Karzai government owes its only claim to legitimacy to Weber’s third source, the legal one (e.g., western-style elections and the rule of law). This has no historical precedent as a basis for legitimizing Afghan rule at all, however, and the notion that the West can apply it to Afghan society like a coat of paint is simply wishful thinking. In essence, the Karzai government is illegitimate because it is elected.13
...This problem of illegitimacy is especially acute at the village level of rural Pashtun society, where dynastic and religious authority has been unquestioned for over a thousand years.14 The widespread perception among Afghans that the Karzai government is illegitimate—because it lacks any traditional or religious legitimacy—predates Karzai’s August disgrace by five years.
This explains a lot, in my opinion, and does not bode well. What I would like to know is how accurate his analysis is. Anthropology and sociology are not my specialties. Johnson is Director of the Program for Culture & Conflict Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School and did not pull this assessment out of thin air. There is a page on NPS linking to a long line of his publications that show the evolution of his analysis of the Pashtun insurgency, which is the most sophisticated that I have yet seen. I specifically recommend "No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan - Afghanistan Frontier" and "The Taliban Insurgency and an Analysis of Shabnamah (Night Letters)."
Cheers,
Yadernye
Military Review article has been touched upon
Yadernye,
The Military Review article appeared a few days ago on the current thread on the Afghan campaign: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...t=7128&page=27 With comments at Posts 530-540.
It was a short discussion, have a peek. If there is a lot you want to contribute you can go to that thread; if the discussion "takes off" a new thread can be created to keep the focus on the article's view of the Pashtun insurgency. Updated: earlier posts on other thread copied here.
Welcome aboard.
Mike, another perspective on "legitimacy" and "control"
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Originally Posted by
MikeF
Yaderyne,
Welcome Aboard, and thanks for the link. I enjoyed the article. Here's my take based off my current thoughts on small wars.
1. Similarities of differing insurgencies. The description provided by the authors was the strongest point of the article. The simple answer that they did not highlight was that both groups were conducting a version of Mao's Protracted War. IMO, it's THE playbook for a people's rebellion, social movement, or gang warfare. In each case, you take Mao broadly and apply it for METT-TC (Mission, Enemy, Time, Troops, Terrain, Civilians) in a given situation.
2. The Sine Qua Non of Counterinsurgency: Legitimacy. I disagree with this assertion, and IMO, it is something that we get fundamentally wrong when trying to understand small wars. Instead, the sine qua non of small wars is control. Legitimacy is merely a subset. For instance, does a farmer out in the boondocks care if Karzai is legitimate? No. He cares about his farm and his family. In terms of control, he wants to know who to go to IOT get fair settlements when he has disagreements with his neighbor.
Mike
I think it is probably more useful to consider any and all governments as "legitimate." I realize that flies in the face of traditional logic, but traditional logic also creates tremendous obstacles to effectively dealing with governments who's legitimacy WE disapprove of; and also causes us to overlook problems with the nature of the legitimacy of a government that WE do approve of. Bottom line on legitimacy is that what is important is that the populace served by any particular government recognizes its source of legitimacy.
The U.S. gets into a lot of trouble in meddling efforts to manipulate who gets into, gets removed from, or sustain in government over the populaces of others. We value OUR approval of such governments over how well the populaces of those same states approve. This is what, in my opinion, causes a manipulating outside state to become the target of a nationalist insurgency movement when the people act out to attempt to get a government whose legitimacy they recognize.
So, we ask the wrong question. We ask: "Is this government legitimate by our standards." What we should ask is "Does the relevant populace recognize the legitimacy of this government."
Next, "Control." The majority position that comes up over and over is that a measure of effective governance is its ability to control the populace. This is a slippery slope. Most people don't want to be "controlled," so much as they want the government to control the things that enable them to pursue their lives in relative peace and security. A fine nuance, but the government needs to exert reasonable (as defined by the populace) control over the environment the populace lives within, not over the populace themselves.