China and South Asia- An Indian Perspective
The evolution of China’s South Asia policy needs to be studied not in a vacuum, but in relation to that country’s overall foreign policy framework; the main determinant of Beijing’s external approach has always been its domestic priorities in different periods. In fact, the domestic and foreign policy linkages have continued to be a part of the statecraft of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) ever since Chairman Mao Zedong proclaimed founding of the nation in October 1949, saying that ‘China has stood up’. ...
a recalibration of Beijing’s attitude towards the region has been gradually taking place in pursuance of that pre-requisite and its outcome has been a “Balanced South Asia Policy of the PRC Under a New Situation”, providing for China’s development of relations with South Asian nations.....
The Chinese claims that the PRC’s South Asia policy has become balanced is open to dispute. The recalibrations noticed have only been symbolic, lacking in substance as there has been no fundamental change in China’s policy of treating Pakistan as an ally, in order to neutralize the impact on the region coming from India’s ascendancy. There has been no let up in Beijing’s arms supply to Islamabad, despite the knowledge that Pakistan cannot guarantee the non-use of Chinese arms against India. Also, China could increase its strategic presence in other countries in India’s neighborhood in the background of its increased economic aid to the latter, a development not missed by New Delhi. .....
In specific terms, Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan and South China Sea Islands stand listed under the ‘core interest’ category. Chinese media have included strategic resources and trade routes in the list. As a result, China has come to adopt an uncompromising position on issues concerning the country’s sovereignty. Pointers include China’s growing naval activism in the South and East China seas, consistent hard line stand on the Sino-Indian border and the Dalai Lama issues, resistance to Yuan revaluation demand, action on Google, the stiff anti-US positions on issues like Tibet, Taiwan and climate change and efforts to expand influence abroad through the use of military and nuclear assistance. .....
Worrisome to India is the latest situation regarding China’s position on Kashmir. China is taking up road and railway projects designed to link Pakistan and China via Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) where Chinese troops are reportedly deployed ostensibly for construction work. As noted analyst Mr B. Raman puts it, the reported infrastructure projects undertaken by the Chinese military and nuclear establishments in Pakistan Occupied Gilgit-Baltistan region, may become strategically important to the Chinese army in the event of another conflict with India; in particular, the Karakorum Highway could be useful for China as an overland route for moving missiles and spare parts to Pakistan. Also, there appears to be a deeper meaning to the issuing of stapled visas by Beijing to Kashmiri Indians, indicating that China is shedding its traditional neutrality on the Kashmir issue. Quoting Mr B. Raman again, this new nuanced position on Kashmir could mean a dilution of China’s past stand of accepting Kashmir as a de-facto part of India, while at the same time treating POK including Gilgit-Baltistan region as de-facto and de-jure parts of Pakistan. Is China’s stand a quid pro quo for Pakistan’s help to Beijing in fighting against Uighur separatism in Xinjiang? Is Beijing developing future options for questioning India’s locus standi to negotiate with China on the territory in Ladakh ceded by Pakistan to the PRC? The remarks of Indian Prime Minister that China “could use India’s ‘soft underbelly’ of Kashmir to keep India in low level equilibrium”, demonstrate how serious these questions are. .
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