Iran's Historic and Present Ties with Lebanon, Hezbollah
From the Vital Perspective Blog - Background Briefing: Iran's Historic and Present Ties with Lebanon, Hezbollah.
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The origins of Iranian involvement in Lebanon:
Iran first became involved militarily in Lebanon when a 2500-strong Iranian expeditionary force drawn from the Revolutionary Guard land army was sent to Syria in 1982 to assist in confronting Israel during the Peace in Galilee campaign.
Although the Syrians prevented actual Iranian participation in fighting, with many of the troops being returned to Iran, the remainder (1000-1500 men) stayed on to camp in the Bekaa Valley in the midst of the Shiite population. The force established a permanent military and logistic infrastructure at Camp Sheikh Abdallah in Baalbek, (which it had captured from the Lebanese Army) and at the Zabadani Camp in Syria, northeast of Damascus. In addition, command posts, field intelligence and operations units were established at Baalbek, Beirut, Zahleh and Mashgara (south Bekaa).
However the most distinctive accomplishment of the Iranians in Lebanon was their ability to cause disparate Shiite groups (which had been operating as local clan militias) to unite under one organizational umbrella called Hezbollah ("the party of Allah"), to indoctrinate their leaders with the extremist concepts of the Islamic revolution, and to train them in the military techniques and methods of the Revolutionary Guards.
Assistance by the Revolutionary Guards to Hezbollah prior to and during the present confrontation:
Iran did all it could during the present confrontation to stress its moral support for Hezbollah, as being part of "the historic struggle against the Zionist cancer and the USA". At the same time Iran strenuously denied any military involvement in the crisis. In fact, Iran was totally involved in these events.
This involvement was led by the Quds (Jerusalem) Force, an elite unit of the Revolutionary Guards. The Quds Force commanded by Qasem Suleimani is in charge of Iranian military operations and terrorist activities world-wide, and Lebanon is one of its main theaters of operations.
The Revolutionary Guard force in Lebanon is the spearhead of Iran in its campaign against Israel. It expresses an Iranian strategy that sees Lebanon as a beach-head, and so cultivates Hezbollah and its strategic abilities as a means of reacting to Israel, to wear Israel down with the ultimate aim of destroying that country, and meanwhile maintaining a balanced deterrent against it.
Over the years the Revolutionary Guards strengthened Hezbollah's military capabilities, granting it over $100 million annually. Iran also supplied the organization with varied weaponry, some of which was used by Hezbollah in the recent conflict. Some of these weapons were used independently and others required Iranian consent before use, such as the C-802 missiles...
Further Iranian assistance to Hezbollah in the recent fighting:
Iran supplied Hezbollah with intelligence about Israel.
Technical assistance in operating weapons: This assistance complemented routine basic training held in Iran at Revolutionary Guards camps and facilities. The two main camps of the Quds Force where non-Iranians are trained are the Imam Ali base in Teheran and Bahunar camp at Kharj north of Teheran. Two Hezbollah terrorists captured by the IDF related that they had been trained by the Revolutionary Guards at the Kharj base. One of them named the commander of an anti-aircraft course in 1999 as Hassan Irelo, a senior Iranian officer in charge of training.
Courses and joint exercises held in Iran for Hezbollah included anti-tank weapons (firing Sagger and Tow missiles), and anti-aircraft missiles. Special efforts were made to train in the use of strategic missiles with ranges of over 75 and 100 km, as well as drones. Revolutionary Guards officers assisted Hezbollah in launching an Iranian drone in November 2004 against Israel.
During recent years the Iranians stepped up supply of weapons to Hezbollah by air. When humanitarian supplies were flown into Iran following the earthquakes in Bam in southeast Iran (Dec 2003-Jan 2004) at least 9 return flights were used to ferry weapons to Hezbollah.
It is estimated that some recent attempts to resupply from Iran were prevented by IDF action. But the huge arsenal amassed over the years gave Hezbollah its "second wind". Iranian leaders have recently admitted publicly to supplying Hezbollah with weapons including long range rockets that threaten Israel...
Hezballah Leadership Profile: Naim Qasim
From the Jamestown Foundation: The Man in Nasrallah's Shadow: A Profile of Sheikh Naim Qasim
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Sheikh Naim Qasim, the deputy secretary-general of Hezbollah, is one of the most interesting politicians in Lebanon. He is also one of the most under-covered by the Western media because he remains overshadowed by the towering influence of his boss, the charismatic 46-year-old Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah. Yet the life and career of the number two man in Hezbollah is important since he is the leader who would likely lead the controversial party if Nasrallah were to step down or get killed by Israel...
Additional insights into the man and his perspectives on the organization can be gained from his book, "Hizbullah: The Story from Within".
Palestinians Aim to Learn from Hezbollah
1 September Washington Times - Palestinians Aim to Learn from Hezbollah by Joshua Mitnick.
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Gunmen from the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, a militant Palestinian group known for its suicide attacks on Israel, say they envy Hezbollah even as they despair of their own inability to defeat Israeli forces.
"Even though we feel our capabilities are depleted, any chance at striking back we'll take. We have men that will eat stones," said Abu Ameed, who used a nickname for fear of arrest by the Israeli military.
"And if our generation feels a little demoralized, the next generations will not stop."
Mr. Ameed was part of a group of gunmen who spoke with a reporter in a grungy courtyard parking lot in Ramallah. Their disappointment was obvious. The Israeli military can reach them at will, and leaders of their own Fatah party want them to lay down their weapons.
But after Hezbollah held firm against an Israeli invasion for 34 days until an Aug. 14 cease-fire, the Palestinian gunmen say they have hope.
Israeli officials and analysts have expressed concern that Palestinian militants will try to replicate Hezbollah's tactics and "Lebanonize" areas such as the Gaza Strip by smuggling advanced weapons and building bunkers.
The militants, who wore black shirts, said they are trying to learn the lessons of Hezbollah's success, which they attributed partly to the militia's cohesion and discipline...
IDF Studies Hezbollah's Resilience
14 September USA Today - Israeli Military Studies Hezbollah's Resilience by Yaakov Katz.
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Israel's military has ordered a series of investigations to examine why its armed forces were unable to crush Hezbollah militants during a month of fighting in Lebanon.
Hezbollah guerrillas proved a resilient foe for Israel's vaunted military, inflicting casualties and firing missiles into Israel despite a punishing air campaign. Even after Israel sent thousands of troops into Lebanon, Israeli military commanders were still surprised by Hezbollah's capabilities.
“This is by far the greatest guerrilla group in the world,” said Brig. Gen. Guy Zur, commander of Division 162. His division lost 12 soldiers during an effort by Israel to gain ground days before a United Nations-brokered cease-fire went into effect Aug. 14...
Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000 after an 18-year occupation in the south. Hezbollah used the past six years to build a complex network of tunnels and other fortifications in southern Lebanon. Some of these bunkers were found a couple hundred yards from the border with Israel.
Israeli troops, Saguy said, walked into traps Hezbollah had been preparing for six years.
Hezbollah is rearming after Israel lifted the sea and air blockade of Lebanon, allowing the group to get smuggled weapons, some experts say.
“Hezbollah is working to recover its arsenal and will be in several months where it was before the war,” Ganor said.
Other important questions
1. Hezbollah lost several foot soldiers in the conflict. Are they effectively able to recruit replacements? There is a big difference between supporters waving Hezbollah flags and volunteering to fight. If their recruiting trend is improving that would be an area of concern.
2. What is the trend of public support for Hezbollah? Understandably there was mass support for Hezbollah during the recent spat between Israel and Lebanon, since Hezbollah was the only effective force countering "perceived" Israeli aggression; however, now that the dust has settled is the Lebonese public reconsidering their position on the Hezbollah?
If anyone can provide answers to these questions it would be most appreciated.
Hizballah Likely to Bounce Back
Bill,
I can provide experienced-based SWAGs:
a. Recruitment will not be a problem among the young Shia in Lebanon. Hiszballah's "victory" may be perceptions-based but that constitutes reality in this matter.
b. Larger support for Hizballah will be greater at least for the near term. Hizballah damage payments to locals and earlier civic minded efforts all work in the organization's favor.
The central questiuon will be how Hizballah, the Lebanese government and the Lebanese Army, and the Israelis react to the expanded UNIFIL, one with a much more aggressive mandate and larger troop list.
Frankly, Zur's comments are somewhat obfuscatory; Hizballah's record against the IDF was not a state secret hidden from IDF leaders. And the open press--especially Poole's book on their tactics--had very accurate portrayals of what could be expected, especially the use of caves and caches.
Best
Tom
Technology likely supplied by Iran allowed guerrillas to stop Israeli tank assaults
Hezbollah cracked the code
http://www.newsday.com/news/nationwo...orldnews-print
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Hezbollah guerrillas were able to hack into Israeli radio communications during last month's battles in south Lebanon, an intelligence breakthrough that helped them thwart Israeli tank assaults, according to Hezbollah and Lebanese officials.
Using technology most likely supplied by Iran, special Hezbollah teams monitored the constantly changing radio frequencies of Israeli troops on the ground. That gave guerrillas a picture of Israeli movements, casualty reports and supply routes. It also allowed Hezbollah anti-tank units to more effectively target advancing Israeli armor, according to the officials.
"We were able to monitor Israeli communications, and we used this information to adjust our planning," said a Hezbollah commander involved in the battles, speaking on the condition of anonymity. The official refused to detail how Hezbollah was able to intercept and decipher Israeli transmissions. He acknowledged that guerrillas were not able to hack into Israeli communications around the clock.
The Israeli military refused to comment on whether its radio communications were compromised, citing security concerns. But a former Israeli general, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said Hezbollah's ability to secretly hack into military transmissions had "disastrous" consequences for the Israeli offensive.
Lessons and Implications of the Israel-Hizballah War: A Preliminary Assessment
Lessons and Implications of the Israel-Hizballah War: A Preliminary Assessment
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/p...icyFocus60.pdf