Ally with other movements in order to hijack them
RUSI's Director, Professor Michael Clarke, weighs in with his analysis:http://www.rusi.org/analysis/comment...511D272D72DDC/
He concludes:
Quote:
What these documents show us is a centrally-directed attempt to achieve all the old Al Qa'ida ambitions; to ally with other political movements in order to hijack them; to fight heroic guerrilla wars for disputed territory, and to build up a new Caliphate that will extend across the Middle East and far beyond. They are aims which are as old fashioned as they are chilling.
Has anyone seen a reaction from AQIM to these revelations?
AQ doesn't follow its own lessons learnt
Clint Watts adds his analysis:http://www.fpri.org/geopoliticus/201...essons-learned
Quote:
Don’t feel bad U.S. military, you are not the only force struggling to make better decisions from your lessons learned. Al Qaeda and particularly their Sahel affiliate, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), struggle to improve their operations based on analyses of past failures as evidence in the Associated Press’s (AP) recent publication of AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel’s confidential letter to his fighters in Mali. While an incomplete manuscript, three chapters of AQIM guidance discovered in Timbuktu provide some clarity to al Qaeda’s strategic thinking in a post-Bin Laden era.
Later:
Quote:
The document provides a fascinating peak into the mindset of al Qaeda affiliates after Bin Laden’s death. While flashes of Bin Laden’s intent appear in Droukdel’s dispatch, AQIM’s strategic plan to integrate with local groups appears to undermine itself in two key ways.
AQ centre's final letter to their most difficult employee
A fascinating AP report on the relationship between AQ centre and their affiliate Moktar Belmoktar in the Sahara (AQIM); almost amusing. There is a very short thread on AQ's management style, AQ's M&A Strategy is a franchising network:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=11974
Here is one passage:
Quote:
Your letter ... contained some amount of backbiting, name-calling and sneering. And such brotherly, official correspondence should not contain this style of language....We refrained from wading into this battle in the past out of a hope that the crooked could be straightened by the easiest and softest means. ... But the wound continued to bleed, and in fact increasingly bled, until your last letter arrived, ending any hope of stanching the wound and healing it.
AP's article:http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/05...aced-internal/
Link to letter itself:http://hosted.ap.org/specials/intera...er-english.pdf
Step forward CWOT with is analysis:http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=1088
Al Qaeda's widening North African jihad confounds foes
A rather catchy title from Reuters, but has some gems within:http://mobile.reuters.com/article/id...30809?irpc=932
This report served as the catalyst for merging threads (see Post No.1).:wry:
Is AQIM under external, Algerian control?
Professor John Schindler of the U.S. Naval War College and blogger 20Committee, has re-Tweeted a 2012 article 'The Ugly Truth about Algeria', with many links worth pursuing:http://nationalinterest.org/commenta...t-algeria-7146
One link I peered at:http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n19/adam-sh...murder-mystery
Outside France few know of the Algerian military intelligence, DRS:
Quote:
The lead agency in the fight against the Algerian mujahidin has been the country’s military intelligence service, the feared DRS. With a reputation for ruthlessness and efficiency second to none in the Arab world, the DRS is arguably the world’s most effective intelligence service when it comes to fighting Al Qaeda; it is also probably the most cold-blooded.
(Later on)To what extent the local Al Qaeda affiliate is secretly controlled by the military—as GIA and GSPC were—is an open question, but its recent record suggests that DRS influence over any Algerian extremist group is considerable.
The DRS appear in the main thread on Mali IIRC and there is a small thread on contemporary Algerian matters:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=2079
A new jihadist group, al-Murabitun
Hat tip to Andrew Lebovich for noting this development in his blog commentary 'Of Mergers, MUJAO, and Mokhtar Belmokhtar', a summary and a longer 3k word piece:http://thewasat.wordpress.com/2013/0...ar-belmokhtar/ and http://thewasat.wordpress.com/2013/0...ar-belmokhtar/
The roadmap for AQIM Azawad
Not sure why RFI have taken months to publish this, but this week an update on the Droukdel document was published, in French so the link may need Google's translation to help:
Quote:
RFI broadcasts all the roadmap for AQIM Azawad, a document signed by the hand of the leader of AQIM, found February 16, 2013 by Nicolas Champeaux and Jean-Louis Le Touzet, envoys of RFI and Liberation in Timbuktu. In this paper edifying, dated 20 July 2012, the bloody Abdelmalek Droukdel reveals black and white its target in northern Mali: create an Islamic state that will not be labeled Jihad. Droukdel clearly shows how: his men are fool local people to armed movements in the North the illusion that they have power, and not to arouse the attention of the international community. To achieve its goals, Droukdel is ready to give the full and immediate implementation of Sharia. This paper therefore reveals a surprising shift in the strategy of the terrorist leader and also confirms the deep tensions within the branch of al-Qaeda. Finally, he said that Mali is not immune to a return of jihadists. This is the first time such an internal document of AQIM is distributed in its entirety.
The document is within the article and is twelve pages long (which may not translate readily).
Link:http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20131006-m...da-sanguinaire
They have not gone away you know
Paul Rogers offers a brief overview of ISIS to AQIM across Africa and most recently an attack in the Ivory Coast:https://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-r...-isis-to-aqim?
He ends:
Quote:
In late 2015 there was a common view in western security circles that ISIS was in retreat and that AQIM and Shabaab were greatly weakened. In the space of just three months that has been
turned on its head. In a familiar pattern, a burst of optimism about the prospects of the 'war on terror' has been shown to have flimsy foundations. The west's continuing failure to understand what is happening fuels a conflict out of control.
