Can't speak to Afghanistan, wasn't there.
However, with respect to Viet Nam and a few other places, we did indeed leave a few, relatively speaking, people in bad straits. Certainly not millions by any stretch. For some the error was their own and for some the fault was ours. That or the actually rather small numbers don'tt excuse those that we left that we should not have but the entire issue should be viewed in context and perspective. The vast majority of residents in Viet Nam and elsewhere were just thankful that we were gone and accepted the cost of those 'left behind.'
I suspect the same attitude prevails in Afghanistan. To cite promises presumed is irrelevant to all but those who wish for whatever reason to make an issue of them. Some here or there may feel "lesser." That as they say, is their problem. For the US, 'lesser' is a fact of life and has been for over a hundred years. TR started us on the downhill slope and W. Wilson accelerated the decline -- been going on ever since; generally at the hands of those in positions of power who were concerned with 'doing good.' That includes G. W. Bush who kept us in Afghanistan and Iraq, both places where we had no real business to cause us to stay because he -- not the Nation -- had an attack of sadly misplaced moral rectitude. IMO, he failed in his responsibility in his elected position because he put personal feelings before the good of the nation that he was nominally responsible for 'leading' (as if anyone could 'lead' the US... :rolleyes:).
As for perfidy, that's a feature of nations (plural as JMA noted), not a bug. Not going away, either. "Live with it..." Indeed. :wry:
A few. Very small numbers...
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Originally Posted by
carl
A few? Actually rather small numbers? The vast majority thankful that we were gone? Perhaps. No way to really argue that. I remember though the boat people most of whom I think died at sea. The million dead Cambodians. The Hmong who were hunted down and the ARVN collapsing with no fuel nor ammunition. That is part of the context too.
Then you remember that some Boat People had US ties but the majority by far were South (and former North...) Viet Namese Catholics who decided they'd rather not live under the rule of Hanoi -- who BTW later penalized a lot of people who had no US ties or debts owed. You can add the Cambodes to your total but we promised them nothing and in fact did very little there -- we didn't abandon them so I'm unsure why one would add them into the tally of folks we've abandoned...
I went to Laos in 1961. The Hmong were being hunted down and killed before we got there, nothing changed except we added some Americans to the KIA column and the Hmong flocked to help us -- and themselves -- in yet another effort that was doomed to fail before it began -- and a lot of Hmong and other hill tribes as well as Americans knew that very early on.
On the ARVN collapsing with no fuel or ammunition, you're absolutely correct and the US' 93d and 94th Congresses have much to answer for in that defeat. So does Nixon and the failed 'Vietnamization' effort. As do Johnson possibly the worst US President ever and Kennedy who was a good talker...
It was always doomed to fail, so was the entire intervention. We promised something we couldn't deliver -- just as occurred in Afghanistan and in Iraq and has in other places.
You're again focusing on the symptoms. Of course we're leaving people in the lurch. We have -- and had -- little choice but to do so. That's the penalty of sticking ones nose in places it doesn't belong -- and why all those people are just happy to see us leave.
They really wish we hadn't come in the first place.
The quick smack at that point is that regardless, we went, therefor we acquired a debt of honor and whether we should have done so or not is immaterial. That's a quick rebuttal -- and it's wildly fallacious. The reality is that anyone who promises something they cannot provide is far more morally guilty than one who foolishly tries to something they patently cannot do, finally realizes their error and has little choice but to withdraw under pressure.
In quick turnover, quarterly bottom line and sound bite prone America, those who initially committed are never the ones that have to clean up the mess as best they can. You're fond of history and often cite successes of others and even ours from past centuries. For those other and those other times, there was a degree of continuity; people were more careful about what they promised or did because there would likely be consequences. We have devolved the system, destroyed any semblance of continuity and now let faceless people or even, Gods help us, Committees who will move before any consequences might occur...
Focus your anger on those corrupt and righteous souls who wrongly send us to these destined to fail efforts, not those who have to try to pick up the pieces and do the best they can with a terrible hand.
As long as you and others focus on the wrong end; the 'departure' as opposed to the problem site, the beginning, it will not change. We will continue to meddle and fail and abandon some people that we should not.
Empirical evidence does not seem to support the claim
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Originally Posted by
carl
I do care about the millions of others who were foolish enough to put their trust in us. They weren't as wise as the South Helmand farmer.
I wonder whether millions of Afghanis have placed their trust in the US. Were that to be the case, I am inclined to believe that much less anti-Coaltion violence would be happening in the country. To say, correctly, that the rank and file Afghanis had placed their trust in the Coalition in general, or the US in particular, would be tantamount to saying that the the guys wearing the white hats (us) had "won their hearts and minds." And, had we won their "hearts and minds," then we could say we had won the population-centric COIN campaign. However, given that the opposition forces are still able to "move through the people as a fish swims in the sea." to quote Mao, I doubt that "millions" of Afghanis have much trust in the protection that the Coalition forces are supposedly providing to them.
In other words, the lack of progress in stemming the violence in Afghanistan seems to demonstrate that the Coalition has not established a believable claim to be the legitimate protectors of those Afghan people who Carl asserts will be sold out by US forces' departure. Without that legitimacy, I aver that neither the Afghanis nor anyone else in the world will view the Coalition's departure as a sell out. Anti-American/anti-Western voices may very well bruit the "sellout/abandonment" claim as part of their standard anti-American propaganda rhetoric/rant, but merely saying something does not make it true.
Afghan feelings about the US presence in Afghanistan seem much more like those of the citizens of Rock Ridge the day that Sheriff Bart arrived in town. (Blazing Saddles)
Who does the West take with them at the end?
Many years ago I read Frank Snepp's 'Decent Interval' on the end of South Vietnam, it made quite an impression on me, although not immediately found on my bookshelves today:eek:
Americans no doubt have some, strong memories.
Snepp referred IIRC to lists of priority individuals and families who had worked for the USA and only some escaped at the time of the fall of South Vietnam.
I do wonder whether similar lists already exist in Afghanistan and whether anyone has asked or thought hard if those at risk want to leave. How many interpreters for example left with the Western forces upon withdrawal? Somehow I doubt that the British public would accept a responsibility to accept more than a few hundred Afghans.
Incidentally a few years ago I met an Afghan refugee in the UK, he'd had been a Kabul cadre, trained in the USSR and was in Bulgaria at the end. He had never returned home and his parents were known to be dead. We already know that Afghans trained overseas have a habit of going AWOL.