Don't Know how I missed this
Quote:
Originally Posted by
slapout9
Entropy thanks for posting.;)This is a Strategic paper. It is a key part of SBW (Slapout Based Warfare) and I was shocked to something like this in print. The people are not the COG !!!! It is the land with the people and how they interact with it. IMHO this is a war winning paper.(Emphasis added Ron H)
Norfolk: remember my paper about Strategy....Seize Terrain That has Political Value!!!!!
But Slap we gonna have to go at it on this one.
I'm gonna read the book and get some points to debate on but I'll start out with this. Focus on capturing physical terrain such as land or even infrastructure is effective but not the COG. Reason being it simply provides job security for the armed force by creating a requirement to maintain that control. The people on the other hand own the land, the jobs, the causes, basically any factor which contributes to the end result of any given operations.
If you can define a way in which terrain (other than people) guarantees a particular action works both in gaining against the enemy and gaining buyin from the people long term even after your gone then I might be persuaded.
From what I can see though if your first focus isn't on the people and how to get them involved in the process thus leading to more informed and effective knowledge of what needs to be secured/destroyed/embraced/or just plain left alone; then your SWAG's tend to be be a lot more wild guesses and a lot less informed moves.
In that case I think we're in violent agreement
Quote:
Originally Posted by
slapout9
Hi Ron, My point was/is it's the people and the terrain "together" (which is what geography used to be about when I was in school) that equal the COG...you just said it better then me.
Just as long as those setting forth the path don't allow the different parties to claim responsibility for one of the two and expect a different party to handle the other
Example:
Lanes, Not my job its yours, I'll take the ground then you diplomacize:eek:.
In New Military, Data Overload Can Be Deadly
In New Military, Data Overload Can Be Deadly
Entry Excerpt:
In New Military, Data Overload Can Be Deadly by Thom Shanker and Matt Richtel, New York Times. BLUF: "As the technology allows soldiers to pull in more information, it strains their brains. And military researchers say the stress of combat makes matters worse. Some research even suggests that younger people wind up having more trouble focusing because they have grown up constantly switching their attention."
The Statistical Irrelevance of American SIGACT Data: Iraq Surge Analysis Reveals Real
The Statistical Irrelevance of American SIGACT Data: Iraq Surge Analysis Reveals Reality
Entry Excerpt:
The Statistical Irrelevance of American SIGACT Data: Iraq Surge Analysis Reveals Reality
by Joshua Thiel
Download The Full Article: The Statistical Irrelevance of American SIGACT Data:
Maneuver warfare at its core is a mechanistic endeavor and fits with a corresponding necessity of top-down hierarchies. Conversely, counterinsurgency is a more ambiguous environment that varies in its complexity and context; it is the chess match of war. It is different in every locale and can cover the entire spectrum of war simultaneously. Consequently, counterinsurgency is difficult to put on a bumper sticker, to trademark as a catch phrase, or sell to a population and their representatives. In 2006 the United States (U.S.) public’s perception of success or failure of the Iraqi counterinsurgency strategy was concentrated around the concept of massing combat power in time and space, often called the “The Surge.” The term, “The Surge,” condensed a new counterinsurgency strategy into a simple and quantifiable slogan for the sound bite culture surrounding current affairs in the modern world. Unfortunately, counterinsurgency is more complex than “add more and then you win.”
Download The Full Article: The Statistical Irrelevance of American SIGACT Data:
Major Joshua Thiel is a United States Army Special Forces Officer and a recent graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School with a Masters of Science in Defense Analysis. He is currently serving in 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne).
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Human Intelligence in Counterinsurgency: Persistent Pathologies in the Collector-Cons
Human Intelligence in Counterinsurgency: Persistent Pathologies in the Collector-Consumer Relationship
Entry Excerpt:
Human Intelligence in Counterinsurgency: Persistent Pathologies in the Collector-Consumer Relationship
by Michael Gallagher
Download the Full Article: Human Intelligence in Counterinsurgency: Persistent Pathologies in the Collector-Consumer Relationship
In the realm of counterinsurgency (COIN), the currency is intelligence. In other words—as the Counterinsurgency Field Manual succinctly puts it—intelligence drives operations. “Good” intelligence provides precision, helping the counterinsurgent eliminate insurgents from the populace “like surgeons cutting out cancerous tissue while keeping other vital organs intact.” Within this surgical effort, Human Intelligence (HUMINT) proves uniquely valuable; it can obtain information that more technologically-oriented assets cannot. Thus, while all counterinsurgents collect operational reporting as they perform their daily functions—what is frequently termed “passive” collection—HUMINT requires “active” collectors who are specially trained to conduct military source operations and interrogations.
Download the Full Article: Human Intelligence in Counterinsurgency: Persistent Pathologies in the Collector-Consumer Relationship
Michael Gallagher is a Captain in the Marine Corps and currently a fellow in the Junior Officer Strategic Intelligence Program. He deployed twice to Iraq as a Human Intelligence Exploitation Team Commander.
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(NPR) Math Can Predict Insurgent Attacks, Physicist Says
Quote:
The atrocities of war often seem random. But when it comes to insurgent attacks in Afghanistan or Iraq, that's not exactly the case, says Neil Johnson, a physicist at the University of Miami. Johnson tells Guy Raz, host of weekends on All Things Considered, about the equation his team has developed that predicts when such attacks will happen.
"We found ... that there was a kind of rhyme and reason behind the numbers," he says. "They weren't just accelerating, they were accelerating in a particular way."
http://www.npr.org/2011/07/31/138639...physicist-says
Military Intelligence Fusion for Complex Operations
Illuminating the Structure: Intelligence in the Development of CT Strategy
Fitting Intelligence to the Fight: Lessons from Afghanistan
Afghanistan Data Initiative: McCain Institute asks
Via FP's Situation Report, a plea for civil & military veterans of Afghanistan to participate in a survey for the at Arizona State:
Quote:
...is developing a database for lessons learned from Afghanistan in the hopes that those lessons learned don't have to be re-learned. The "Afghanistan Data Initiative, a robust, fact-based, data-driven analysis of what happened in Afghanistan, but the Institute is doing it without imposing any preconceived ideological or political framework....We hope to disseminate this raw, fact-based information, providing a resource for future research and study, allowing others to draw conclusions and make better decisions in the future. In the long-term, we expect that this data set will serve as a resource for future research and academic study......Please take part in our survey to help ensure that the experiences and sacrifices of you and thousands of others like you are not lost to history, but recorded and learned from for the future."
They want honest answers and won't attribute comments of poll participants to the public arena. It takes about 25 minutes to complete.
Link to survey:https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/6B67866
What is the McCain Institute? From their website:
Quote:
The Mission of the McCain Institute at ASU is to advance leadership based on security, economic opportunity, freedom, and human dignity, in the United States and around the world.
Link:http://mccaininstitute.org/
I have emailed them to tell them SWJ / SWC exists!:wry:
Intelligence in Complex Environments