While I would agree with all the other points made here
Quote:
Originally Posted by
PhilR
If memory serves me correctly, the decision to send the extra troops was tied in with the decision to re-look at the Iraq Joint Campaign Plan and the decision to send Gen Petreaus. While the "surge" is usually assocated with extra troops, it also featured additional State Department resources (ePRTs and an embassy crew that was was pretty much the DoS "A-Team" headed by Amb Crocker).
While this isn't any official view, I believe that the surge, in all its parts, played a decisive role in the Anbar Awakening because it sent the signal that we (the coalition) were going to be around for awhile. This gave the tribal leadership the confidence that they could deal with us and not be left out to dry. Prior to the surge, the key strategy was to turn the war over to the Iraqis as fast as possible. That is still a part, but the new strategy emphasized securing key portions of the population first.
It would seem that Phil has it right in that the greatest overall change took place in the perspectives of the people within Iraq, their leaders, and foreign interests; and what they were willing and ready to do about it.
The point at which the HN proactively begins to work towards change large scale will always be decisive. And General P with the surge forces and associated use of them was able to provide the conditions for that to happen.
Ultimately the locals have to win the local war and our soldiers helped and are helping to get them there.
Just my take ---
A different look at the surge
I'm brand new to the board ( I posted in the introduction forum)
I look at the surge from the micro level. I was there, and extended for 4 months (16 total) due to the surge, as a team leader of a Tactical HUMINT Team. Serving in a Shia area owned by the Mahdi Army, the surge didn't mean much. I believe the surge is working militarily in the short term, but I have no faith in the Iraqi political system, which is where I think the definition of success has to come from. Last I knew, the Sadrist Current still has 30 seats in the Iraqi parliament. The Sadrist MP in our area has a PSD who were also members of JAM, involved in mafia activities. She provided political cover to an extent that the ISF in the province were paralyzed. Judges refused to issue warrants. JAM members could and did kill ISF and coalition forces with impunity, using Iranian trained and supplied action team members, who had official MOD identification cards, etc. JAM would murder a policeman in her city, and the next day the JAM commander would be publicly drinking Chai tea with the Chief of police at the station. I was in the room to hear a US state department rep say that this Sadrist MP had immunity because she's a politician. I observed the frustration of senior ISF at this statement; one of whom has since been assassinated by the very people he was prevented from going after. Unlike in Sunni areas, Shia sheikhs are unwilling to risk confronting the militia because they rightly perceive that Shia militia equals unaccountable political power. Their provincial governor, with a 5th grade education, takes his marching orders from the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. I've been in several meetings with this guy, as a fly on the wall. He does nothing but put roadblocks in the way of those few ISF who are willing to go after JAM.
These are the people the surge is working to strengthen.
I guess my question is...how does the political reality I experienced, which I believe is representative, fit into a discussion about the efficacy of the surge?