I'm looking forward to buying three copies, myself and two of the kids... :)
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I'm looking forward to buying three copies, myself and two of the kids... :)
Very impressive, Steve. I read both the Preface and the Conclusion, and while you covered a lot of ground, it wasn't clear to me whether you addressed the rise of Islamic extremism as an aftermath of our invasion of Iraq. It seems to me that even after Iraq stabilizes, the Long War will continue against Jihadists whose numbers and resolve have both increased since 2003, thanks to U.S. actions in the ME. Shouldn't that be a factor in the evolution of American Strategy?Quote:
Originally Posted by SteveMetz
Also, is there a word missing in your final sentence of the Conclusions section?
Quote:
The full effect of this long struggle will not become clear confronts its next, as yet unidentified security challenge and the power or weakness of the Iraq paradigm is put to the test.
Steve M,
Looks interesting, can I get this on Amazon? Looking forward to the read and footnotes.
Steve L.
Steve,
What a great way to start the New Year...Congratulations !
quite strongly that the numbers and resolve might well have increased at the same or even at a greater level had we not entered Iraq. Turning the other cheek in the ME is seen as a distinct weakness and attempts at compromise in the western mode are viewed as concessions to be exploited.Quote:
Originally Posted by JeffC
We have been guilty of misreading the ME for many years but our failure to react to provocations since 1979 certainly had far more to do with the airplane fly-ins than did Operation Ajax, any support for Israel or the literally dozens of other minor contributors. The folks in the ME are born hagglers and -- they believe at least -- born warriors; they attack weakness. That's what they do. It's in the genes...
That is forgotten by many in the west who do not think at all like that average person in the ME and who too frequently try to act based on a perception that those who live there think as we do. They do not.
Steve makes a valid point in his Preface and reiterates it in the Conclusions -- he and most strategic thinkers confined Iraq to the periphery unless it popped up on the radar screen. That syndrome, too, is a facet of American strategy and has been for most of our 220 years. Our political system with wholesale changes every four or eight years causes this, always has and always will. I wouldn't change that as I for one believe the advantages far outweigh the disadvantages... ;)
So when can I start plagerizing this? :DQuote:
Originally Posted by SteveMetz
When can I get a SIGNED copy?
Ha! Ha I say! I currently owe a chapter on the changing nature of war to a compilation the Norwegian air force is doing; a paper for a South African army; and a paper on "high value targeting" (AKA assassinating bad guys) for the RAND Insurgency Board. Plus I'm leading a CSA tasked project on OIF strategy decisionmaking. I'll rest when they pry my cold, dead fingers off of my Macanudo.Quote:
Originally Posted by Chris Albon
I'm hoping that we can get Janeane Garofalo to play Bill Kristol in the movie. I'm a *great* fan of irony.Quote:
Originally Posted by Rex Brynen
Won't be till next fall. There's a long way to go.Quote:
Originally Posted by Surferbeetle
Next Fall? Darn, drat and other similar comments! BTW, need a reviewer?
Well, the difference is that we know for sure that all of the numbers went up: recruitment, terrorist acts, number of cells operating in other countries - post-2003 invasion. Since that's a known fact, and the alternative that you expressed is a hypothetical, it would seem prudent to at least examine that increase as a variable in any analysis of our military strategy.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
Thanks. I'll let you know what the publisher says. Don't know if I have to find my own or if they do.Quote:
Originally Posted by marct
a highly likely one but in either case, it's irrelevant, we are where we are and where we are is at a point where the impact of any or no increase or even had (or has?) there been a decrease -- and we don't; cannot, have true numbers -- will have no real strategic impact. The issue 'strategically' (to misuse the word) is the intention of said population and the numbers are relatively immaterial. Their resolution is only a slightly more relevant issue as that will almost certainly vary from person to person on a daily basis -- as will the total numbers of adherents for that matter...Quote:
Originally Posted by JeffC
The intent of the truly dedicated is important but the number of those and their resolution is almost tangential. :cool:
They are out there, there aren't all that many but those who are true believers will be intent on doing the west in general and us in particular harm in any way they can. That was a given 50 years ago, ten years ago and will be ten and even 50 years in the future. The only way to mitigate their potential for harm is to make it far more costly. That is very difficult to do with those who are willing to die for their cause but it is not impossible. It will take two to three generations as opposed to five or six had we simply waited, restricted ourselves to 'containment' (though I'm unsure how you contain an amorphous group of non-state actors) and 'diplomacy.'
We know all those numbers went up -- we also know that successes in deterring recruitment, short circuiting terrorist acts, and identification and disruption of the greater number of cells operating in other countries have been achieved and that those successes are growing. They have not really had a good year in spite of the increases you posit and I'm quite sure that will continue to be the case. That's why I say those pluses are unimportant.
Ken, I don't know where you're finding your facts, but here are a few starting points:Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/st...2/excerpt.html
http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/...icleid=2369635
This issue is so well-documented that I'm a bit surprised that you're willing to debate it. There is no lack of data that the U.S. war in Iraq has contributed to the radicalization of Islamic extremists; that they are spreading into Europe, Africa, the Near East, etc.
No offense intended, but I'm not exactly sure I know what you just said. It sounds like you're saying that the documented increase in al-Qaeda fighters world-wide is "irrelevant", and/or that we "cannot have true numbers". I must have missed the memo that said to ignore whether your enemy is gaining ground, both in numbers of fighters and geographical distribution. I have a hard time believing that that's considered sound doctrine in any nation's military, let alone ours.Quote:
a highly likely one but in either case, it's irrelevant, we are where we are and where we are is at a point where the impact of any or no increase or even had (or has?) there been a decrease -- and we don't; cannot, have true numbers -- will have no real strategic impact.
To bring this discussion back around to Steve's book, my question still stands for Steve - has this unforseen development been addressed in your book as a factor in our evolving military strategy Post-Iraq?
First, I'm not questioning the probability there more bad guys about -- you must've missed the fact that I said they probably had gone up -- but that 'fact' is irrelevant IMO. Thus there is no debate on the 'issue.' I'm unsure why you assume I'm debating anything. I'm not.Quote:
Originally Posted by JeffC
I suggest that there is little data on the issue as you state it but a whole lot of mostly ill-informed conjecture and postulating by folks with differing agendas (on both sides). Forgive me if I don't drink either side's Kool Aid. You may differ in your thoughts on the same 'fact' and that's okay. Two people looking at the same circumstantial evidence and drawing different conclusions is not at all unheard of...
The real fact is there is not a major terrorist organization or operation now that did not exist pre-9/11. The equally real fact is that there are a lot of unemployed and therefor disaffected young Muslim males in all the areas you mention and they're going to find something to do with their spare time. They will join and then leave, rejoin and leave again and switch allegiances with some rapidity any thing that offers an escape from boredom. Thus, 'jihad' is cool.
An equally real fact is that item, strategically, is not a pressing concern. It is more relevant operationally but only a little. It can be locally significant tactically. Whether it will be remains to be seen and in any even will vary widely in net effect from area to area.
Your links pose a problem to me. First, Frontline is not exactly on the cutting edge of anything and anyone or anything associated with Hamilton and Pillar is, IMO, highly suspect of foisting incompetence on the world, so, while I read that link, it doesn't pass the "so what" test. Secondly, Jamestown is a much more competent source but that particular link doesn't tell us anything that wasn't known ten years ago about Muslims in Europe; it merely updates the info.
Here's a LINK you may or may not have seen. Note that it essentially says the same thing I said (my point, as they say...) and that you decided to blow off below; Numbers may be up, however the other side is not making a whole lot of progress...
That is exactly what I said and meant -- in relation to strategy. Numbers in small to middling quantities are not important; intentions and capabilities are all important. The former are not known, the latter are being degraded by the west -- and by Muslim nations -- on a daily basis. I am not privy to the Strategy, nor should I be, however, based on what I can see, the Strategy did and does accomodate your concerns.Quote:
No offense intended, but I'm not exactly sure I know what you just said. It sounds like you're saying that the documented increase in al-Qaeda fighters world-wide is "irrelevant",...
True, we cannot. All we can get are guesses by folks with agendas. Nor are the numbers at all important strategically.Quote:
...and/or that we "cannot have true numbers"...
I didn't say to ignore the numbers and the geographic spread, I said they were irrelevant to strategy; I'd add in the quantities probable and locations known, the slight improvement in their status in those two areas is significantly offset by their losses in many other areas. The only place they consistently remain well ahead of is in the IO sector -- there, they're creaming us, no question. They always will for many reasons but we could surely do better than we have and are -- that, though is only of small strategic concern for several reasons.Quote:
...I must have missed the memo that said to ignore whether your enemy is gaining ground, both in numbers of fighters and geographical distribution. I have a hard time believing that that's considered sound doctrine in any nation's military, let alone ours.
As an aside, do not confuse the number of adherents and / or supporters with a number of 'fighters' -- the two are not synonymous, far from it. Expanding operations in areas where one has long been present is also not synonymous with 'gaining ground' in the intelligence analysis or operational sense; and it has no strategic connotation at all..
I obviously can't answer for Steve but my solution to your question would be to buy the book and read it before critiquing it or patronizing the author (IMO, of course), even indirectly.Quote:
To bring this discussion back around to Steve's book, my question still stands for Steve - has this unforseen development been addressed in your book as a factor in our evolving military strategy Post-Iraq?
I question your use of the word 'unforeseen.' By whom? Having seen some early documentation on the invasion of Iraq from several sources, the increases you cite may have been unforeseen by you but State, the CIA and the Army all foresaw them LINK(Go to Conclusion, p.13), LINK. I foresaw them as did many of my acquaintances -- and my kids, including my then 20 something non-military daughter. As did, I suspect, the Administration. They, like me, seem to have decided that the gain was well worth the minor risk. Then there are those that did not foresee them and / or are afraid of risk. Some folks may be prone to both foibles.
Jeff,Quote:
Originally Posted by JeffC
When we talk about strategy are we talking about where to go and what to do or how to go about getting where we want to be.
It seems to me just like forest and fires, there are always lots of trees dying or dead bushes through any given area. KNowing about it and doing something are two different things. If an area is left to its own for a longer period of time without any thinning or firebreaks being built it will inevitably burn larger and more devastatingly when a fire eventually starts. if proper care is taken to be proactive in preparations against that fire then the end result would be less drastic. So strategically I think about the issues with terrorist throughout the world and how on their own within their own little areas they may not seem so bad but sooner or later the fire starts and depending on past actions and preparations of those countries around them it will help to determine how bad the fire gets.
If you look at it this way how much has really been done in the last 20 years to burn the fire breaks or thin out the forests so as to minimalize what would eventually happen without any doubt.
Two tanks can't go in opposite directions on a oneway bridge at the same time so which tank do you think should let the other guy come to his side first.
It just seems to me that sometimes the absolutes which which exist despite what we would like to believe are really left out of the picture and thus strategy does suffer.
So which tank wants t back up and let the other guy come
Ken, I've got a lot to say about this, but I'm not going to do it in this thread. I'll organize an essay on the subject with appropriate reference data and post it when its ready in the appropriate forum.
I will, however, comment on this statement of yours:
Ken, did you see my first post? (quoted below)Quote:
I obviously can't answer for Steve but my solution to your question would be to buy the book and read it before critiquing it or patronizing the author (IMO, of course), even indirectly.
Personally, I don't see anything disrespectful or patronizing about what I wrote, nor did I write a critique. I asked a question because I didn't see this issue covered in either the Preface or the Conclusion, which is all I had available to read.Quote:
Very impressive, Steve. I read both the Preface and the Conclusion, and while you covered a lot of ground, it wasn't clear to me whether you addressed the rise of Islamic extremism as an aftermath of our invasion of Iraq. It seems to me that even after Iraq stabilizes, the Long War will continue against Jihadists whose numbers and resolve have both increased since 2003, thanks to U.S. actions in the ME. Shouldn't that be a factor in the evolution of American Strategy?
As I said to Ken, I don't think that this is the appropriate thread to have this discussion/debate, Ron. It should stay focused on Steve's successful completion of his book.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ron Humphrey
Instead, I'm going to work on an essay on this topic and post it in its own thread in the appropriate forum. I hope that you'll read it and comment on it then.
my part and not precisely what I meant
Yes, I saw it. Patronizing is, I guess, in the eye of the beholder. IMO the question was mildly so and your 0001 comment to me was more so and that may have triggered my use of the word. YMMV. Agree none of this needs to be on this thread.Quote:
Originally Posted by JeffC