The Ghost of General Gavin
1- I have written about this before but since you brought historic examples I will add some more. This is based upon his "War and Peace in the Space Age"written in 1958 and a personal interview at his winter home in Winter Park,Fl. in 1985. He no longer believed that Strategy at the military level existed! Here is why. He believed in 58 that once the earth was mapped with satellites and ICBMs came on line the whole world was now a tactical battlefield. Anyplace in the world could be hit with a missile. So all military functions of shooting-moving and communicating would be sent to a tactical battle command system, i.e. C4ISR. Strategy was now in the realm national policy only. Wars would become "Pushbutton" fast and furious with breaks in between for political solutions. This is why he fought so hard for a national missile defense system. My personal opinion is this is why he had a winter home in Florida near the Martin Co. which actually produced an operational missile defense system before Henry Kissinger gave it away in SALT treaty one.
Pushbutton Warfare part 2
I had more to post the first time but I hit a wrong button so the rest of my original post is lost in cyber space somewhere. However to continue. General Gavin also believed and never really understood why ICBMs could only be equipped with nuclear warheads, he would very much agree with the Navy's recent proposal to put conventional warheads on long range submarine launched missiles. Or land based missiles. He also thought ALL ships in the navy should be submersible.
He was highly upset over the military failure to understand the implications of the Falkland islands missile attacks on British ships. Besides being better than aircraft missiles are cheap.
Finally he thought good generals should know tactics. He literally believed that the only way military strategy could be defined was generalship. If a general had to have a strategy then he had failed to realize that he (the general himself was strategy) and good generals know tactics.
To me this makes a lot of sense. Example look at Iraq, if our strategy is clear, hold and build. That makes know sense. Clear,hold and build might be goals or objectives but they are not a strategy.The general must know (how) which tactics to use before anything happens. If you don't know clearing tactics and holding tactics you will not reach your objectives. How to do something is the hard part, what to do is easy.
We have talked a lot about the Strategic corporal maybe Strategic Compression is nothing more than how to be a "One Minute General"
From the Slapout, Alabama the cultural center of the universe, good night.
Ruminations on Strategic Compression
Here are a few more thoughts on strategic compression:
1)Your point about this not being a new phenomenon is well-taken and needs to be remembered. Many of the historical examples of Hitler meddling in the decisions of his subordinate commanders could be taken as examples of strategic compression (France in 1940, operations in Russia from the very beginning, and many more examples).
2)It's worth keeping in mind as well that while combat unit size/numbers may be decreasing, their supply and logistics “tail” often does not shrink at the same pace. Modern units may be more efficient, but they still consume large amounts of ammo and POL. There is also the base area syndrome to consider. By this I mean that the level of creature comforts “needed” by the troops (in many cases it's the supply line troops and higher command levels “needing” the goodies) tends to increase, putting a greater strain on the supply line.
3)In my mind, I see the biggest problem with strategic compression coming from the higher command levels. We DO need better training with regard to independent operations, decision making, cultural awareness, and so on, but it all goes out the window the exact second someone with more junk on his or her shoulders decides to “help” the tactical leaders. It's also worth remembering that strategic compression can make the results of that “help” more damaging than ever (it's hard to dismiss as outdated an order that arrives in real time), and the “helper” quite often escapes unscathed if something goes wrong. While I see much talk about improving lower-level training, there is a great silence regarding the training of higher-level commanders. It should be remembered that every time they “help,” micro-manage, or lead by video-conference or Charlie-Charlie bird, they are undercutting the authority and confidence of their subordinate leaders.
For the most part, I feel we have a well-trained basic force, one that understands the impact the CNN Effect can have on their operations – if for no other reason than they've seen it happen before they enlisted or during the early stages of their active duty time. With proper guidance, training, and above all moral support (meaning the freedom to make mistakes and learn from them), this force can adapt to strategic compression. What worries me is the response of higher command levels (battalion command and higher, especially above brigade command) to strategic compression. You cannot use fears of the CNN Effect to clamp down on lower level leaders and then turn around and complain that they do not show enough initiative. Of course they don't! They've been “educated” not to.
It should also be remembered that much of this real time information is going to be incomplete and even incorrect. The ability on the part of higher commanders to correctly evaluate what they're seeing and hearing will become even more important than it has in the past. Being able to put information in context, especially when it's pouring in from a number of sources (many of which are unreliable), may become THE key job for at least part of a commander's staff.
I used the example of Hitler earlier for a reason. He created his own strategic compression, reacting to his own vision of what was happening at the front and his own (often fuzzy) strategic goals. And he would interfere down to the battalion and even company level when it came to combat orders and postings. Given today's level of communication, ANY higher commander could take on the role of Hitler within his own chain of command, reacting to faulty intelligence and/or vision and giving operational or tactical orders that result in a poor outcome or possibly disaster, or at the very least gumming up the works.
One final observation: There is a flip side to strategic compression. Given the speed of operations, it is now more possible than it has ever been (perhaps) for a small unit (company sized) to have the impact of a much larger unit. This may come through combat power, or through a company commander's decision to not use his combat power in a particular way. This makes the ability of our senior NCOs, lieutenants, and captains to function independently more important than it has been since the days of the Frontier Army. If they are over-controlled they will not be able to make correct decisions. However, if they are trained to think for themselves and understand the impact their decisions may have on a higher level, we may gain an edge in time against our enemies. Being able to react while they are still pondering a response is invaluable, and we too often find ourselves on the receiving end of this situation.
Also, an increased reliance on communications makes us more vulnerable than we have ever been to some sort of attack on our communications systems. Commanders who are conditioned to wait for “help” from higher will not respond well when that “help” goes away. We can use the possibility of strategic compression to follow a training system similar to that used by the German army after World War I. Train each subordinate leader to think of and consider the problems of a commander one or two levels higher. That doesn't mean they're being prepared for such command positions, but that they become aware that their decisions in a village may have an impact on operations in the province, the situation in the country, and possibly throughout the world depending on the media presence. And then train the senior commanders to sit back and let their subordinates do their jobs with a minimum of “help.”
The Five Reasons for Compression
First and foremost – thanks much for the input so far. It is helping us focus our efforts and shape further discussion and research…
Our (USMC) Canadian Army LNO dropped off an article (not online) titled Military Command: The Compression of Levels of Command by Henning Frantzen. This article appeared in a 2004 edition of Challenge and Change for the Military – New Missions, Old Problems. This journal is published by the School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University and the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute. While much of the article addresses the items discussed above on this thread – it does break down the reasons for compression into five distinct categories – Multinational nature of operations, limited commitment, media, the nature of conflicts (internal, irregular), and technology. I can’t break copyright nor desire to “retype" the entire article – so here is a bulletized summary:
- Military doctrines, for the most part, separate the levels of war between strategic, operational and tactical. Of these, only the strategic level is explicitly concerned with politics. The operational and tactical level is concerned with fighting.
- While most recognize the Clausewitzian thesis that war is a continuation of policy… it is often taken for granted that the political issues are concerned with the decision to wage war, the objectives and resources necessary for war and the constraints and limitations facing military commanders.
- Compression of levels of war blurs this traditional understanding – the levels are being merged.
- The result is that commanders seem to spend less time on actual command (formal definition) and more time and energy struggling with political affairs.
- The best that commanders can now hope for is that they contribute to a political success rather than military victory.
- The first reason for compression of the levels is the multinational character of current military operations. This results in a reduction of military commanders’ authority due to national restrictions and limitations. Issues that under other circumstances are strictly military are transformed into complex issues of international affairs and traditional levels of command seemingly do not apply.
- The second reason for compression (merger of politics and military) is the limited commitment with which we engage in contemporary conflicts and war. They tend to rank lower on the security agenda and the issues of risk and casualties develop a high priority.
- The third reason contributing to compression is media scrutiny and the speed by which information is broadcast and then has an effect on public opinion and political decision-makers. Military operations cannot be conducted separately from the world of civilians. Military judgments and reasoning are increasingly questioned by civil society and military commanders cannot exercise their profession in a vacuum.
- All that said, the more important source of compression is the nature of current conflicts – internal wars of various sorts… Because these wars are fought within civil society it is much harder to separate military aspects from political aspects… The objective of the intervention – situation conducive to peace – demands more than a military victory.
- The decentralized character of these conflicts drives operations down to the company and battalion level rather than corps and division. While operations are not just political all tactical decisions cannot be made without considering their potential political effect.
- The fifth source of compression refers to new ideas on how to organize and command military power for future conflicts. The Strategic Corporal is one example… Experiments with strategic corporals and network-centric warfare are ways of dealing with new technological opportunities… Technology offers the opportunity of micro-management.
- Concepts for command should be adjusted to reflect the changes caused by compression and to deal with the associated issue.
Does "Wag the Dog" really work?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
Other asymmetries need to be addressed and managed.
1. Managing bad news: The kids at Abu Ghrab we’re punks, the LT at My Lai lost temporarily lost his mind, the murder / rape cases in Iraq are inexcusable, and these incidents have managed to elevate to the strategic stage. We can’t defend these acts, but we can put them in perspective and counter attack. The perspective is these are aberrations and that they will be punished, which should make us the envy of every rate nation where it is the norm to have thugs for cops and soldiers. Second, while we’re putting our guys in jail, we need to point out where the enemy did much, much worse and awarded their guys for doing so. The contrast is white and black if it would only be depicted. When we have we forced the enemy to defend their incidents like they have forced us to defend our actions?
2. Media Access: We allow the media full access, warts and all. The enemy allows select access.
Managing bad news is a central aspect of modern warfare, in particular for the US and its allies. The military supremacy leads to a different kind of challenge. However, countering the bad news is easier said than done. As Abu Ghraib was discovered, there was a very active campaign to try and put into perspective, but it failed. This might be because higher standards are expected from the US forces than they are from the insurgents and other thugs, but the fact is that enemy does not need to defend its actions because its core audience approves of them. The contrast might be black and white (I doubt that it is...) but in reality US and allied forces are held to a different standard, and it makes great TV news to show their failures to maintain that standard.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
How do we counter the negative effects of strategic compression? Just some very rough thoughts:
1. Create another story, a bigger story “wag the dog”. This is somewhat of a joke, but if we can make the enemy atrocities a bigger story?
I don't think you can make the enemy atrocities a bigger story. It is not a story at all as far as the media is concerned apart from when it really goes overboard, but then again we all knew these guys were bad.