I don't have much experience dealing with SEALS other than playing one on T.V.:)Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
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I don't have much experience dealing with SEALS other than playing one on T.V.:)Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
I'm scratching my head about the "mass" comment as well. There are not enough SEALs to really mass anywhere. Have they experienced missteps and problems that exploded into a situation larger than the size of the original element that ran into trouble? Sure did, but their numbers employed on missions have always been relatively small.Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
Furthermore, they really don't need infantry competence for most of the missions they are assigned these days, at least not in a classical use of the word infantry.
Swimming, special recce, direct action, etc. can benefit from an infantry background, but it is by no means a prerequisite.
That's relative to the geography and OPFOR in question.
About 30 men raiding a single house at the same time is an application of "mass".
One could claim it's about "surprise" as well (as the quantity allows for reaching all rooms quickly), but it's still not exactly intricate tactics.
I guess my understanding is that the Navy had the UDTs which morphed into the SEALs during the U.S. involvement in Vietnam (a couple of Vietnam veterans have made an association between the SEALs and the Mekong Delta to me, I don’t know if that’s historical memory or solid historiography). Perhaps nowadays it is more helpful to think of the SEALs as part of the Navy’s contribution to USSOCOM than as part of the Navy?Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
I imagine there are a few sailors who joined the Navy looking to be SEALs, didn’t make it through BUDS (no shame in that), and are now scraping paint somewhere in the Indian Ocean for the duration of their enlistment contracts.Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
When you have the time and resources to employ against a single structure in a rolling hard hit, why wouldn't you use mass? It certainly allows you to dominate an objective, do what needs to be done (including TSE) quickly, and then get off the objective in good order.Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
I agree that it's not intricate tactics. I've seen it done surreptitiously by a rifle squad in Iraq, and the tgt presented as much physical threat to the raiding force that many HVTs did, yet those special ops HVT tgts consumed a hundred-fold more resources to go after. TTPs are 't the point of this thread though.
SEALs have a role to play. I think as with all special purpose forces, they should stick to that role or risk the deleterious effects of mission creep, but they are very good at certain things--frogmen being a prime example.
Because there are better ways?Quote:
Originally Posted by jcustis
Because the "mass" tactic depends on having an opponent who's not smart?
Trust me, they'd get more than a bloody nose if they were up against me.
The internet is no good place to discuss the "why", though.
Okay Fuchs, roll on with your bad self.:D
The morphing began before Vietnam, actually, although the Navy kept UDTs around (and continues to do so). Kennedy's push for SF had something to do with that growth, so the link between SEALs and the Mekong Delta is pretty accurate as far as it goes when you consider the historical context of the association.Quote:
Originally Posted by ganulv
Below is an essay I found at the Institute of Land Warfare written July 2012:
http://www.ausa.org/publications/ilw...W_12-3_web.pdf
So with this as a guide what does the U.S. military look like in the coming years?
Good article and those questions need to be asked and answered before a proper force structure can be developed and I would suggest the article goes hand in hand with this one from Parameters (spring this year). The lead author is a Marine Captain. We are not good at Grand Strategy and I don't think we ever will be, however in the past we have learned to set priorities and it worked out very well.Quote:
Originally Posted by gute
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/P...tzer_Gorka.pdf
After we set priorities we will learn that Amphibious warfare is the only kind of Warfare there is for the USA....unless we want to wait and fight Mexico in California or Texas.....wait we are kinda doing that now;)
To have a Grand Strategy you need clear, consistent, long-term policy, and a 4-year election cycle is not terribly compatible with that. Is any democracy really "good at Grand Strategy"?Quote:
Originally Posted by slapout9
Unless we have a persistent threat--and even then--I'd have to agree that the US certainly cannot do it in the polarized political environment that currently exists.
We have a Ranger Battalions because they do a certain mission very very well and the USMC has not had great success with the same mission. Can you say "Mayaguez incident"? Ranger Batts have proven their usefulness time and time again.Quote:
Originally Posted by slapout9
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Not a solid comparison, since the Ranger Battalions didn't exist at that time. Rangers clearly do some things quite well, but there are also occasions when they (like any unit) are committed to tasks they aren't suited for.Quote:
Originally Posted by reed11b
I have never seen anything a Ranger Battalion does that the 82nd didn't used to do before we had Ranger Battalions and still could do. It is the Ranger training that is important and should be spread through all Infantry units like it used to be.Quote:
Originally Posted by reed11b
Are you saying the Ranagers could have handled the Mayaguez incident any better?
The Marines would probably say......can you say "Black Hawk down!"
No tab, badge or brand makes a man or unit the end all, be all for every situation. That is why we have a mix of types of units, each with its own unique advantages and disadvantages for a savvy commander to mix and match as necessary for best effect.Quote:
Originally Posted by slapout9
The problem of the conflicts of recent years is that they came to call for a lot of a couple different types of activity, and units all started abandoning their respective bases of specialization and expertise to fall in on some degree of competence on those common themes.
Pick your metaphor. From a sophisticated tool box into a bag of hammers; or from a symphony orchestra into a brass band. May meet the current requirement (as defined), but is not a good long-term solution.
Time for everyone to get back to their core competencies. Then, it is time to balance the relative size of each of those capacities to challenges of the modern era. We have been a military in conflict, but we are a nation at peace. Time to re-size and re-focus for the real challenges that are out there, not for the noises we hear in the dark.
For conventional ground forces this probably means we need a lot less, with most warfighting capacity relegated to the National Guard, and a smaller, more expeditionary capacity retained in the active component. Marines should pick up the lion-share of expeditionary missions as they invoke far less strategic risk for the nation when they are employed. SOF also provides an effective peacetime engagement tool, from building relationships and cultural understanding in critical locations, to taking out point targets on rare occasion. The Navy is the Navy. We are a maritime nation. Nuff said. The air force? Born of the Cold War we don't really have a model for what to do with these guys in the real world. We need to figure that out. They play a critical part of our deterrence mission, as well as our ability to move forces quickly and secure the airspace of critical locations for critical periods of time (not all air space all the time as the A2AD crowd seem to imply).
But DoD needs to take this serious. It is not our job to be as big as possible and do our job, it is our job to be as small as possible and do our job.
Ranger BNs are not often used in BN sized operations, their training in BN operations are not as extensive as a result. However, their pace of CO and PLT operations is very high nad they are very good at it. Apparently they also function as additional manpower in other special operations. Considering that they are markedly cheaper to produce than most special operations team members and are trained in certain techniques that conventional infantry units are not (and would have a hard time making time to do), I would think that the Ranger Regiment has a valid niche.Quote:
Originally Posted by slapout9
In the end the value of a soldier is what he can "do to his enemy." So Bob..... what can a Ranger do to the enemy that a Regular Soldier or Marine can not do?Quote:
Originally Posted by Bob's World
The Marine Corps disbanded the Raiders because they had a General staff that asked that question and in the end they told the Raiders that their is nothing you can teach the raiders that you shouldn't be teaching to the rest of the Marine Corps. It's the same way with the Rangers, it is to costly and unnecessary duplication. The Ranger skills should be taught as widely as possible through the entire Infantry just like it used to be.
Rangers, 82nd, Marines all work various aspects of the same mission set. You don't just have one screwdriver in your toolbox, nor does one just put trumpets in their brass section. Can you get by with just one flavor? Sure, but it will sometimes be the inappropriate tool for the job, and the job will take longer or be messier because of it.
Our problem is not that we have Ranger Battalions, I think they provide a valuable option to senior leaders. A bigger problem is how we have morphed Ranger Battalions and tailored them to the job of hunting HVTs From highly effective raiders of battalion-sized targets we have turned them into a vast pool of squad/platoon-sized assassins and kidnappers. Not sure we need an entire regiment dedicated to that latter mission as we move forward.
So, to my point, we need to re-balance and right-size the force, and we need to make it as small and efficient as possible. Our geostrategic place on the planet allows us a luxury of being able to assume risks that other nations cannot. We need to leverage that once again.
They say it, but the reality has shown this to be wrong. You simply can't be good at everything all the time. If the Raiders were such a bad idea, why has USMC currently embraced MARSOC? Look at some of Ken Whites arguments about what the military expects of officers and why it is unrealistic, for it is applicable to units as well. None of this is meant as a dig on Marines, they have an aggresive warfighting culture and some very good infantry tactics and better combined arms doctrine then the Army, but there decision to have no (few) "elite" Marines since all Marines are "elite", was a poor choice IMNSHO.Quote:
Originally Posted by slapout9
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