Answers to Bob- Sorry to chime in a little late...
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Originally Posted by
Bob's World
Wilf asks a fair question. Or why not get a production line up and running producing a modern version of the A-6 Skyraider for ourselves and the many small, poor countries that have requirements? (sure they want F-16s, but really?)
I assume you mean the A-1 or AD-1 Skyraider of Vietnam Sandy fame.
The reason why is because we have a production line for the AT-6 and Super Tucano, both of which can do the same job. There are some advantages to having a turboprop vice a prop.
The USAF is currently working procurement of the Light Attack And Reconnaissance aircraft- there's a briefing on it scheduled for 27 Oct at 1230 at CGSC for those who are in the neighborhood.
LAAR will give the USAF a COIN optimized light attack capability that our 6 SOS folks can use to build partner capacity as you suggest.
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For the top end aircraft critical issues are threat, deterrence and asymmetric counters.
1. What is the threat? (combination of capability, inclination, likelihood, risk, etc)
The air threat in the current NSS is the same as the ground and sea threats- we need to be able to do full spectrum from peacetime engagement to COIN to the high end.
The high end threat is the Su-30MKK, F-11, and F-10- soon to be PAK-FA. The other issue is advanced EA. See the report on China's military power:
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs...eport_2009.pdf
Last year's report, but the picture is pretty grim. This threat is real, and the other problem is their numbers vs ours.
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2. Do current platforms effectively deter that threat?
Yes, but we only have 189 F-22s and the last is being built- China is building more of everything mentioned above. F-22s only have 8 missiles - eventually numbers matter. OBTW not all 189 Raptors are available for use...
The only reason we can deter a threat like China right now is our training- and eventually even that will be eclipsed by numbers - even if we match our Korean War 10-1 kill ratio, that still means we could lose everything pretty quickly...
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3. Are there relatively simple, inexpensive counters to these new platforms that can be quickly rolled out by opponents putting us right back at the same deterrence balance we are at currently?
I wish. We're pretty much at the level of picking the low-hanging fruit by improving radars and EW systems. We need a new missile, but that's in the works too. Unfortunately there's no easy answers in air to air.
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4. What are the missions that drive this. Are there changes of policy that would cause some of those missions to (rightfully) either fall off the books or take a much reduced priority.
The missions are Air Superiority, DEAD, INT, Strategic Attack- but you need Air Superiority first to enable the rest- so unless you feel like conceding our great-power status, we can't really drop the mission.
Strategically we can drop supporting Taiwan, but that doesn't help - we still need to be able to deter China. I think that conflict with them over Taiwan is highly unlikely. However, we can't predict what would happen if a serious disruption took place in China's economy, or if the social contract (Chinese Communist Party rule in exchange for economic prosperity and keeping the PLA happy) broke down.
If we can't deter China, a lot of folks (especially Korea, Japan, and Australia) would need to either accommodate China, develop their own militaries, or quickly develop nukes...
I submit that our ability to project power is a big part of why we haven't seen a great power war since WWII... if we lose that ability (which is highly dependent on air and sea superiority) we are in trouble.
In other words, the small wars may not stay small.
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I don't have the answers to any of these. I did participate in the High-End Asymmetric Threat section of the last QDR though, so I do have some insights. Sometimes we use our desire for numbers or types of platforms or organizational units to drive retention or adoption of missions, that in turn then drive policy decisions. My one recommendation is that we need to turn that around to the extent possible.
Services and the corporations who produce these platforms are biased advocates; which is fine, so long as we've designed the process to contain those biases into limits set by our national policies and military missions. Currently (and I suspect historically) they opposite is true. BL, neither General Dynamics nor General Officers should pick our wars for us.
Completely agree. We don't have the cash to buy what we would really like to have, so we have to make do with what we have now.
I think you will end up seeing the USAF follow the Navy and buy some F-16 block 60s as a stop gap- just like the USN's recent Super Hornet buy. Everyone has to hedge because F-35 is going to slip, and at this point it is too big to fail.
I'd be curious to hear more about your QDR insights...
V/R,
Cliff
Thanks for your service. An opposing view.
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Originally Posted by
Cliff
The reason why is because we have a production line for the AT-6 and Super Tucano, both of which can do the same job. There are some advantages to having a turboprop vice a prop.
The USAF is currently working procurement of the Light Attack And Reconnaissance aircraft- there's a briefing on it scheduled for 27 Oct at 1230 at CGSC for those who are in the neighborhood.
LAAR will give the USAF a COIN optimized light attack capability that our 6 SOS folks can use to build partner capacity as you suggest.
Go beyond that and use the same aircraft that all airmen use in initial flight training as the light attack version. Then any airmen can be tasked to fly it just as any can be tasked to fly Reaper/Predator.
Believe light attack aircraft also can be used for homeland defense, counterdrug, and search and rescue. For instance, F-22 airmen in the Florida panhandle could augment scarce fighter flight hours flying light attack missions guarding offshore oil wells, looking for drug runners, and deploying to Afghanistan. Alaska F-22 drivers would augment their hours flying search and rescue and patrolling the pipeline. Langley F-22 drivers would watch for small planes and cargo ships with possible cruise missiles and nukes. If artillerymen are being forced to operate as infantry, it follows that F-22 airmen can contribute to the war in a light aircraft in between white scarf duties.
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The air threat in the current NSS is the same as the ground and sea threats- we need to be able to do full spectrum from peacetime engagement to COIN to the high end.
Hence having F-22 drivers flying light attack aircraft.
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The high end threat is the Su-30MKK, F-11, and F-10- soon to be PAK-FA. The other issue is advanced EA. See the report on China's military power:
Last year's report, but the picture is pretty grim. This threat is real, and the other problem is their numbers vs ours.
However few THREAT nations have large quality fighter inventories, those that do are deterred by nukes, and none have true 5th generation stealth aircraft that allies will have thousands of in a few years. The USAF and friends have priced air combat out of reach of most threat nations and the same level of training is still out of reach in Russia and China. Most of China's and Russia's aircraft are so old that their quantity has little quality of its own. Russian aircraft in Georgia were shot down by MANPAD and friendly fire so we could probably expect similar results in China, whereas allied IR and radar countermeasures and experience would be highly effective.
Agree that the F-35 with internal ordnance will be a highly effective CAS provider during week one and beyond and even better with external stores. The Russians lost several Su-25 in Georgia so S-300/S-400 threats would also hinder use of A-10C...but not F-35....which is coming out 20% cheaper than original government estimates for Lot 4. There is nothing wrong with F-35s that hasn't been wrong with all other aircraft types in their early years. The superior air-to-ground capabilities of F-35 make it preferable to more F-22s...even if restoring more parts for it assembly line was cost feasible.
As MG(Ret) Scales wrote recently, during WWII, being a bomber or submarine serviceman was as dangerous as being an infantrymen. That has not been the case for 65 years because excessive funding has gone to air and sea supremacy at the expense of the average G.I. Joe who still dies and get maimed in the thousands for every 10 Airmen and Sailors that perish or are legless. Only SEALS and JTACs experience remotely comparable risks.
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Yes, but we only have 189 F-22s and the last is being built- China is building more of everything mentioned above. F-22s only have 8 missiles - eventually numbers matter. OBTW not all 189 Raptors are available for use...
That's what F-35 and F/A-18E/F and EA-18G are for. Not every enemy aircraft needs to be shot down by an F-22. AWACS and satellites will know where the good stuff is originating. Ground and sea-based air defense systems will get their share as well.
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The only reason we can deter a threat like China right now is our training- and eventually even that will be eclipsed by numbers - even if we match our Korean War 10-1 kill ratio, that still means we could lose everything pretty quickly...
Our numbers of 5th generation stealth aircraft are climbing faster than their zero.
Even in the Korean war with war-experienced Russian pilots augmenting Chinese, a 10:1 ratio in nearly identical aircraft was the norm. The war experience of Chinese and Russian pilots today, not to mention DPRK or Iranian is essentially non-existent. An F-22 assisted by F/A-18E/F and EA-18G with experienced crews would have much higher ratios because they are much better aircraft and pilots, and will continue to be until plenty of even better allied F-35s and unmanned aircraft exist. Even WVR there would be little to lock onto and F/A-18 and F-35 helmet-mounted displays, F-35 DAS, and clean configuration would prevail when F-22 are arming/refueling. Why haven't we figured out how to do air-to-air rearming with missile pods into internal F-22 and F-35 bays!
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The missions are Air Superiority, DEAD, INT, Strategic Attack- but you need Air Superiority first to enable the rest- so unless you feel like conceding our great-power status, we can't really drop the mission.
Yet the USAF air superiority crowd always ignores the capabilities of Patriots and Naval air defense missiles, let alone the other fighters of other services and allies that won't have to fly from Guam.
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Strategically we can drop supporting Taiwan, but that doesn't help - we still need to be able to deter China. I think that conflict with them over Taiwan is highly unlikely. However, we can't predict what would happen if a serious disruption took place in China's economy, or if the social contract (Chinese Communist Party rule in exchange for economic prosperity and keeping the PLA happy) broke down.
If we can't deter China, a lot of folks (especially Korea, Japan, and Australia) would need to either accommodate China, develop their own militaries, or quickly develop nukes...
Just having lots of F-35s from all services, JASSM-ER fired from B-52, Tomahawk-launching subs, and an offensive missile fired from vertical launch cells, and figuring out how to fix the Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile future problem would be sufficient to fix China. Increased dependence on selling to Walmart and the U.S. would fix the rest.
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I submit that our ability to project power is a big part of why we haven't seen a great power war since WWII... if we lose that ability (which is highly dependent on air and sea superiority) we are in trouble.
In other words, the small wars may not stay small.
Agreed except the area where ability to project power is suffering the most is ground power. The USAF has the most intertheater airlift in the world by a wide margin and yet the US Army wants new GCVs that will hinder ability to use airlfit to deploy or threaten to deploy credible, sustainable heavier armor until sealift arrives.
All the Russians had to do in Serbia was airland airborne forces to deter NATO. Putting a small HBCT combined arms battalion augmenting an airborne brigade on the east side of Taiwan would be sufficient to deter an amphibious assault in the preparation phase.
Strykers alone in the narrow passes of South Korea near the border would be decimated by North Korean infiltrators and stay behind forces with handheld RPGs and ATGMs. And the sealift distances to South Korea are so excessive that airlift and prepositioning are the sole rapid options. But heavy armor without fuel only is effective a few hours. Clearly, a DPRK strategy would be to destroy our fuel tankers with stay behind forces and artillery, and SOF.
I see that the Army is buying more Joint High Speed Vessels which would help in both the Pacific and Persian Gulf. Great unless you buy a fleet of 50+ ton GCVs and future variants of it for the heavy BCT that will quickly eat up a JHSV's 600 ston payload.
All just my opinion, as always.
Some answered in previous response
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Originally Posted by
Cliff
There were rumors that this exact plan would happen, but for F-35 folks.... fly F-35 for the high end, have LAARs or AT-6s for COIN/FAC roles... This would require 2x the planes, and also 2x the maintenance... not exactly affordable in today's day and age.
It would mean fewer total pilots if F-22 aces flew both, augmenting their under 20 Raptor hours per month. Suspect they could more safely practice some air-to-air maneuvers/TTP in the LAAR as well. Just one squadron of 24 LAAR might be shared by three squadrons of F-22s. Maintainers for the 24 LAAR are essential regardless, so it is a sunk cost no matter who flies them.
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Unfortunately, the Russians and Indians plan on fielding PAK-FA by
2013.
See my previous post... the US is producing its 189th (actually 186th operational) F-22 right now. China, India, and Russia are all producing air-to-air fighters still... the US will be producing 0 in a few months. At some point, numbers start to matter. See the link to the DoD report in my previous post for words on the effectiveness of SAMs against our aircraft... unfortunately, the threats have some pretty effective SAMs.
We are producing F-35s that surpass anything China is producing and will beat PakFA in BVR. Suspect EODAS and AIM-9X coupled with helmet mounted displays would do just fine in WVR, as well. Why do you guys never mention that half the day is at night when WVR won't matter too much anyway.
I buy the argument that F-22 and F-35 will run out of missiles, but doubt the "quantity has a quality of its own" numbers will kill too many of our stealth aircraft as they are heading home to rearm. We and allies will get their numbers down rapidly enough to matter. You don't need to win the air war in a week when the longer blockade lasts for months.
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Completely agree on the air-to-ground... the problem I am talking about is air-to-air and SEAD/DEAD... F-22 is much more effective than F-35 in the air-to-air role... F-35 only carries 1/2 the number of missiles... again it comes down to numbers.
You mentioned the missile quantity disparity repeatedly. Suspect from informed forum comments that eventually F-35 will have 6 internal missiles. Its larger numbers of aircraft make up for half the missiles per aircraft and in many non-CAP mission both F-22 and F-35 will have just two AMRAAM.
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Let me start by saying that I totally agree that the folks on the ground are bearing the brunt of the current fight. I have nothing but respect for all of those who have placed themselves at risk around the world... they are all heroes.
Agree 1000% but sickened when things like FCS unmanned ground and air vehicles that could lead dismounted troops through IED fields/roads are not given the same emphasis as air/sea power. We fixed the HMMWV problem with MRAP/M-ATV but not the dismount problem.
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F-18 is not as effective as F-22, and can't survive double digit SAMs. ISR/C2 and datalinks are key for sure.
Suspect that with towed decoys and other countermeasures, helmet-mounted displays not on F-22, a fair amount of stealth, and EA-18G support flying more sorties than F-22 closer to Taiwan and thus outside S300/S400 range, and an eventual AIM-20D...it could hold its own against Chinese aircraft.
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It's unfortunate that the USAF, USN, and USMC's successes in the air in the last few conflicts have made people think that we will always have an overmatch in the air.
Since the advent of the F-15/F-16 have we or allies lost more than one fighter in air-to-air? Don't believe so, and F-22/F-35 stealth is a leap ahead beyond either with threats not currently being able to duplicate that stealth.
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Hmmm... I don't think it is in any one realm that power projection is suffering- they all are. We are dependent on sea and air LOCs for any power projection... and that is ALL services, the whole joint force. Without LOCs, no one can fight... so everyone needs to be concerned about Anti-Access threats.
The Navy has ample stationing in Hawaii and elsewhere adn plenty of back-up carriers. The USAF needs few C-17s and little time to move fighters to Guam/Hawaii/Alaska/Diego Garcia/North Australia/and South Korea/Japan after missile threat is gone.
South Korea has only Strykers able to rapidly reinforce it, and double hulls won't solve all their survivability problems and lack of firepower. Have more confidence in the ability of a C-17 to airland or JHSV to sealand in South Korea or on the east side of Taiwan with mountain-masking prior to their hard-to-miss border crossing or amphibious assault preparations then have confidence in EFVs, amphibious/maritme prepositionings ships, and airborne forces launching a forcible entry after the PLA already controls Taiwan.
Thanks for the great discussion...some final personal views
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Originally Posted by
Cliff
The F-18s will be closer... but again they have a short range (369nm legacy, 520 Super Hornet - and both of those are with 3 external tanks!). The better the Chinese Navy gets, and the more anti-ship ABMs become credible, the less help the carrier can be - because you end up spending more and more effort protecting the boat and less effort projecting power. CFTs on F-35 are unlikely as it would ruin the stealth.
Not sure legacy F-18C/D matter that much and believe ASBM can be defeated through a combination of multispectral smoke (littoral combat ship dispensing smoke in front of carriers?) and the same smoke over island bases in the Pacific on the outer edge of missile range.
http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/1...-of-Obscurants
Wonder if the USAF should look at the F/A-18E/F (or F-35C) for rotating Pacific island-basing and stateside homeland security. Use smoke to defeat ASBM radar/IR sensors, and jammers to locally disrupt Chinese-GPS to eliminate pinpoint targeting. Then employ concrete shelters over catapult launch and recovery to provide passive countermeasures to survive missile attacks while staying within reasonable range and escorting/augmenting KC-X aerial refueling. Marcus Island? Wake Island? Midway Islands? As you mention, up to 29,000 lbs of fuel can be transported internally/externally in a Super Hornet in 5 tanks which when added to KC-X top-off would leave a near perpetual fuel supply and protection escort for KC-X. Add a mini-boom to the F/A-18E/F and have 3 refuelers on station at a track or anchor.
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Agree on the effects. Not sure on the numbers... China is producing F-10s, F-11Bs, and FB-7s... Our first IOC F-35s are in 2012, with the first deployment in 2014 at best...
I think there is a window of risk over the next 5-7 years. I think you are overestimating our advantage, and underestimating the work other folks have done.
Forgive my display of old-guy bias and I truly respect the mature/respectful arguments you are making. But a J-10, J-11B, and FB-7 are no more capable than an F-15/F-16/FA-18E/F and we already acknowledged how few of those have been lost in the past 30+ years...and the experience-level of the PLAAF or PLAN in the next 5-7 years is not likely to be considered near-peer.
While the 1970s-1980s military shared none of the austere repeated deployments and extraordinary ground risk of service today or in the Vietnam war, there was a far more extraordinary "window of risk" in the European theater with double digit thousands of Soviet tanks/BMPs more than capable of rolling over NATO. The related nuclear risk was far higher, as well. So when considering China, with much to lose economically and little to gain over the next 5-7 years by attacking Taiwan, it is hard for me to feel much concern.
And as much as we portrayed the Soviet air and ground threat as 10' tall back then, with the exception of numbers, they truly were not much threat (other than numbers far more in disparity than today's threats) to M1s, Bradleys, F-16, and F-15...but would have posed a serious threat to M60s, M113, and F-4s that were slowly being replaced. THAT was a window of vulnerability! Yet it was addressed with a 50,000 lb Bradley that also proved more than up to task in OIF before being uparmored at which point it remained only in the 60-70,000lbs range...so why does the GCV need to be 100,000-140,000 lbs? Why is it unacceptable for F-35s to take on Pak FA's that lack stealth? China will never own any because the Russians have gotten wise to their repeated attempts to backward engineer.
While respecting any Soldier's loss, find it hard to get very alarmed by the loss of 125 combined-arms rusty Israelis regulars and reservists against a determined Hezbollah foe that had years to dig in and prepare. Where was the smoke to defeat ATGMs/RPGs? CAS (was doing EBO)? Artillery prep? In most realistic future uses of U.S./allied heavy armor and airpower, we would be addressing a threat preparing to or in the process of invading someone else, therefore giving them little time to prepare a proper defense. In addition, the very act of invading would make it difficult to hide advancing armor in slow-go terrain, thus leaving them vulnerable to airpower and ATACMs, and Apaches.
Bradley/Stryker/LAV III survivability in OIF, current air-deployment of 25% of supplies to Afghanistan, the air movement of Strykers and M-ATV there, and the success of 60+ sorties in inserting armor/airborne forces into Bashur, Northern Iraq should be far more revealing to us than any lesson of Lebanon in 2006. Adding belly armor to a GCV should not exceed 80,000+ lbs to retain the key benefits of C-17/C-5M air-deployment of heavy-light mix air deployment facilitated by the current trend of placing HBCTs and IBCTs at many of the same division-home bases.