Isn't this monograph kinda off the mark...
I thought it was an interesting argument but to me it failed to differentiate between strategic and operational. I'm just a lowly nug and may be a little slow here at ILE but what does FM 100-5 or FM 3-0 have to do with strategy--which seems to be the main issue they have. I mean, the name of the manual is "Operations." Perhaps its a definitional issue but shouldn't strategy involve more than one branch of services and possibly--probably heresy--more than one department in the executive branch? The argument the authors make that the operational level of war "operate[s] free from unwelcome interference from strategy...(67)" is, IMHO, flawed. If they truly believe this, they fail to answer the question why. If you like the DIME model, FM 100-5 and FM 3-0 are really only a subset of the M--the failue of the USG to have a true strategic (i.e. longer term that the 1 year mandate of the NSS) plan is probably a huge contributing cause. The rest of the USG is not fully integrated into the strategic plan and therefore strategy devolves into the land of operations. The authors conclusions--specifically the CvC arguments about war and politics--I think are valid, but by laying the blame at the feet of the operational level they miss the true issues in contemporary warfare linking politics, strategy, and tactics.
That's true in German usage, nominally true for most but the US Army
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Fuchs
The Operational level is the tactical level of corps and theater headquarters.
has a tendency to get bogged down with minutia and adopt the latest, best thing as the holy grail. The authors of the monograph point out -- not too cleanly -- that our fetish with 'the operational level' tends to make us try to apply it where it isn't appropriate. Their problem is that since they apparently were not there when the Army adopted the 'operational art' and probably have little experience around the institution that is the US army (as opposed to the people in that Army), they misread our inability to apply what's needed when it's needed as a flawed adaptation instead of what it is; inflexibility and an excessively slavish approach to 'doctrine.' They pointed their attack upstream instead of downstream where it's more appropriate.
(With a note that we, the people in the Army aren't that inflexible or slavish -- but the institution is. Very much so. Sadly :( )
I tend to agree with Fuchs, above...
LINK.
I tend to agree with Wilf and PhilR, there is no such thing as an Operational level but it's not a major issue. If one just has to use the term for some reason, I believe Fuchs is correct. It was and is a Continental European construct and applicable to warfare there. It, as a term and concept, can be elsewhere employed but it is subject to dangerous misuse.
The Operational level of war applies to the Theater level and their employment of subordinate commands (be they Armies, Corps or Divisions) and it applies in only major conventional force on force combat (that does not preclude the use of SOF or irregular warfare as Operational assets or techniques). Operational level methodology entails maneuvering major formations in consonance with strategic aims in order to facilitate tactical success. Anything other than that is either Strategic or tactical.
Militarily, lacking a major conflict against a peer force, virtually all effort is going to be tactical as, in the West, we emphasize civilian control of the military. Strategy thus becomes the responsibility of the Government (hopefully, with military advice if the armed forces are to be employed) and the Forces are or should be responsible only for Operational and Tactical employment in the execution of that strategy.
One thing for sure, no Corporal or Platoon is going to be Operational or Strategic. That's a dumb and dangerous misnomer. Situation dependent, a Battalion might be a strategic force. More likely, a Brigade, Task Force, Division or Corps with a General Officer commanding can be but such a force is unlikely to need or even be able to employ Operational level methodology.
Error occurs when one attempts to apply Operational level concepts and methodology to inappropriate settings. To wit, the Coalition in Afghanistan. Afghanistan itself IS the operational level for this war. Strategy put us there, everything done there is tactical.
In most western COIN efforts, the nation involved is the de facto Operational level, it becomes the Theater as operations will generally be limited to that nation only and maneuver of large formations will not be necessary -- or even desirable. Strategy places forces in that nation, all that then transpires there is tactical. Tactical operations, as always, can have strategic effect. Similarly, Strategic decisions can have tactical effects. Rules of engagement developed politically for example. Or a decision to not deploy or use certain military assets, equipment or units. Conversely, a political decision that forces the use of certain elements can have an effect.
Operational decisions can have strategic and / or tactical effects. An effort to employ Operational level processes in an inappropriate setting can also have strategic and tactical effects and they will almost always be adverse. See Afghanistan...
Yep. We did that until we got overinvolved with
Quote:
Originally Posted by
slapout9
Instead of calling it the Operational level, didn't we used to call them Campaigns? Or is that something else?
Europe and all things European in the 80s... :rolleyes:
Operations are performed by Doctors on the unsuspecting...
Operations can be the title or part thereof of an office, officer or other entity. Operation __(insert name here)___ can be whatever anyone wants it to be as Fuchs says. The Operational level of war is just that. operations (small 'o') are what units do... ;)
operations (small 'o') are also performed by computer programs and subsets thereof... :D
To preclude confusion, I suggest re-titling 'The Operational level of war' to 'the Mediocre level of war' (based on the number of Corps Commanders relieved over the years...). :wry:
Which brings up a question. How can COIN be the 'graduate level of war' (which is fallacious, it's the middle school level of war -- chaos and hormones driving pettiness and all round immaturity to new new levels) with no Operational level per se? * :o
* GO make work employment ala Field Forces / XXIV Corps in Viet Nam and similar later examples do not count.
I can't see the argument being proved
The paper neds a rewrite and to substantiate the argument. It fails to substantaite its claims in the introduction or even explain them.
East Timor was not a failure of military strategy, and it was too small to claim any theory of an operational art. It failed because the poltical groups in East Timor, who were split along differing lines of personalities long before independence, were usurped by Mari Alkatiri's FRETLIN group. Threw the East Timorese political parties plans into disarray. There are other reasons I am happy to explain off line.
The paper wrongly promotes Tukhachevsky as the star of the operational art, but it was Sveckhin and to a lesser extent Kamanev who started it, although Tukhachevsky put it into practice. The Operational art was based on the needs of various fronts during the Russian Civil War.