Very good points above by several
I'd suggest that the critical point in the development of practices in generals is service as a Battalion commander. Puller was and is indeed an icon but his later career based itself upon his service as Cdr 2/4 and 1/7.
Westmoreland correctly wasn't on any list of greats but his experience as a Battalion Commander at the tail end of WW II pointed him in that direction. I worked for several Generals who had commanded Battalions in Viet Nam. Those who commanded early in the war with full, non-infused and generally well trained first string Army units were pretty laid back and willing to give subordinates a littler slack -- they were also willing to accept and try innovative ideas.
Those who had commanded later when they had to accept infusion from other units, when it was nominally illegal to move a unit outside artillery coverage, there were too few Captains and senior NCOs but a slew of 2LTs and SGTs who would do anything you asked them (but didn't know much and required considerable watching) were invariably over cautious and micro-management inclined.
I had earlier noted a similar phenomenon with WWII Army veterans, those who had commanded Battalions in the Pacific were generally far more flexible and less excitable than were their counterparts who had served in Europe. In the Corps, all were Pacific veterans and I don't recall meeting any that were excitable except Puller who was a minor force of nature... :)
Thus I think that a combination of the 35 year (± 5) old temperment and first command of a multi-unit echelon where the subordinates have to be granted considerable independence and are more frequently out of sight merge to produce the military and command techniques and methods of the Generals.
Perhaps we should look at that.
To amplify on one thing Marc mentioned, Ullman when III Corps commander IIRC had one of the Diviisions at hood on the way back in from the field. he ordered them to halt and bring all the Officers into the Garrison area for an Officers call and to let the NCOs continue the move to billets and insure accountability and get the cleanup started. I have been informed by a reliable source that a couple of LTCs had absolute panic attacks and I know that on hearing this anecdote, one former Battalion Commander in my presence said, very seriously and angrily, that had he been there, he would not have complied with the order and that Ullman was dead wrong to have issued such an order...
Perhaps we should also look at role changes and playing "Fallout One."
I routinely did it with NCOs at Platoon through Battalion level for many years and it works. Strangely, I could only convince one Battalion commander to do it with the Officers -- but that worked well also and he went on to get two stars...
We should be breeding trust, flexibility and innovative thought. My perception is that we're doing that better than we did in the mid-60s until recently period but perhaps not as well as we did it pre-MacNamara. I believe that all three attributes are going to be needed over the next few years and we should be developing rather than inhibiting them.
CMO or Military Governance type doctrine?
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Another aspect of this that occurred to me is whether the leadership skills and attributes of past generals (or officers) are the same as are needed today when our militaries are faced with increasingly complex ways of warfare, as used both by us and our opponents? Certainly many of the skills and attributes of part 'hero-warriors' are applicable today, but I wonder whether some may not be, and whether there are skills and attributes needed today for which there was no requirement for a leader to have. I am not competent to judge whether this an issue worth considering, but you and a great many of the SWB certainly are. If there is difference, this would suggest an emphasis on more modern leaders that better exemplify the traits you are seeking to instill.
We've got some doctrine out there on the subject - but the idea of using these type vignettes (in any but the most rudimentary sense) is new to me (if anybody has some examples with doctrinal references please help me out).
Surely there are probably a myriad of recent (within the last 20 years) U.S. and multi-national examples where innovation by a soldier or civilian serving in one capacity but faced with challenges outside that capacity has innovated a solution. I think at the GO level you can start with a Chiarelli type example, but we could quickly find a set of link examples that ends with a National Guardsman who deployed as an 11B, but whose civilian job might have been running a dairy or poultry farm, or power plant engineer and quickly found themselves in the spot light. Highlighting the importance (through a true vignette) of an individual as a mission critical enabler would be good I think toward fostering both an understanding of how such things are linked, and in flattening things out a bit.
Also of use might be using some examples:
- of indigenous partnerships to innovate and solve problems ranging from military to building capacity in other areas
- Inter-Agency/IO/NGO cooperation where the civilian is highlighted
- Tactical/Operational/Strategic problem vignettes that highlight the type of innovation required solve other then military problems - (they might also reflect some possible solutions sets)
I need to go back and look at some doctrinal pubs - I think the FM 3-0 is going to hit the streets in conjunction with the AUSA - I wonder how it will be different?
Best Regards, Rob
The Marines could -- can, do -- use the tradition
aspect to good effect; the Army less so. Our theoretical traditions are abstract and while units pay them lip service, few have anywhere near the depth of meaning that they do in other armies, particularly those who adapted from the British Army.
Thus, I'm a little dubious that would work for us sans a major culture change in the US Army. Add to that todays attention spans and the fact that history in US Schools seems to be an almost proscribed subject...
Let's see what Marc comes up with. As he he says there are more esoteric rituals that might have merit. There are also some very practical efforts that could be pursued.