New Paper on Soviet Advisory Effort in Afghanistan
I just found this recent report from the Cold War International History Project “The Blind leading the Blind: Soviet Advisors, Counter-Insurgency and Nation-Building in Afghanistan.” As described in the paper, this addresses a less discussed aspect of the Soviet experience there. While I believe that we should be careful in taking direct lessons from the Soviet experience, some of the issues raised are worth considering in light of our own efforts.
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/p..._Web_Final.pdf
Quote:
"It [this paper] will show that Soviet leaders believed that they needed to undertake a nation-building project in order to stabilize the country and bring their troops home. Nation building in this context involved developing a successful governing party, extending the reach of the party and the government into rural zones throughout the country, and providing material incentives to help the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) gain legitimacy. Building socialism was not a goal in itself—Soviet leaders believed the country was not ripe for socialism and urged their tutees in the PDPA to move away from a revolutionary agenda. The goal was political stabilization, with nation-building as its major tool. That this often looked like socialism stemmed from two factors: one, that the PDPA leaders thought of themselves as revolutionary Marxists and shed this coat only reluctantly, and two, that the advisers sent by Moscow, particularly the party and agricultural advisers, only knew how to replicate their experience in the USSR and likewise could not (or would not) shed the ideological approach that was natural to them."
How much difficulty do we have in shedding our own ideological approach, if that is what is necessary?
Phil Ridderhof USMC
Afgansty: The russians in afghanistan, 1979-89
A book review of 'AFGANSTY: THE RUSSIANS IN AFGHANISTAN, 1979-89' by Roderic Braithwaite, a former UK Ambassador in the USSR, who IIRC can take a decidedly unorthodox viewpoint on affairs:http://www.spectator.co.uk/books/676...ifferent.thtml
The review opens with
Quote:
There used to be two rules of successful imperialism. First, don’t invade Russia. Second, don’t invade Afghanistan. As Rodric Braithwaite points out, invading the latter country itself offers no real difficulties. The Afghans abandon their strongholds and take to the hills, allowing the invader to enjoy the illusion of power in Kabul, with a puppet leader installed in the Bala Hissar, the old palace fortress. The problems come later, as a long war of attrition achieves little and finally obliges the invader to cut his losses and run.
Ends with:
Quote:
His book has the great merit of treating the episode as a unique and horrific experience, while allowing the reader to draw his own parallels with the British involvement in Afghanistan in the 19th century, and indeed the present day.
Afghansty: serialised (2 0f 2)
Part 2:http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russ...nistan-part-ii
On a very different aspect of the war, the impact on the veterans and their families. Some echoes here of the USA and Vietnam.
Near the end is this:
Quote:
And indeed the failures were not military. Neither the Soviet army in Afghanistan nor the American army in Vietnam was defeated: they held the ground and eventually withdrew in good order. The failures in both cases were failures of intelligence, of judgement, and of assessment. Both the Americans and the Russians set themselves unattainable strategic goals. Neither were able to achieve their main political objective: a friendly, stable regime which would share their ideological and political goals.
Soviet SOF veteran on the Muj
Thanks to Kings of War (KoW) for this:
Quote:
...He had quite a lot of such photos of fierce looking Mujahids because for the most part what his work had involved was walking around Afghanistan with a bag full of money and favours, living on his wits, and hiring one band of Mujahideen to go kill some other band one month and vice versa the next.
Link:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2011/07/eph...nd-desiderata/
There is a b&w photo of three tribesmen from a Russian website and this text which explains a lot about the locals: Using a Google translation
Quote:
Baluchi nomads who inhabited the southern provinces were mostly are friendly, but still had a warlike reputation and never parted with their weapons. Sometimes act as agents agreed, taking a service fee by the same weapon. Beluji Nomads, found in the southern Provinces, Were the Most Part for Friendly, BUT due to fierce warrior Their Reputation They Were Never met When Carrying Weapons.
Link:http://afgan.ru/39/mfoto20.htm
Building Afghanistan’s Security Forces in wartime The Soviet Experience
A RAND report 'Building Afghanistan’s Security Forces in wartime The Soviet
Experience' that has appeared and not picked up before; hat tip to an Indian magazine.
RAND's summary:
Quote:
Security force assistance, specifically the development of Afghanistan's security forces, is a central pillar of the counterinsurgency campaign being waged by U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. The outcome of the campaign hinges, in large measure, on the effectiveness of the assistance provided to the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, and other security forces. This report provides an overview of Soviet efforts to improve and facilitate the training and development of Afghan security forces, specifically, the Afghan military, police, and intelligence services. It covers the time period from 1920–1989, with specific focus on the period of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, from 1979–1989. To do so, it draws on Western, Soviet, and Russian historical sources and interviews in Kabul and Moscow with individuals involved on the Soviet side and on the Afghan side. It concludes with comparisons with and lessons for ongoing security force assistance in Afghanistan.
Link:http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1078.html
For those who have little time maybe the final chapter is what you seek:
Quote:
Conclusion: Parallels, Disconnects, and What the International Security Assistance Force Can Learn from the Soviet Experience
Or the Indian magazine's review, pg.17:
Quote:
She concludes that the ISAF could learn some lessons from the Soviet experience in terms of a greater Soviet willingness to deploy large numbers of police advisors, well-matched in rank and age to Afghan counterparts, better retention in volunteer Sarandoy force as well as the dangers of relying on militia
Link:http://zenpundit.com/wp-content/uplo...ommunityed.pdf
Soviet Experience in Afghanistan: Book Review Twofer
Soviet Experience in Afghanistan: Book Review Twofer
Entry Excerpt:
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Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.
Parallel frontlines: ten years of Soviet and American occupation compared
Cross refer Post 4, entitled 'Parallel frontlines: ten years of Soviet and American occupation compared' on the Ten myths about Afghanistan thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=14262
RAF learning lessons paper
Came across this short article whilst looking for something else: 'What are the enduring lessons of the Soviet campaign in Afghanistan 1979-1988 and what can the RAF learn from the Soviet experience?' by a RAF officer, Squadron Leader Fowler on a course and published in the UK Defence Academy Yearbook 2009.
Link and go to Pg.190:www.da.mod.uk/.../424148-Defence-Academy-Yearbook-2009.pdf
KGB veteran: a small glimpse into his ways
An intriguing semi-obituary of a Soviet era KGB senior officer who committed suicide in March 2012, added here as the comments on the Soviet role in Afghanistan fit better:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article..._spy?page=full
Quote:
Shebarshin's Afghan years convinced him of the futility of any occupation of that unruly, martial land and revealed the depth of the cooked intelligence that launched the Red Army's intervention and doggedly supported the failed military adventure for nine long years.
Even better is the tale of the crashed SU-25, which has a quirky end:
Quote:
The Pakistanis, on America's behalf, made the colonel the usual offer: a condo in Phoenix, a Ford F-150 pickup truck, a good dog, and a good life.
Leaving Afghanistan: is the USA following the USSR strategy?
A fascinating Parameters article, hat tip to SWJ Blog, entitled 'Leaving the Graveyard: The Soviet Union’s Withdrawal From Afghanistan':http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/P...r/Fivecoat.pdf
Quote:
The Soviet military strategy combined control of the cities and population, security of the major roads, an aggressive train and equip program for the Afghan military, and focused military operations to eliminate insurgent strongholds. From 1985 to 1989, the Soviet Union helped the DRA forces grow from 252,900 troops to 329,000 troops in a joint force comprised of KhAD,
ministry of interior, and army forces
Quote:
The United States’ military strategy in Afghanistan in 2012 is similar to the 40th Army’s: control the population, secure the roads, fight the insurgency in the south and east, and train and equip the Afghan forces. Like the Soviet Union, the United States has struggled to secure the population (an estimated 36 percent of key terrain districts were under government control in September 2010) with significantly less combat power—11.2 security forces per 1,000 citizens. With a projected decline in coalition and Afghan combat power, the United States and its Afghan allies are at a security high watermark. As the number of forces decline, tough decisions will have to be made
The author is optimistic that a political strategy, with deadlines that are kept, with a stronger air force and intelligence service (for intell and para-military arm) will be enough for a Kabul regime to fulfil Western and Afghan needs.
I wonder if the ANSF realise that after 2014, if they fight, their chances of being KIA / wounded will greatly increase. With less air support, logistic support (inc. medical treatment) and more.
Worth a read, although the information ops aspect will need a lot of work in Afghanistan.