Clinging to the past for what?
I love these conversations where those indoctrinated at CGSC in pseudo-intellectual theories of war rally around Clausewitz and Army doctrine that frequently isn’t worth the paper it is written on. Anyone who dares questions this sacred doctrine is subject to heresy trails and is excommunicated. Of course there is no obligation on the true believers’ part to justify their hypotheses. I argue these so called “principles” are not based on objective observation, but simply faith and indoctrination.
They are called principles of war. A principle in the military generally means it should never be violated. In another forum we couldn’t agree on the definition of war, but simply agreed you know what it is when you’re in it. We generally agree we’re at war now, so what level of war do these so called principles apply to: strategic, operational, or tactical, or all of them? I will only argue a couple of the principles.
1. Mass is no longer required to prevail at the tactical, operational or strategic levels. Whether we call it a level of war (LIC, MIC, or HIC), 4GW (I don’t like the term either), or something else, desired effects can be achieved without mass. Al Qaeda achieved an impressive tactical/strategic short to mid-term victory on 9/11 without the use of mass. Numerous insurgents have achieved their desired end state using infiltration and selected acts of terror without the use of mass. With our superior training and technology we can achieve tactical and operational success without mass also. We didn’t need mass for our Air Force to conduct a raid on Libya. We didn’t need mass to prepare to drop a nuclear weapon on Moscow if our other forms of defense didn’t work. Of course I have seen mass defined at least five different ways in an attempt to force this principle to fit to various scenarios. I have seen more time wasted in planning groups trying to defend this nonsense than actually determining what needs to be done. We need a Martin Luther in the U.S. Army to formalize the divide that I know exists between those who are trying to determine how to win, and those who are simply trying to defend their traditional education. Traditionalists should be forced to defend themselves with logical arguments instead of faith based arguments.
2. Surprise is not “always” required, especially if you have absolute advantage (that doesn’t mean mass). At the tactical level surprise is generally desired, but at the strategic level we may very well want to advertise our intent (threaten our foes to comply and if they don’t, then follow through, e.g. weapons inspections in Iraq). The utility of surprise for COIN operations is generally limited to the tactical level.
The list goes on, each principle can be challenged, which in effect means it is not a principle. Sometimes they apply, and sometimes they don’t, which really makes me wonder what the “so what” factor is. Are these supposed to be criteria we use to evaluate courses of action? How do they help the war fighter? Furthermore, how can we simply assume that these so called principles of war apply to COIN? Conventional wars are focused on an enemy’s military and irregular conflicts are focused on the population. The two types of conflicts are not the same. These principles were developed for conventional conflicts between peer competitors. These principles made perfect sense for the type of war they were designed for, but they make little sense today.
What is your definition of surprise? I suspect
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Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
1. Surprise - what is your definition of surprise?
our definitions in a military context are quite similar. Simply in my view it means doing the unexpected and can be anything from a withdrawal to a no-firearms infiltration by small teams to an Inchon Landing and most everything in between. The choices are only limited by ones imagination and initiative...
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2. Local dominance - so what distribution?
Strange question, METT-T applies as always -- not trying to be doctrinaire because I'm certainly not that but ask a question, get an answer.
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3. Agility - do you mean the ability to change direction quickly?
Uh, no. That's only a relatively small part of the agility quotient and a rather silly one to cite i'd think. I mean the mental flexibility, equipment flexibility and organizational flexibility to respond quickly to enemy actions taken, hopefully, in response to own actions that precipitated the situation at hand..
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4. Initiative - initiate means to start, so why is starting something a principle?
Two nations divided by a common language :D . No, I mean to foster and encourage initiative on the part of subordinates and units and, tactically and operationally (and far more importantly), to always seek to be the initiator of actions rather than to respond to the opponents actions. If you don't think that's important, we can disagree on the value.
The ability to think and to act in the absence of orders or when faced with an unusual situation. It also reinforces Agility and Surprise
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5. Simplicity - meaning only do something simple? Comparative to what?
Avoid complex plans, the more complexity, the more openings for failure. Sometimes complexity is required but in my experience, that's quite rare.
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6. Objective - what about freedom of action?
I'm easy, change it to 'goal' or 'aim.' Freedom of action is a given if initiative is fostered and encouraged. The issue is to remain focused on the purpose and destination of the operation.
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7. Execution - meaning what?
Kill the guilty? Or the process actually followed as opposed to the planned course in achieving the goal or aim. Or you could reverse paraphrase this: ""I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!""
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8. Economy of force - relative to what and meaning what?
Don't apply "overwhelming force." Use what's needed to do the job. Why send five men on a patrol when three are adequate -- or, even better, a single Scout can do the job. Why insist on a coordinated two Brigade attack when a Reinforced Battalion infiltration will do a better job? No sense risking more casualties than necessary. There are other considerations but that's one.
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9. Security - what about activity?
Security means watch your rear and practice sensible OpSec for the level of force involved. I have no earthly idea what you mean by "what about activity."
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I am in no way looking to be dismissive of your list, but I would ask what such a list is supposed to achieve? How does having such principles or even being aware of them help the practice of operations?
For the impossibly brilliant, such a list is a total waste of time; for the pedestrian it gives a simple list of ideas to consider in the conduct of operations. It is a framework, no more, for the application of force in war. If one dwells at Platoon level, it's a totally unnecessary list; at higher echelons, it may have some utility for many, little for a few. It is admittedly too long, it can be refined down to five. Which five?
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The challenges to each principle are derived from Leonhard.
Have not read it. Given this quote Amazon says is therein:
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"We still persist in studying a type of warfare that no longer exists and that we shall never fight again." Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare, 1961.
I probably won't bother. People have been telling me that war as we knew it is gone forever since the late 40s; been to three Wars, two county fairs and a goat roping since then and war is pretty much war. I heard there'll never be another amphibious landing -- then I went to Inchon, been downhill on that score ever since. I've heard about the demise of Parachute troops and the death of the Tank. Right...
Principles of War are like principles of living, some need them, some don't. Having a sensible set available may do some good and is unlikely to do much harm.
Good post, WM, even if you did
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Originally Posted by
wm
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On a separate note, here's an anecdote related to Ken's comment about the order of presentation of the principles. When I learned them from an Armor officer in ROTC, he lead off with Maneuver; an artillery officer who taught them in OBC started with Mass while the infantry-branched tactics guru led off with Offensive.
My personal mnemonic sort goes like this: maneuver, objective, surprise, simplicity, mass, offensive, security, unity of command, economy of force. Part of the arrangement puts what I consider the key components to building a plan that is likely to succeed as the first four items, the remaining 5 are also important, but their relative im[portance is much more dependent on METT-TC, IMHO. They are arranged in order simply to remember them as MOUSE.
include a quote from from a Dinosaur. :wry:
I think it's particularly good that you included the paragraph of yours I quote above. Being old, I'd truly forgotten that my early days also included a different order depending on who was spouting the principles. The thing that was pounded in my head was that the order was irrelevant, apply them to the situation at hand and you may not need all of them. Perhaps we've gotten away from that.
That triggered another thought. All forms of warfare have their devotees, all our little Mafias (and I've belonged to a couple) make it entirely too easy to develop mantras that become dogma. Take the people bit. I don't really have an objection to including the 'C' -- just a reactionary move objecting to change for change's sake -- and I acknowledge that 'C' is not such a change, it does have a place. Sometimes I just say stuff to see if everyone's awake... :D
However, that let me recall I had before 1960 been informed that COIN did required a focus on people. Then, after working in three Insurgencies and a couple of IW operations that were not quite insurgencies in the strictest sense, I realized two things that occurred in all of those.
1. The vast majority of the people just wanted all those involved in the actual conflict of force to just go away and leave them alone. Period.
2. If you are a foreigner, particularly if there is a large cultural and /or racial gap, they are not ever going to give you their hearts and minds and are not going to trust their own folks who are on your side.
Get too wrapped around the people bit and you'll expect things you'll never see. Yes, the focus is on the people rather than on the enemy forces but it's entirely too easy to determine that a specific pattern of operation is the holy grail. I doubt that any one size fits all is going to adapt totally to all situations and the tendency to adopt a mantra and make it a dogma exists.
All that's required to avoid that is a little initiative and mental agility. :cool:
When he was still persona grata
Larry Cable used to delight CGSC students with his comment on MOO TWAAA, "Sounds like a cow going out of both ends."
Cheers
JohnT