Distinguishing "Causes" from "causes"
This comment from Slap:
Quote:
I say a cause is nothing more than a large group of people with a common motive. It turns into an insurgency/revolution when it reaches a certain tipping point as to the total number of people involved.
got me thinking. What I come up with is that we use the same word "cause" to mean two quite different things:
1. In one sense, we look at "cause" and "effect" based on a set of more or less objective facts: e.g., what factors "caused" the accident. Those factors span a spectrum from the most "proximate" to the most remote ("but for causation", "ultimate causation" - but for a nail, the kingdom was lost). In the accident case, we focus on the more proximate causes and the extent to which each of them contributed to the accident in assessing comparative fault (where the motivations of the parties does come into play). In this rather inexact form of art, the jury finds A, X%; B, Y%; C, Z% at fault and awards damages accordingly. And, certainly, folks use a similar process to consider the "causes" of an insurgency.
2. In another sense, we look at "cause" not with respect to effect, but as one or more of the "Causes" that appear in the "Narratives" of the revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries. Each of those "Causes" may or may not have a basis in a "cause" that we find objectively (Meaning 1). Each of them does, however, have a basis in the perceptions and motives of the populace as they view their individual situations. As to those "Causes", "Motives" are very much intermixed and crucial to the feedback process which frames the "Narrative" (whether revolutionary or counter-revolutionary). That is the basis for Mao's "from the people, to the people", where the "Narrative" is taken in raw form from the People, shaped by the Party, and then returned to the People, who reshape it in a continued "chicken & egg" scenario. The "Narrative" (as one of the factors) probably will have an effect on the outcome of the insurgency - and, hence, would be a "cause".
To sum the distinctions in blunt terms: People die because of a "cause"; people die for a "Cause".
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This continuation is somewhat thinking out loud; although the thoughts have occured to me before.
In Southeast Asia, we can look at four countries: Indochina, Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines. As to them, we can accept some common factors:
1. All were feudal (as the Marxists used that term) and colonial, pre-WWII.
2. All were occupied by the Japanese during WWII (showing the people that an Asian military could defeat Western militaries).
3. During WWII, nationalist movements were strengthened.
4. At the end of WWII, the colonial powers returned (length of stay varied).
5. After WWII, insurgencies developed in all (in Indochina and Indonesia, we have I and II cases).
We could (simplistically, IMO) look at WWII as the "cause" of those insurgencies and that the "Causes" were "anti-feudalism" and "anti-colonialism". There is some truth in that, but the realities were more complex.
In considering those six insurgencies (Indochina I & II, Malaya, Indonesia I & II, the Philippines), Bill Pomeroy (CPUSA author and special operator) left us with some good advice in his Guerrilla Warfare & Marxism (1968, International Publishers, the CPUSA bookstore - book no longer in catalog), p.200:
Quote:
The theory that there is an "Asian model" of contemporary guerrilla liberation struggles (it is assumed to be patterned on the Chinese experience) breaks down with a close examination of each struggle. This has been pointed out in the Introduction, but it needs to be stressed further that liberation movements in the region have been variegated, each with its own historical roots, deriving from the peculiar nature of the colonial system in each colony, and each pursuing its own course of development.
With that caveat in mind, considering the "Causes" expressed in the "Narratives" (both revolutionary and counter-revolutionary) in each of these six instances gains some understanding as to one factor (among many) that made each of them different from the others, in both development and outcomes. That is an exercise that I've not yet completed.
Regards
Mike
Agreed as to what a cause is
Quote:
Originally Posted by
slapout9
I say a cause is nothing more than a large group of people with a common motive. It turns into an insurgency/revolution when it reaches a certain tipping point as to the total number of people involved.
But what an organization's "Cause" is is a very different thing from what the "causation" for a conflict is.
For an example, I listed above some aspects of what I believe contributed to causation for the American insurgency against Great Britain. Their cause however, was probably best summed up in one word:
Independence
I think it is very important to sort out the differences between causation, motivation, and cause when addressing an insurgency. By putting these very different things into the correct boxes, one can then begin to focus their efforts either as the counterinsurgent, or insurpport of the counterinsurgent, for best effect.
Most people I meet dump them all into one box, like a the way a typical guy dumps all his clothes into the washer. Sure, they get "washed", but it isn't particularly effective.
My $.02, woth approximately that...
I think BW has valid points if we're discussing insurgency. There's a certain problem in applying those points to our current conflicts, though, because we're not fighting against insurgencies. One of the reasons our current problem set looks so complex is that we keep slamming square pegs into round holes and trying to impose grandiose but imaginary and counterproductive constructs such as "war on terror" and "global insurgency".
We're fighting a war against AQ, but AQ is not an insurgency, unless we stretch the definition of insurgency far beyond the breaking point. AQ is not populace-based or nationally based, nor is it directed toward the overthrow of an existing government. It's never been able to muster sufficient support in any national environment to drive a true insurgency, though it has managed to exploit existing insurgencies that it did not create. AQ doesn't need to move the populace of any given nation to establish a COG and overthrow a Government, it draws its strength from diffusion and holding a relatively small but very highly motivated core of true believers spread out among a large number of national environments. An insurgency needs to establish a support base among a national populace, a terrorist group does not.
I don't see the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan as insurgencies either. We didn't start these fights to defend a government from insurgents, we started them to remove governments we found distasteful. We succeeded, and created power vacuums in both areas. What we are seeing now is not insurgency against established governments, it is armed competition to fill that vacuum. In each case we support one one of the contending parties, which we choose to call a government.
In this environment "good governance" may be less an issue than it would be in a traditional government vs insurgent scenario. The armed parties are not fighting for good government, they are fighting for power, which they will use to advance their own interests. The populace is less concerned with good governance than with staying out of the line of fire and with supporting whatever faction they think will best advance the interests of the groups they actually identify with, more likely to be defined by family, clan, tribal, or sectarian distinctions than by any concept of nationhood. "Good governance" is only an issue to the extent that it is defined as "governance that brings benefits and protection to me and mine".
In some cases, especially in Afghanistan, people may be fighting not because they object to bad government but because they simply don't want to be governed. In this case any external government constitutes bad government.
In short, I think BW makes valid points about what we might call the Cold War pattern of insurgency. I'm just not sure our current fights fit into this pattern.
What AQ is doing & "global insurgency"
Hi Dayuhan et al,
My two centavos worth since I cite two posts. ;)
We may be on the same page.
As close as I can come, AQ is waging global special operations warfare. If you want to say they are waging global unconventional warfare, that's OK since AQ's operations take place in areas it regards as "eneny-occupied" territory. See this post:
Hi John - part 2
As to "global", but not "insurgency" (except as part of the toolkit), see this post:
You're moving in the right direction
Those are my current best shots at the 25m target.
Regards
Mike