Probably a few ways to get it "mo better" using the BCT as the organization around which to build. I think it starts by defining far enough out where that BCT will be going so they can:
- consider the current conditions and start building information on the environment early
- figure out what their shortfalls are based on who they need to partner with e.g. is a 1:1 BCT to IA BDE partnership, or is it a 1:1 BCT, 10 police stations, some CLC/SoI types, and a National Police BN - along with the need to either fill some slots on the PRT or to provide a senior LNO who can synch ops, and some security for their movement and other life support issues.
-Is their a need build up other parts of the infrastructure such as provide TF 134 type support to help the partner build cases? Are there any prisons which need to be developed in order to support security sector reform and development (this one is often over looked and we've paid for it - most recently at Badush in Iraq 07 and Kandahar this month). How about partnering with local clinics and hospitals - not only a developmental issue, but also a security issue. How about other emergency and public services?
This could make for a very pregnant BCT (vs. a pyramid), but that does not mean we should shy away from it if it supports the mission. Just as we'd planned modularity for other environments, with a good lead in time to figure out what they need, the additional personnel and equipment and the authority and resources to get soldiers the right training, I think a BCT could do it better then sending in an ad-hoc package that arrives at different times. As it goes through its deployment it can help the follow on unit make its assessment as to what it needs next year, and what it does not.
If the BCT does the mission and lays out its capability and capacity gaps - then the various providers can figure out how fill them. It may not be perfect, and they may not get them all, but at least under unity of command the BCT CDR would have a better idea of where he's coming up short and then be able to decide where to accept risk.
Down the road some:
At some point we would not necessarily have to have a centralized TT training site for them either. At the point where those skills became institutionalized at that level - there might be enough "master trainers" and former advisors resident in the BCTs to run their own programs. This was my point about ASIs (Additional Skill Identifiers) that classified what type of training and experience a soldier had so it could be built into the MTO&E at various echelons. MTO&Es are an important part of training and readiness to perform what missions we give to units. The are derived from the same process that drives UMRs, school slots, funding, priorities, CL V allotments. In this case having the ASIs on the MTO&E means that this is an at least semi-permanent feature of the BCT and in line with the issue of future relevancy to land power.
On PME:
We might have a specialized school for advising FSFs that we could send those identified in their units as having the most compatible personal skills, traits and attributes. This is not a pre-deployment school, or a in country academy (although it might accommodate some who needed a crash course), but a 3 month course that was focused on advising FSF - with no time on those skills the unit should develop. In other words none of the pre-deployment which eats up so much time - rather the school would focus on how to build relationships, how to advise on core competencies that were already developed on an individual and unit level, etc. It could be run by the service, or it could be run by the Joint Proponent for SFA.
We already have some other relevant skills for SFA - those that deal with contracting, foreign military sales, etc. for those leaders who will work in those related areas in order to ensure mission success - program those requirements into the MTO&E and expand the existing schools to meet the demand (or send out mobile training teams) - hell send the CHEMO:D - I jokingly say that - in fact I've known some incredibly competent CHEMOs - however my point is that if we determine the BCT or 2 star HQs needs X amount of SAOs, FAOs, IO, what have you to support the core mission, then change the MTO&E and send them to the schools.
How about partnering with local universities to come into post and teach a variety of languages on a sustained basis. Let DoD pay the bill and send soldiers during the duty day. Extend the program and teach the same languages in on post schools to our soldier's kids - hell open it up to the spouses. Don't make it just straight language proficiency - but like getting a minor in a foreign language in a university - teach the culture, politics, history, literature and art that goes with the language skill so guys can be conversant and build relationships and interests. DoD might even foot the bill for soldiers with doing well in the course to go on a 2 week study abroad with the university and have cultural immersion.
What are we teaching in our BNCOC, ANCOC, SGM ACAD, and the assorted officers courses from the most basic to the War Colleges, to include the BN and BCT level command courses? Some of these courses are in fact offering related electives- but what should be changed in the core curricula? How we consider the nature of the problems we will encounter matters.
In that way I get LTC Nagls point about the "advisor tab". Why do we expect new LTs to show up to a 18th ABN Corps IN BN with a tab? Because its a cultural expectation. Ranger school is an institution in that regard, in the same way that AASLT school is at the 101st, jump master qualification at the 82nd, EIB for all Infantry units, EMB for medics and all the other tabs and badges we place value on - they represent the institutionalization of something. I may not agree with it (remember I got my foundation in the Marines:D), but I recognize the value of such things to the institution - they represent far more then the cloth or metal and enamel stuck on the uniform.
That is my point about institutionalization - when we see something as a core part of "Land Power" we have institutionalized it. At that point it is woven into the broader tapestry who we believe we need to be in order to meet our institutional obligations to the nation. In my view the CSA's message is pointing us in the direction that our civilian leadership says we must go to meet our commitments to the future security of the country. Nobody said don't still be the Land Power that can compel others to our will by taking and holding ground - that is a part of who we are as well. What I think is being said is that along with what we've always done, we need to make room for "by, with and through" because its both a key part of our future security, and because the size and scope of the mission is such that our GPF land power must take it on to be successful.
Best, Rob