Love to bring up that early Korea thing, don't you? :rolleyes:
Printable View
If the situation were reversed, the Army would never let us live it down. It's all in good fun. My 101st Airborne-veteran father makes fun of my Marine haircut every chance he gets.Quote:
Love to bring up that early Korea thing, don't you?
Absolutely not. Having been on both the infantry and the grunt side, the only argument that ever held water when it came to who should clear fires is that the infantry officer better understands maneuver and thus knows where all of the friendly units are located. Three problems with that 1) Maneuver is not some closely guarded secret that no one but a select few understand like infantry officers like to pretend. A good LCpl can track a battalion's movement. It's not rocket surgery. 2) The FO or LNO's main reason for living is to know where his supported units are so that he can do his job. The Co. CO or Bn CO is worried about a million and one things. The FO or LNO is worried about one thing. Who is more focused on getting clearance of fires right? 3) It's irrelevant. The challenge of clearing fires is not knowing where friendlies are, it's knowing what the round is going to do and what it can effect. The maneuver element and it's locations is just a tiny piece of the puzzle that needs to be understood to properly clear fires.Quote:
I trust that you intended to put an emoticon behind the clearance of fires comment. Or if deliberate, why would come to that conclusion?
Obviously the CO is HMFIC and nominally has final say. But it's doctrinally delegated to the Weapons Platoon Commander or the Weapons Company Commander. Both can compare with the 0802 when it comes to tactical fire direction (when, where, how many rounds) but both are rank amateurs when it comes to technical fire direction (the one that actually protects maneuver units). It's irresponsible and born of nothing more than a sharp difference of view. Infantry officers should be handed an SME for indirect fire and it's ludicrous to waste their capabilities like this.
Now that being said: It's only about half the fault of the infantry community. The other half is caused by the artillery community sending undertrained and unwanted 0802's to the grunts. Some of us are trying to change that, but it would be easier to make the case that we need to send our best and brightest to the grunts if they weren't getting treated like second-class Marines when they get there.
So are you saying the FO attached to a Rifle Coy FiST and the LNO OIC attached to a FSCC is the one who should be clearing the fires in support of maneuver? Unless I've missed something the past 15 years, aren't we already handed a SME for indirect fire...who does his current job pretty well and fits within a good fire support structure?
That's going to require a lot of best and brightest that the arty community does not have. That's why the balance of having that FO or LNO integrated into a team at the FiST and FSCC level is the method that has worked best over the years.
One of the benefits of that 0802 FO or scout focusing on one thing is that it allows him to be timely in plotting GT lines and battery positions, getting tgt data for the call for fire, and getting that fire direction stuff right. Add in the responsibility for orchestrating mortars and CAS, and you can't do it as well without a team involved, unless you are willing to sacrifice time. That has nothing to do with technical fire direction, which I don't think any infantry officer believes he could do better than an 08, so you are spot on there.
We rate 0802s in LAR, and I think the same in Tank Bns, as our FSCs. I wouldn't have it any other way, primarily due to our structure and the nature of our mobility. He is not, however, the LNO to the firing battery or battalion, which we still need. Your community does not have the manpower to support what you advocate, even if it were the better way, which I still don"t see.
I'm not proposing any additional personnel, just that maybe the guy with the most knowledge and experience in the field should be the FiST team leader, instead of the guy with the least. The FAC or the Air O comes with years of CAS training and experience. The mortar liaison comes with the same for mortars. The 0802 hits the fleet with the formal knowledge and training to integrate the three and he should, before hitting the grunt unit, have done practical application to reinforce it. Plus, he comes with a team who is doing the coordination and clearance, leaving him free to supervise and train the entire team, instead of a dual-hatted 0302 who can only dedicate a portion of his time and attention. The 0302, if he's lucky, has gotten some OJT mentoring from the previous FiST team leader. Sometimes he was mortar platoon commander, and his platoon may or may not have trained him up. He brings nothing to the table except a requirement for the rest of the team to bring him up to speed. Might as well have your PFC point men in charge of each fire team. Worst case scenario he interferes with the ability of the rest of the team to do their job. Best case scenario it's a complete waste of an 0302 that could be doing other things. You want timely and accurate fires? Get rid of the speed bump in the process. Sure, it has worked for a long time. That's no reason it couldn't be done better.
I think you've been misinformed, because coordinating fires is about all that a 0302 Wpns Plt Cmdr does, and is certainly all that a 0302 Wpns Company Cmdr does in the middle of the fight. And remember, it's not as though the Wpns Plt Cmdr just shows up one day and starts the job, he has typically been a rifle company commander for a while before moving up. I've pretty much never heard of 81s Plt Cmdrs bouncing back down to take a spot in a rifle company...the other way around is the desired career path.
FACs do not come to a unit with anything more than the FAC/TACP package under their belt, and instruction in the tactics of other airframes, which he learned at the school. Besides that, there are no "years" of CAS training, and a Cobra guy knows about squat concerning what the fixed wing guys do until he completes the course. And then there are the C-130 FACs. They don't get too much CAS experience before attending the school and hitting the battalion. And unfortunately, if they were so good straight out of the cockpit, we would not see some of the antics that occur when CAS is employed, in both training and peacetime. :rolleyes:
I will grant you this...an 0802, with sufficient integration training involving the remaining 0861s he brings with him to serve as the LNO cell at theBn-level, could be the FSC. I'll give you that. In my experience, that is not the case with 0802s sent out to serve as FO tm leads.
War Lab to Apply Seabasing and ‘Three Block War’ to Counterinsurgency: Company to carry out two-part mission
Date: November 23, 2009
The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory’s experiment in Oahu, HI, next summer will examine the applications of enhanced company operations and seabasing concepts on a counterinsurgency mission.
EDITED by SWCAdmin: see http://www.strategypage.com/militaryforums/1-13794.aspx, 3rd article down (as of this posting) for the material that has been removed from this site due to copyright concerns
Fascinating.
1) Though I am not certain as to the difference between infantry side and grunt side, I disagree with your thought regarding the "only argument that has ever held water." I would ask that you consider the subject of clearing fires as one of "whom" clears them vice "what MOS." Oddly enough our operations centers are more than one person and the input of several participants is necessary for decisions. And there is a reason that 0802's are not the Operations Officers for infantry battalions.
2) Maybe.
3) As you note, merely tracking movement is only one of many considerations being weighed during the fires process. If you follow this to its logical conclusion I think you answer your own question.
4) If you truly believe that this is an instance a sharp difference of view then we will disagree.
Just released about a week ago, more confirmation of USMC plans to gradually shift to Coy-sized MAGTFs when Major Combat Ops wind down.
This arty portion was one of the final pieces of the overall construct to ensure sustained all-weather in-direct fires, if & when they need to engage.Quote:
General: Artillery ops to become smaller (Military Times)
By Gina Cavallaro - Staff writer
Posted : Monday Jun 14, 2010 18:01:04 EDT
Large-scale operations requiring artillerymen to lay down blankets of fire across wide swaths of enemy-held territory are likely a thing of the past, according to a Marine three-star general.
The future of artillery will be defined by small, sea-based operations that will require precision fire and quick decision making at the platoon level.
It has basically moved out of the Concept phase w/adhoc prototype Security Cooperation MAGTFs (SCMAGTF) already deploying to Nicaragua, Haiti, Greece, Senegal, Belize, Cameroon, DR, Liberia, even Romania to name a few.
That's to build & refine the day to day mission of staying constantly engaged w/the Partner Nations Liasoned thru the MCTAG now, so as MCOs wind down the Victor units can smoothly transition into this role.
I'm all for firepower and tube launched PGMs, and understand that the 120mm EFSS will take over from the 155mm, but what about minmum safe distances and ammunition resupply. The 105mm guns and 81mm/60mm mortars still have their uses as they can provide more intimate fire support, especially if the enemy are 'hugging you'. A comapny sized untit cannot provide for all the fire support it needs by itself, but due to its size can be overrrun, or elements of it.
1st to establish a baseline, just how reinforced Coy & even Plt-sized elements are being used w/70-100miles dispersion in A'stan now, Coy-sized MAGTFs would only be used when its the format that's most advantageous.
Its a Construct geared toward rapid &/or prolonged engagement of Hybrid & IW threats, but can be aggregate to reform a Traditional BN-sized MAGTF if needed.
Also the Construct is designed to work in concert w/the MEU(SOC)s nearly tripling Combat Power in a matter of hrs.
Every Marine Inf Coy has a Weapons Plt that includes a 60mm Section T/O. Also an 81mm Plt is Organic to every Inf BN's Weapons Coy so embedding an 81mm Section per Coy MAGTF wouldn't be difficult.
W/the EFSS the 105mm wouldn't really be a valid option. The EFSS is much more mobile, has a smaller foot print, & I is believe lighter. Also plans are to eventually have an Automated EFSS which will cut the Loop fr/just under 2min to about 20sec.
Wow - when did they start issuing crystal balls?Quote:
Large-scale operations requiring artillerymen to lay down blankets of fire across wide swaths of enemy-held territory are likely a thing of the past, according to a Marine three-star general.
The future of artillery will be defined by small, sea-based operations that will require precision fire and quick decision making at the platoon level.
A few years ago, a very good General said that tanks were a thing of the past and signed off on their elimination (he was a tanker to boot). The only thing that saved him was that he recognized the gaffe, bought new Main Battle Tanks and shipped them overseas for use in a grapefield near you.
One thing soldiers should stay out of is the prediction business.
Is this a cunning plan to make the Corps operationally irrelevant?
Why would any force give up being able to do formation level combat operations, unless you want to be beaten into dust by some bunch of clowns with a some combined arms military capability.
Infanteer
Yes. Very good ones apparently.Quote:
Wow - when did they start issuing crystal balls?
Perhaps the X27 would solve the over the horizon assualt problem and render the EFV defunct:D
Its nice to cherry pick but thats not what he said. What he said was:
In other words, "..you’ll need the ability to mass at times". But you'll also need the ability to disperse.Quote:
“In artillery you’ll need the ability to mass at times, but you’re probably going to need the ability to respond with precision with the ability to minimize collateral damage,” he said...
In the coming years, the threat of a nonstate enemy with access to high-tech weaponry, including precision fires, is sure to grow, he said.
Within that construct, Flynn said, the six-gun artillery battery will most likely remain the norm, but that battery might have to split up into three platoons, with two guns each to cover a dispersed battlefield...
Do you have the Task-Organization built into your structure to do both?
Not only that but can you do both fluidly.. shifting fr/one to another when its advantageous for you??
To do that effectively you'll need to add this into your training, organization, & mindset:
The Marine Corps is losing nothing, every capability they had they will continue to have. But their gaining more training, authority, expectations, & capabilities @ a lower level.Quote:
- Multiple platoons that can scatter over large battle spaces
- A need for leaders who are well-trained to operate on their own while disconnected from the central grid
- It will require a more rigorously coordinated targeting cycle and quick computations done by people at three locations
- & Security for the various platoons
Sure if that makes you feel better.
BN-sized MAGTFs are the dominant deployment construct. While in Theater that BN MAGTF will now have the ability to disperse into multiple Coy-sized MAGTFs to cover more of the Theater.
In a time of Crisis a decision will be made based on threat levels, to immediately respond & send in a C-MAGTF while still being able to Re-Aggregate into a BN MAGTF to do "formation level combat operations". Either way the MEU(SOC) will quickly move in for support.
The key strength given to the Theater Commander is Flexibility, Speed, & Escalation of Force.
Crisis Response is a routine mission for the USMC. Some previous USMC CR missions were:
- Securing Embassies/Engaging Rebels in Liberia, Sierra Leone, & Somalia to name a few
- Withdrawing American Citizens in Lebanon under fire
- Show of Force in Rwanda
- Counter-Piracy & supporting Counter-Terrorism in HOA
- Forcibly removing Haitian President Aristide fr/power
The list goes on... All missions that had an initial force of a Marine Coy or less. The Coy-MAGTFs are designed to engage in similar missions quickly w/out leaving a large footprint.
The purpose is to give the T-Comm the exact stated mission of the MAGTF: To provide Scalable, Task-Organized Forces...
The aviators that show up at battalions to do Air O/FAC expertise is going to differ according what airframe they fly and what qualifications they had in that airframe.
You are absolutly right about the C-130 guys and to that heap I'd throw the Prowler, Frog, and ####ters.
At the next strata you will find single seat hornet and harrier guys. By virtue of them making it through their first fleet tour they will have a lot of CAS experience, likely combat.
At the next strata will be two seat hornet/cobra/huey guys. These guys will likely have had a FAC/A qualification which means they have a LOT of CAS experience and more to the point they will have lots of cross-platform CAS experience.
MAGTFs demonstrated the ability on many occasions as shown, but it wasn't standardized.
This studied how to Leverage the Power of the MAGTF to support Ops fr/the BN down to the Squad for use in Crisis Response & Low Intensity Conflict. W/out losing the ability to reconstitute to perform HIC.
So yes they have sent Coy even Plt & smaller elements to conduct various LIC/CR missions in the past. But No they did not have anything like this ability in past b/c they could optimize the Leverage of the MAGTF like the can now.
Its like doing everything thru Algebra & then discovering calculus, its makes operations much more efficient.
Also to be a MAGTF it would have to self-contained for sustained periods, which was not the case until now, otherwise it would be considered a Landing Team.