Books for beginner COIN people
I paged through the threads about books on here, but I didn't exactly find what I was looking for. Specifically, I'd like recommendations on good introductory books for COIN. Note two things, please:
1. I already own FM 3-24. I bought it two years ago, and it came along with me to college.
2. I'm in college. So I prefer free things. Free things are nice.
Any other recommendations on books that relate to this sort of thing are welcome (history of radical Islam, history of Afghanistan, etc.).
Thanking you in advance.
Not the answer to the exam question but...
I would suggest you start with Clausewitz on War. Get the Howard Paret translation. THis is THE standard. Yes, it's heavy and not easy to understand, but COIN is merely a style of War. if you don't understand war - and very many do not - then you won't understand COIN at the level that is actually required.
After, that a liberal spread of Mao-Tse-Tung, Kitson, Julian Paget (if you can find any) - those are the British Army classics, and of course, William Gwynne's Imperial Policing. - again out of print, but there are copies out there.
Hope that helps. Actually reading this board, will equip in way that many would and should pay money for!
USMC Small Wars Manualfrom the 1940
USMC Small Wars Manual Available in soft copy for free. More of a TTPs and users' guide than a theoretical base, but much can be infered from what they chose to document.
The Hows and Why of People's War
Patton,
I've been given some thought to this question as of late. Specifically, we've been debating how to teach the institutional army about COIN. I learned from On the Job Training followed with my current academic pursuits. With that in mind, I'd suggest starting with the basics of how and why.
1. To answer the Why, I'd recommend two books.
A. Why Men Rebel- Ted Gurr
B. Revolutionary Change- Chalmers Johnson
Summary of Gurr...
Amazon Review
In this book, Gurr examines the psychological frustration-aggression theory which argues that the primary source of the human capacity for violence is the frustration-aggression mechanism. Frustration does not necessarily lead to violence, Gurr says, but when it is sufficiently prolonged and sharply felt, it often does result in anger and eventually violence.
Gurr explains this hypothesis with his term "relative deprivation," which is the discrepancy between what people think they deserve, and what they actually think they can get. Gurr's hypothesis, which forms the foundation of the book, is that: "The potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among members of a collectivity."(p.24) http://www.beyondintractability.org/booksummary/10680
John T. Fischel SWJ summary- excerpt from another thread
1. The absolutely deprived/oppressed do not rebel.
2. Neither do those who are doing well.
3. Rebellion happens after a period of social/political/economic improvement is followed by a sudden and relatively steep downturn causing the government to lose its legitimacy.
Gurr calls this "perceived relative deprivation."
It's still the best theoretical explanation for insurgency out there.
COL Bob Jones adds
A couple of points worth considering:
In general, insurgency occurs when a government "fails" its populace. Failure being not meeting some issue or issues that can fall across the full range of Maslows heirarchy that a significant segment of the populace feels is important enought to fight over, and where legitimate means for addressing the failure are not available. Not the same as effective governance, as government can be effective (British governance of American Colonies) and fail; or it can be ineffective and succeed. The only metric that matters is how he populace feels about its governance.
Insurgency falls into three broad categories: Revolution, to change the governance of the entire state; Separatist, to break some segment of the state off and form a new state; and Resistance. (In Iraq you see all three forms at the same time, and each requires a tailored approach to resolve).
COIN efforts tend to be long, drawnout affairs largely because Governments (politicians) are even worse than most people at taking responsibility for their shortcomings. Far better to blame such failures on others and focus on "fixing them," rather than being introspective and adjusting your own actions as your main effort, and addressing the symptoms of that failure as a supporting effort.
Finally, outbreaks of insurgency tend to occur after any major disruption ends a period of major governmental control that has suppressed the ability of a wide range of populaces to self-determine their own governance. As Spain crumbled as a major power at the turn of the century (led to popular uprisings and also a scramble by other states to take over payments on old colonies), At the end of WWI a major disruption of the European Colonial system occured with similar effect. The end of WWII led to many African and Asian uprisings. Concept of a common ideology for distinct events occurs as many of these populaces turn to an ideology of communism to rally the populace for change. Post Coldwar the areas released from suppression were central europe, the middle east. Russia in large part opted not to resist, so change was relatively bloodless in Central Europe. In the Middle East the US led west is resisting such changes to the political structures the worked so hard to shape and sustain, so there is conflict. Most of these populaces are majority Muslim, so it makes a convenient ideology to rally the populace for change.
Summary of Johnson...
CHPT 8 PG 156-157
"by demonstrating through apparently indiscriminate violence that the existing regime cannot protect the people nominally under its authority. The effect on the individual is supposedly not only anxiety, but withdrawal from the relationships making up the established order of society. .... usually has the opposite effect of calling people's attention to the seriousness of the situation and encouraging them to support any strong reassertion of authority"
"..provoke the ruling elites into a disastrous overreaction, thereby creating widespread sentiment against them. ...transform the political situation of the country into a military situation. That will alienate the masses, who, from then on, will revolt against the army and the police and blame them for this state of things."
More to follow...
Mike
The How and Why continued...
To understand How men rebel, you gotta go with Chairman Mao...
Here's a quick summary with a little help from Dr. Gordon McCormick and David Kilcullen...
KEY POINTS*:
1. In this ‘game’ of IW, the goal of the state or counter-state is control of the populace. The counter-state is an organization that seeks to take over the responsibilities of the state. The counter-state can be a tribe, gang, insurgent, terrorist, or drug lord.
2. Control is dictated by the perceived security level of the populace. In this type of conflict, control is often coerced as the state and counter-state battle for the physical and psychological so-called “hearts and minds.”
3. If the government stops providing essential services, security, and governance to the populace, then the counter-state will fill the void. For example, an area in Iraq where coalition forces mass in large FOBs and the government does not govern. These areas are often dubbed “denied areas.”
4. The point at which the state cedes an area to the counter-state is defined as the break point. This break point is “achieved by establishing a local military advantage, displacing (or neutralizing) the residual presence of the old regime, and creating an alternative set of administrative and governing institutions” (McCormick, 1999, pp. 26-27).
* These key points are a portion of Dr. Gordon McCormick’s Mystic Diamond Model from his seminar on Guerilla Warfare. Dr. David Kilcullen used the model to introduce his conflict eco-system.
ENEMY COURSE OF ACTION:
Chairman Mao set the ultimate playbook for the counter-state. The Vietcong, NVA, Hezbollah, Hamas, JAM, and Al Qaeda adapted it for their own purposes.
1) Clandestine Organization
2) Psychological Preparation of the People
(a) Propaganda
(b) Reduction of Prestige
(c) Peasant Resistance
(d) Destruction of the Opposition
3) Expansion of Control
(a) Destruction of the Oppression
(b) Land Reform as a Tactic of the Party
4) Consolidation of Power
(a) Paramilitary Forces
(b) Mutual Surveillance
(c) Movement Controls
In China, the Maoist Theory of People's War divides warfare into three phases. In Phase One, the guerrillas earn population's support by distributing propaganda and attacking the organs of government. In Phase Two, escalating attacks are launched against the government's military forces and vital institutions. In Phase Three, conventional warfare and fighting are used to seize cities, overthrow the government, and assume control of the country. Mao's doctrine anticipated that circumstances may require shifting between phases in either directions and that the phases may not be uniform and evenly paced throughout the countryside. Mao Zedong's seminal work, On Guerrilla Warfare,[4] has been widely distributed and applied most successfully in Vietnam, by military leader and theorist Vo Nguyen Giap, whose "Peoples War, Peoples Army"[5] closely follows the Maoist three-phase approach, but emphasizing flexibility in shifting between guerrilla warfare and a spontaneous "General Uprising" of the population in conjunction with guerrilla forces (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guerril...e_Maoist_model)
I hope this helps...
Mike
Patton, in a blatant effort
at self promotion, I'd recommend my own (with Max G. Manwaring) Uncomfortable Wars Revisited, OU Press, 2008 (paperback edition) which is a "reasonable" price.
Cheers
JohnT
Sheesh. I read Clausewitz when I was
a Corporal in 1952. Who knew I'd offend so many people. To make matters worse, it was the 1940s Maude translation and not Wilf's recommended Paret edition (after my time...). :D