Actually, as I've argued elsewhere, I think it can be argued that Rhodesia's remarkable tactical and operational successes actually were strategically disadvantageous—obscuring, as it were, the inevitable political writing on the wall.
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Is this what he meant?
I read his position as being that fighting a counter insurgency war while holding the ability to switch to HIC (convention warfare) should the circumstances change was the plan.
There is still a war in Dhofar? Thought that wound up in 1975? (Rhodesians were actively recruited for the Oman forces after 1980)Quote:
b.) What you see in Rhodesia is close what you see in Oman or Dhofar, where you have imaginative British trained officers freed from senior over sight. Point being the idea is not uniquely "Rhodesian."
The best we could put together were a number of battle groups which could operate independently or I suppose if there was a concentrated threat as a brigade. Certainly the RLI exercised as a battle group in 1979 when there was much talk of possible ZIPRA invasion from Zambia.Quote:
c.) While the Rhodesians were uniquely skilled at the sub-unit level, I very doubt that they had the resources or training to fight effectively at the formation level. If you could find documented proof that they did train and resource this level of operation, and how they aimed to do it, that would be an extremely important find.
Also if you read up on Operation Quartz brigade orders were issued (I was the scribe for one of the brigades orders - as a GSO3 Ops - under direction of the Brigade Major) which were a series of attackes on insurgent Assembly Places which if looked at natonally could be seen as a divisional action.
Then if you read up on the history of the war in 1979 you will find that as the insurgent bases (in Zambia and Mozambique) became better defended (thanks to Russian and Cuban advisors) the actions against these bases became more conventional in nature. So one day the whole battalion would be gathered for these camp attacks (using conventional tactics) and a few days later sub-units were back to operating in four man "sticks". The ability to switch instantaneously between the two became second nature.
Indeed.Quote:
d.) JMA may have a conflicting or additional view point.
I suggest that one should learn to differentiate between HIC and COIN in that HIC is fought by battle groups and formations while in COIN it becomes a "corporals war" except where through risk aversity no operations are carried out in less than platoon strength.
Units should have the ability to switch from one form of warfare to the other without having to undergo training or a refit.
Not sure a I agree that it is more difficult to operate at formation level. For whom would that be? Only for the brigade commander ... for the rest it is IMHO easier.
Sub-unit operations down to fire team level (four men) is not easier for the Brit forces. Corporals and Lance Corporals are not trained to apply the required degree of operational leadership and discretion that is required for such independent operations. How a typical US fireteam would perform independently on a (say) five day patrol I can't say.
The Rhodesian Training evolved to meet local circumstances and was certainly based on British TTPs. Trained Brit soldiers who joined up were required to attend the "COIN phase" of recruit training (the last 7 weeks of the 19 weeks core training programme) the first 12 weeks being what we termed "conventional warfare" training which which the Brits knew all about.
The Portuguese taught us much about the basics of fire force operations as they had gunships with side mounted 20mm canons and were conducting heli bourne sweeps. We adopted those but realised that unless you have a stop line or cut-off groups that you sweep the insurgents into the sweep exercise is pointless (hence mowing the lawn futility in Afghanistan).
Also operating with the Portuguese and independently in Mozambique honed the fighting skills the SAS, RLI and the RAR would need later when the war came home.
South Africa's value was that Rhodesians attended their Command and Staff College (as did some Israelis), and they provided training in armour, artillery training and attached airforce choppers and crews and allowed use of strike craft and submarines for insertion of small teams into Mozambique up the coast. And in fact in late 1979 they had battalions in the South of the country operating and doing fire force ops. They were great friends (mostly) until the US (Carter) got them to sell Rhodesia out.
1) I have not written the paper. I am in the very early stages of it, thats why I came to this body, to ask for advice, and direction.
2) I've not gotten any conclusions already, but there are a few facts that I see as pretty telling.
3) As just having gone through standing up a US army brigade, and its now apparently ready to fight, I'm very curious as to the training done by other successful forces. Most interesting to me is the Rhodesia experience.
JMC, thanks for your input. What strikes me most is the "ability to switch". I've seen staff officers who have no idea what maneuver warfare is. Intel officers who don't know how to analyze terrain. Captains. Because thats not what they're being taught. Basic training doesn't even teach squad attack anymore, its all traffic control check points, search detainees etc. I never dug a fog hole, (and no one in my company did either) in my semi-recent experience at basic. It seems, which I seek to get a clearer picture of, that the US army is slow to change, but when it does, it's total.
The ability to balance COIN with conventional seems to be pretty interesting, and I don't know of many armies in the world that did it as well has the Rhodesians. Maybe it's not true; but I hope whatever research I come up with will give me a clearer idea about it.
This paper isn't an analysis of Rhodesian COIN fighting. That's been done plenty. I think the Rand Corp did a fairly authoritative study on it. It's comparing the Rhodesian ability to train HIC and COIN to the US's ability to balance both today.
Some interesting things I found out so far:
-Training cadre spent cycle breaks at the front.
-All Officers had to be NCOs first.
-Scout makes intel, which drives ops. US seems to understand Intel drives ops, but where does it come from?
-Rhodesians won almost every contact without support of Field Artillery.
-Combat tracking is an essential skill in COIN.
These are interesting facts, (maybe JMC or others could dispell some of them as untrue) and I'm curious to see what they could mean in a broader context, specifically as contrasted to the US army training and doctrine production machine.
Did Rhodesians read their own printed doctrine? how often was it updated? What were battle drills that were trained? Was there the concept of the "strategic corporal"?
Yes in that it was indeed an existential war. Remind me of some other existential wars?
MaybeQuote:
In our last existential war, 1942-45, the US showed tactical competence. I have little doubt we will again when needed -- right now for most people, it simply is not needed, adequate will suffice. That's unfair to the guys and gals on the ground now but that's the way it has always been and is likely to stay. Democracies will not invest in really good and hard training short of existential wars -- the Mothers get too upset at the 2-5% casualty rate caused by rigorous training. So does Congress, it's expensive to pay those folks for the damage to their little bods thus incurred and in a tight recruiting market, unnecessary (in the eyes of the budgeteers and politicians) losses are frowned upon.
Studied by whom?Quote:
All the lessons from Rhodesia are readily available and have been studied, some are applicable, some are not. Those that have applicability have already been adopted. Ever notice how the US Troopie carries a weapon now versus say 15 years ago? That may be why some of us cannot understand what you're trying to do.
Carries his weapon? Hanging a weapon on a sling around your neck (hands free) is called carrying a weapon?
Every aspect deserves study as competence is required at every level. Regardless of Carter's success in defeating Rhodesia politically any tactical lessons as there may be still stand.Quote:
In any event, the tactical side isn't a problem, the politics of restraint, risk avoidance and getting out of Dodge are the problem. Regrettably, the Rhodesian tactical lessons don't cover that. Their strategic error let down all those great tactical moves. Ours looks about to repeat the flaw...
"Tactically" means what happens at tactical level. Success there like "they never lost a battle" is meaningful (even if not fully true) regardless of what the politicians foulded up or they could not withstand in terms of international pressure.Quote:
If you do not get the strategy right, you are not going to succeed tactically even though there will be (and are, in Afghanistan; were in Iraq...) a number of great tactical ploys, moves and operations. The TTPs aren't the problem, the politics are.
Many in the US. Not least the Infantry School and RAND (as Jslade0 mentioned).You miss that?No. That's called hanging your weapon around your neck (hands free). The pictures below shows the new and the old carry. The Recruiting Poster is from whence we learned it. You miss that, too? ;)Quote:
Carries his weapon? Hanging a weapon on a sling around your neck (hands free) is called carrying a weapon?
It's meaningful to those who fought those battles -- to others, not so much. And as you say, even if not fully true. Add that if, in the end, for whatever reason if the tactics were great and Rhodesia is no more, then the strategy was flawed. Rightly or wrongly, the actions of the US , UK and moist of the Europeans were fairly predictable -- as were those of Russia and China.Quote:
"Tactically" means what happens at tactical level. Success there like "they never lost a battle" is meaningful (even if not fully true) regardless of what the politicians foulded up or they could not withstand in terms of international pressure.
You guys did good because you had to, that lends an impetus missing today. That simple.
Must have.
You see I am researching for a book on the RLI right now and have found there are very few published sources on this topic. I should be forgiven for asking what source documents they are using for this study?
Well what you may have missed was that when I arrived in Rhodesia in 1973 most weapons were carried on the shoulder (hunting style) and the RLI operated in shorts and t-shirts with no camo cream. Once the war got hotter and the casualty rate increased and the dots were connected we moved into full camo with all exposed skin camo'd. There were some hold outs who insisted on wearing shorts and Tshirts and camo'd their legs and arms.Quote:
No. That's called hanging your weapon around your neck (hands free). The pictures below shows the new and the old carry. The Recruiting Poster is from whence we learned it. You miss that, too? ;)
And of course the weapons moved to the ready at all times. (Daily "pokey drill" was done when in camp to strengthen the required muscles in this regard.)
Competence at every level is meaningful. For the private soldier skill at arms and combat competence are the most important thing for him and his mates. All armies should provide the training at that (and all levels) which will allow their soldiers to have the skill at arms edge over the enemy of the day.Quote:
It's meaningful to those who fought those battles -- to others, not so much. And as you say, even if not fully true. Add that if, in the end, for whatever reason if the tactics were great and Rhodesia is no more, then the strategy was flawed. Rightly or wrongly, the actions of the US , UK and moist of the Europeans were fairly predictable -- as were those of Russia and China.
That said the political issues may be a whole lot more complicated and problematic but that does not diminish the personal skill of the soldiers nor the combat effectiveness of fire teams/sections/platoons.companies/battalions when viewed separately and specifically.
I will leave the comment on the geopolitics as the Rhodesian military can be studied with only limited reference to the political mistakes and who screwed who...
There was a wide variation in quality between the regular units, the national service (conscripts), the Territorial units (reserves), the police and the various militias. Everyone can carry a weapon but not everyone makes a good fighting soldier. Yes, when going the extra mile is directly motivated by keeping families, wives, children and the lot safe (when they live an hour or twos drive from the "operational area") it is not too difficult to get the troops up for that.Quote:
You guys did good because you had to, that lends an impetus missing today. That simple.
Having a low grade enemy also helped.
I suspect he means that efforts to delay or avoid black majority rule were ultimately doomed to failure.
As Steve said:
Quite right. Nor can it substitute for a lack of realism at the national level about what is, or is not, achievable.Quote:
Word. Tactical acumen cannot compensate for a failed strategy. Afghanistan anyone?
Totally agree on both counts. That we -- the US -- do not really provide such competence in peacetime is to an extent an indictment of the politicians and senior military leadership who preclude better training. In their defense, the anti-military tradition in the anglosphere generally is huge part of that problem. That is likely not going away. :mad:
Your comment on the political issues not taking away from the performance of the troops is spot on.
On the topic of what sources were used in the study of Rhodesion tactics and methods, the RAND study (LINK / .pdf) has a bibliography. You may have already seen the report or parts of it. The bibliography cites Cilliers, Cocks, Moorcraft, Venter, Reid-Daly and Stiff. As for the US Army and the Infantry school, a combination of FAOs, Defense Attaches from RSA and other neighboring nations and probably dispatched observers at the time. While paying attention to events there was not politically correct at the time, the Army's been known to cheat on policies emanating from D.C. Serving in the US Army at the time, I can recall great interest in what was being done and how you were operating at all levels. Mostly, reliance at the time was on media reports, though I can recall seeing a Benning printed copy of a manual purporting to be, IIRC, the Rhodesian Forces Counterinsurgency and Anti-Terrorist Operations (or something like that) shortly before I retired in '77. You've probably seen and may recall these LINK, LINK / .pdf. They came later but the interest at the time was significant. Still is...
If so, then correct. The default setting for all UK training from 1919 (till very recently) was major combat operations. "COIN" was seen as a "restriction" of violence, with other skills thrown in.
Dhofar ran from 62/63. Point being it ran almost concurrently with Rhodesia, and mirrored it in many ways, as concerns UK training and doctrine. Point being folks say "Look at Rhodesia," and I agree, but also "look at Dhofar." As concerns tactical and operational skill, they have common routes.Quote:
There is still a war in Dhofar? Thought that wound up in 1975? (Rhodesians were actively recruited for the Oman forces after 1980)
I would submit that this would be very good evidence of the Rhodesian Army operating at the formation level, or at least planning to.Quote:
Also if you read up on Operation Quartz brigade orders were issued (I was the scribe for one of the brigades orders - as a GSO3 Ops - under direction of the Brigade Major) which were a series of attackes on insurgent Assembly Places which if looked at natonally could be seen as a divisional action.
Formation level operations require practising skills to that have a major flow down effect. For the fire team, there may not be a lot of difference, but for Coy Commanders on up, there will be, and very little can be adequately practised doing a CPX.
EG: A Formation level passage of lines, at night to launch to one battle group into an opposed obstacle crossing.
Training fire teams is cheap and easy. Training formations is vastly expensive and very complicated.
You need bridging kit for all the vehicles, plus you need multiple bridging sitesQuote:
Why would you need bridging kit to facilitate a 4-man fireteam crossing a river?
Circa. 1960 to delay was the (historically proven) intelligent approach but to avoid would have been futile.
Perhaps your attention (and that of a few others around here) should be drawn to the Southern Rhodesia proposed Constitution 1961 where the "Europeans" (meaning whites) accepted a qualified franchise system which would have led to an "African" (meaning black) majority in parliament within 7-8 years (soonest) or 10-15 years (more likely).
But the Brits - Alec Douglas-Hume and his flunky Duncan Sandys (Commonwealh and Colonial Secretary) - being led by the nose by that other "great" African democrat and champion of one-party elections Julius Nyerere - whose country (Tanzania) under his "enlightened" leadership went from the largest exporter of agricultural products in Africa to the largest importer of agricultural products - demanded that one 5 year term of parliament leading to a one-man-one-vote... once ... was the best they could offer and the best that - "great" body of democrats and human rights activists - the Commonwealth would accept.
In addition those two liberal authors (by the US definition) of Rhodesian military history - Moorcraft and McLaughlin - state in the preface of their 2008 edition:
That make one think?Quote:
... Nevertheless, after nearly three decades, and in the light of the near-total destruction of the state by Robert Mugabe, many will look back and reflect that the Rhodesian rebellion, although doomed, was perhaps not so damned.
Glad we agree on this.
I can only hope that the US can somehow maintain a core cadre of competent NCOs to pass on the skill at arms until this is once again needed on a grand scale.
I got bitten twice (Rhodesia and South Africa) and promised myself I would never trust a politician - any politician - again. How many times in the average military career do US servicemen get bitten by the politicians? Must be damn infuriating.Quote:
Your comment on the political issues not taking away from the performance of the troops is spot on.
Thank you. The first pdf I had not yet seen. Am reading at this moment. The other two I have seen and also the references you mention.Quote:
On the topic of what sources were used in the study of Rhodesion tactics and methods, the RAND study (LINK / .pdf) has a bibliography. You may have already seen the report or parts of it. The bibliography cites Cilliers, Cocks, Moorcraft, Venter, Reid-Daly and Stiff. As for the US Army and the Infantry school, a combination of FAOs, Defense Attaches from RSA and other neighboring nations and probably dispatched observers at the time. While paying attention to events there was not politically correct at the time, the Army's been known to cheat on policies emanating from D.C. Serving in the US Army at the time, I can recall great interest in what was being done and how you were operating at all levels. Mostly, reliance at the time was on media reports, though I can recall seeing a Benning printed copy of a manual purporting to be, IIRC, the Rhodesian Forces Counterinsurgency and Anti-Terrorist Operations (or something like that) shortly before I retired in '77. You've probably seen and may recall these LINK, LINK / .pdf. They came later but the interest at the time was significant. Still is...
Likewise I tried to read as much stuff out of Vietnam as I could. Too much happened there for a soundbite comment.
Good heavens... been retired for 32 years! What did you do with all that time?