My views on Reconnaissance
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Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
In the "Dicta Wilf" Formation I still have no good reason to allocate forces to something we call "Reconnaissance." - Surveillance and Observation, yes!
Wilf, traditionally, the terms surveillance and observation sufficed. I concur with your point. Current Army doctrine on reconnaissance can be very confusing. Back in 2005, when I was a lonely staff weenie trying to transition our infantry battalion into a RSTA (Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Targeting, Acquisition) unit, I sorted through all the current doctrine and summarized it as best as I could. Simply put, Mike's intepretation of our doctrine is:
1. Reconnaissance- Human Observation
2. Surveillance- Technological Observation (UAV's, sensors, etc)
This simplified our work so when I use the term reconnaissance, I am referring to a group of soldiers collecting intelligence on the terrain or populace to covertly/overtly infiltrate and conduct observation. Likewise, surveillance covers intelligence collected from all the technological toys that we have to play with today.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
I think there is a blind spot when it comes to asking how much information do you want to feed the staff beast, and how much time and effort do you want to expend doing it, for no actual proof that it is actually making things better.
In my mind, recon efforts are not driven towards feeding the staff beast. Rather, these missions exist to empower the platoon leaders and staff sergeants conducting missions. Two quick points.
1. Aerial Reconnaissance. Perhaps one of my best learning points from my last deployment taught to me by some wise infantry dudes. Prior to entering a new area, I would take the company leadership for a helicopter ride after we conducted our map reconnaissnce and initial in-brief. These flights allowed my NCO's and O's to gain a better appreciation for the terrain prior to infiltration. We operated in river valleys, mountanious areas, cities, and desert environments so I wanted them to comprehend the differences. The helicopter flight was one such method for better understanding.
2. Route, Area, Zone Reconnaissance. I hate the term that "insurgents melt back into the populace." One's enemy does not possess supernatural powers. After a hasty ambush (IED or small arms attack), they egress using established trails, paths, or roads. Often, these avenues of approach cannot be found on a map. So we conducted patrols to collect better intelligence on every route that existed within our AO. Simultaneously, these patrols gave us the opportunity to talk with the locals. (In some extreme cases, we were the first americans that they had ever met). Later, the knowledge gained allowed us to better understand the enemy's course of action. We established our own ambush positions followed with a "Suprise" for the enemy.
v/r
Mike
Good thread, All three of you do good work.
Wilf, you can have Saturday off; Mike, you can have Sunday off, Tom -- you deployed, no soup for you! :D
Seriously, very good stuff -- I agree and have suffered much that both Tom and Mike say. Goes with the job, I guess...
I can recall setting up more than one R&S line that did not entail any reconnaissance to speak of and which had extremely poor ability to surveill due to human limitations; thus Mike's definitions are I think a step forward.
I agree with Wilf and Tom that RSTA is a bad combination. As is ISR...
Mike also said this:
Quote:
In a perfect world, I'd send every new soldier and officer to the SLC (Scout Leaders course), RSLC (Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course), and Ranger school. The combination of those schools would provide a good understanding of both mounted and dismounted recon.
I agree but suggest that if we simply did IET (Officer and Enlisted) correctly, the critical aspects of all three plus current IET would be included -- and those three courses could be tuned to do a far better job than they now do because of having to train some basics and retrain others...
I went to the old I&R course at Benning a long time ago. It effectively was Ranger School minus idle harassment combined with RSLC running nine weeks and it started with the premise that most of us knew and could do more than we did and proceeded to rapidly move forward causing us to have to scramble to keep up. Best Army School I ever attended by far; the old Pathfinder school (when we still did DZs) was the next best -- operated the same way. Only schools I ever attended that did not cram eight hours instruction into three days and that dropped people for non-performance.
Reconnaissance is a necessary and vital function. It IS everyone's job as Wilf says -- it also requires a few, not many, specialists that can do it stealthily, quickly, thoroughly and tell you accurately what's out there without fighting for it. They need to be a bit better than the average bear.
I totally agree. That used to be the norm.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Van
Please define "close". Ideally, even battalion scouts should be able to operate out of logistical contact and possibly out of battalion and brigade fire support range for at least two to three times as long as an infantry platoon.
The question is how many Commanders in the US Army today are willing to allow that to happen?
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Re: "Wider Recce"
Strategic recon is fertile ground for a new thread, but is probably outside the scope of Wilf's infantry-centric theme.
Probably so -- and perhaps doesn't bear too much open discussion anyway... :o