I thought that was Asplundh; the Tree Experts...
I don't know anyone here or anyone in any of the services or retired therefrom -- and that's a large crowd of tree experts -- who ever thought there were any military solutions to Iraq's problems.
I think you're missing the point. I don't know anyone who believes the Nation has abandoned them -- I do know many who disagree with this statement:
Quote:
"They just know that asking you to sacrifice your life in pursuit of an impossible objective is stupid."
simply because they know that the objective isn't stupid. They also know that many who have not been there think it is stupid and mostly, they're cool with that.
They don't see it as an impossible objective; the objective was to open a window and let the Iraqis make their own decisions. That window was opened and is being held open. It likely will continue to be held open regardless of who's elected next year and mostly, the largest regret is that too many here do not understand all that. Regardless, the tree experts will confound the amatuers and "detached professionals" (whatever they are...) and continue to do their job in spite of that lack of understanding. Like they always have.
The country may be hungry for a politician who will identify that objective and without BS tell them how long it will take, what price they need to pay and why it's worth paying. I suspect they will be disappointed in all those desires, particularly the 'without BS' part.
I could point out that the country has in one form or another been told everything I said two paragraphs above; the problem is that, for some, those things are inadequate or insufficient cause to be there. Nothing any politicians says or does will change that; those minds were mostly made up and they aren't going to be changed. You may or may not be aware there some in the Armed Forces who fall in that category as well. They'll mostly still go and do their thing because they believe that how well one does something that one does not want to do is a mark of value.
Pessimists are never optimistic, it's contrary to their nature.
COIN & Geezers: The In-house War
Gentile states that when the Tal Alfar lessons were applied to Baghdad, our troops were subjected to "supreme tactical vulnerability". That's pretty serious stuff to taxpayers like me and ol' Mom & Pop back home. How much of that statement is a reflection of reality on the street and how much of it is a reflection of the inherent friction that is becoming readily apparent between COIN proponents and for lack of better word, old school (geezers?), traditional military thinking? More importanty, how much is this in-house war detracting from success of the mission in Iraq?
Somehow I find it hard to believe that any combat arms
unit in the US Army is going to forget that the reality of war and fighting is no longer apporopriate because it is not it an FM... :rolleyes:
LTC Gentile says:
Quote:
"I believe that FM3-24 has become the defacto operational doctrine of the United States Army and it has not been questioned or seriously debated as such."
Sweeping statement. It certainly seems to be the case that it is for operations in Iraq at this time -- as it probably should be. Does that necessarily mean it is the de facto operational doctrine for the entire Army. I doubt it. I'd also suggest that the nominal Soviet quip is probably apocryphal and it was earlier alleged to the Brits -- though it is essentially correct -- and the American Army hasn't changed, that'll always be correct.
We're too independent and egotistical for that. Most Commanders take the mantra and adapt it to their needs and do their own thing. And that's good. :cool:
He may be correct in that we will go overboard on the COIN side; we as an Army have a tenedency to do that to the detriment of training. We must be a full spectrum Army, no question -- and that is a heavy training task and it is expensive; there are a lot of pressures to focus more narrowly. Having been in and around the beast for 45 years, I've watched that oscillation too many times. I think there are enough people coinvinced that we need to do the whole deal to avoid the trap this time. We'll see.
I spent a lot of time training to fight a land war in Europe. Never stationed or fought there -- but I ate a heck of a lot of rice. Pity, I dearly love Bratwurst... :D
Paradox as theory or perception?
Sir,
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Gian P Gentile
my impression was that the paradoxes removed a fundamental of war—fighting--which I experienced in a way specific to the Iraq War.
As I noted in an earlier post, I think that you have fundamentally misunderstood the function of the paradoxes themselves while, at the same time, making a categorical logic error. Even leaving that aside, however, nowhere does FM 3-24 state that "fighting" should not be a part of counter-insurgency. Reduced to its simplest form, FM 3-24 argues that one should use the appropriate tool to achieve desired operational results. Given that the CoG of a COIN operation is the general populace where the desired strategic outcome is political legitimacy, "fighting" may well not be the most appropriate tool in all (or even most) situations.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Gian P Gentile
The most important point that I believed I made in the article was how fighting insurgencies within a civil war like in Iraq are very hard on the combat soldier—in essence a discussion on the moral domain of war—and has not been commented on at all in this blog.
Did you mean "morale" in this? That would certainly be consistent with your statement in the article:
Quote:
But most importantly, I was angry and bewildered because the paradoxes, through their clever contradictions, removed a fundamental aspect of counterinsurgency warfare that I had experienced throughout my year as a tactical battalion commander in Iraq: fighting. And by removing the fundamental reality of fighting from counterinsurgency warfare, the manual removes the problem of maintaining initiative, morale and offensive spirit among combat soldiers who will operate in a place such as Iraq.
I must admit, after reading that particular statement, I could only shake my head and think about Curtis LeMay. This has to be one of the best examples of reductio ad absurdam that I have ever seen, and one of the reasons why I am requiring my students to read your article. If you truly believed this, then I am surprised that you are not arguing Iraq delenda est.
If, on the other hand, it was not a mistyping and you actually meant "moral", I would ask you how fighting is more moral than winning?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Gian P Gentile
Most of the postings in this blog that critique my article focus on my questioning of the paradoxes; why? Because it challenged the theoretical premises of a doctrine that so many have turned into an Orwellian nightmare that clouds creative thought and sadly produces dogmatic action.
Again, you miss the point. In your article you state that
Quote:
However, the paradoxes are intended to frame the thinking of the reader for the entire manual. They are the theoretical framework that informs the entire manual. In this sense, they are crucial to the manual and for how our Army approaches and understands counterinsurgency operations.
First of all, the paradoxes are, as Patriot notes, "Sun Tzuisms" or koans. They are not intended to "frame the thinking of the reader" but, rather, to re-frame the perceptions of the reader allowing them to think outside of a conventional warfare set of perceptions.
Neither are the paradoxes "the theoretical framework that informs the entire manual". Less still are they an evil miasma that produces "an Orwellian nightmare that clouds creative thought and sadly produces dogmatic action". Rather, they are as Shek notes in his quotation "offered to stimulate thinking, not to limit it".
Obviously, they do not have that effect on everyone. This should not be a surprise to anyone who has taken an introduction to Psychology course or read history in any depth. How people react to thoughts that go against their existing preconceptions has been quite well documented, and that includes feelings of anger, revulsion and unthinking rejection.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Gian P Gentile
For me though, the more important aspect of my article was why these types of war are so hard to fight from the perspective of the combat soldier. And in this sense I believe that my critique of the paradoxes is still valid.
Certainly your article has served to highlight the difficulty some officers appear to have with this type of conflict. While I still think that your critic is logically invalid, it may well be psychologically valid for a certain portion of US forces.