COIN, Interdiction, and CAS
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
Ask Tom what an EC-130 could have done to mitigate the genocide in Rwanda. The hate/kill message was propagated primarily from one radio station.
Lift is almost always the biggest shortfall when it comes to AF support for this ground pounder.
For COIN we have sufficient fire support, I would like to hear more ideas on non-lethal fire support that the AF could provide. We won't hear it from their generals, nor will see it on their budget proposals, unless they intend to put it there to get Congressional support, then shift it to bombers and fighters later.
To answer: tremendous effect. I spent hours on the phone in Goma--after the genocide was supposedly over (it was not in the French zone) and aside from beating the drum for water distrubution I raised the IO war repeatedly. And we never got it right--or better said we could never get across just how critical it was.
For me as a boots on the ground guy in Africa--it was airlift. And Special Ops airlift and collection assets were in second place. It was largely the same in the 1960s--although much was made of "COIN" ground attack aircraft (T-28s, T-6s, and A26s) in the Congo in 1964. Those were used as straight interdiction and limited CAS assets--there was no "COIN" as we know it in the Congo then. We--the US, Belgians, mercenaries, and the Congolese--beat the Simbas into submission or extinction. And a key tool was air support.
Even as recently as Somalia--airpower advocates get confused about what is COIN and what is straight interdiction and CAS. AC130s were most definitely needed in Mog; we were not doing "COIN". We were seeking to beat the warlords into submission and we went in like we were doing a simple support operation. TF Ranger was not winning hearts and minds. Even in the support operation we were not trying to win hearts and minds--we were trying to make sure the Somali warlords knew we would seriously hurt them if they tried to disrupt the feeding.
One of the key indicators that the French intent behind Op Turquoise in Rwanda was less "humanitarian" than advertised was their dispatch of Jaguar ground attack aircraft to the AO. How Jaguars were going to stop genocide remains unanswered.
Tom
UAS great for USA..problematic for partner nation
Quote:
Originally Posted by
120mm
imho, the armed UAS like the Predator has all the drawbacks of the Tomahawk, LGB and LGMs do: You're "guessing" that the truck are the bad guys and not a truck full of women and kids.
I'm not a big air support fan in COIN, but there is some utility in a small, manned and armed COIN aircraft. The kind that can slow down to 100 kts and go "eye-ball to eye-ball" with the target.
It also "personalizes" taking out the bad guys to a point the can understand and respect. Which takes away from the image that US soldiers are cowards who hide behind their technology and only win because they cheat. Which takes away one more I/O advantage for the bad guys.
Having said that, the UAS is a great intel "tool", and armed UAS would have a terrific role in taking on high profile threat in a higher intensity environment.
While I think UAS (i.e. Predators) are great for a US military-involved COIN fight, remember that most partner nations do not usually have the ability to operate, support, and employ technically advanced unmanned systems. In a resource constrained environment, would you rather buy a UAS system OR buy a cheaper manned option and, with the left over money, pay your monthly salaries to your military? :)
Operating under the notion that, in the end, the partner nation will either win or lose the fight and the US is just an enabler, pushing UAS on a partner nation may just cause more problems. I think the better answer, and the one being pursued right now in Iraq, is to use manned ISR platforms like a King Air/Cessna 337/Caravan for the host nation...its easier and cheaper to employ over the long term. While UAS do offer amazing persistance, they creat HUGE problems with air space control, maintenance, communication bandwith, etc. Just one Airman's thoughts....
Your conventional mindsets are showing!
When I saw the subject line for this thread I naively thought I was going to see a discussion of the venerable O2-B and its use as a platform for launching leaflets and loudspeaker messages (yes, that's right) at insurgents. Perhaps some talk of the C-130 flying broadcast transmitters.
BUT NO!
The entire thread dealt with steel-on-target, Widow-makers, A-37s etc.
Gentlemen, your conventional orientations are showing!
And it has always been this way. When I was involved in PSYOP campaigns in Central America, a crusty old Air Force officer once confessed about the way he remembered the difference between the O2-A and the O2-B (the PSYOP version). "A is for attack, B is for Bull####."
This is why we don't do very well in this kind of conflict. We claim to understand that it is all about hearts and minds, but the organizational DNA is so biased toward "steel-on-target", that that is what we ALWAYS end up doing. Even here in SWJ.
Infantry And CAS Pilots Bonding For Effect
120mm. I found this article in Air Chronicles. It is a story about the bond between Infantry and CAS. I wasn't sure where to put this so if it should be moved to another thread it is ok with me. The link to article is posted below.
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...c/allison.html