4GW – Myth, or the Future of Warfare? A Reply to Antulio Echevarria
Critics of the Fourth Generation: the Good, the Bad and the Ugly
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Please excuse my ignorance with 4GW; however, it appears as if several others are asserting that what Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf, or Tamil Tigers do is not an extension of politics or political in nature, due to the fact they are not State entities? I would argue that these groups follow an obvious extension of politics as Mao or Clausewitz understood it.
For the mention Gortex6. :)
I have ben following this topic for sometime on the web and still not sureI have a solid grasp of 4GW myself. One problem is that it seems to mean different things to different people. Most would probably point to Bill Lind as the "guru" of 4GW and he usually points to a misunderstanding of 4GW even among proponents of it. One common misconception Bill points to is how it is generally confused with insurgency/counterinsurgency but his point is that it is not marked by that - it is a reference to non-state entities being the primary combatants as opposed to state-sponsored militaries. His definition seems to be that 4GW is the end of state monopoly on war. He points to a time prior to the beginning of state monopoly as analogous to today - so it has been around a long time indeed but was almost extinct until more recent times. I think that in one of the links above Mr. Lind suggests Barb Tuchman's book, _Distant Mirror: The Calamitous 14th Century_ for a good understanding of what we are returning to.Quote:
Originally Posted by Major Strickland
SWC's Zenpundit...
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William Lind has posted a scathing attack on the work of Thomas P.M. Barnett at Defense & The National Interest as part of a series of responses to critics and commenters on 4GW theory...
In my opinion, Thomas Barnett's books, Blueprint for Action and The Pentagon's New Map, are the two best books I have read, along with Kepel's War for Muslim Minds , in a VERY long time. Yes, I have read Huntington, Freidman, and Fukuyama, and believe Barnett provides a much more compelling argument as to the future. Just my humble opinion.
I just went over to the library website and found the Blueprint for Action presentation on DVD so I requested it. Interesting what one can find thru the library now. I started to read one of Barnett's books before and got sidetracked for some reason - it didn't catch my attention so I forgot about it. I'm going to check it out based on such high praise. Thanks Major.Quote:
Originally Posted by Major Strickland
...for a bit of an introduction or excerpt to blind links... Again, thanks in advance.Quote:
Originally Posted by GorTex6
4th Gen Warfare is not new. A serious study of the American Revolution will show that the "Founding Fathers" used 4GW. They used conventional military forces; irregular military forces; insurgency; information warfare; effective local, state and national political networks; social factors; economic boycots; attacks against economic targets; and international diplomacy to win the war.
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Originally Posted by Uncle Scary
Insurgency is not new. The theory of warfare as it is has evolved in the past couple of centuries is new- this is 4GW.Quote:
Originally Posted by GatorLHA2
My point exactly, 4GW is NOT a new form of warfare. Only the theory is NEW? It's like old wine in new bottles, the same old thing with new lables.Quote:
Originally Posted by GorTex6
No. It's like saying "home-made wine is now more popular than cheap wine-in-a-box"...I guessQuote:
Originally Posted by GatorLHA2
Clear as mud?
I don't think the founding fathers would agree with this "4GW", and the USA was founded after the treaty of Westphalia.
Martin
There many studies, histories, or articles written about an "American Way of War." Indeed our adherence to doctrine as a base plate for our operations documents that we as a military continually evaluate, test, and rethink how we define our approach to warfare. FM 3-0 Operations is the Army's "bible" on the conduct of warfare. But looking at this issue from a longer perspective, certain trends or characteristics emerge. I cite the following four:
· Preference for Fire Power over Manpower
· Preference for Offense over Defense
· Preference for Technologically Complex over Simple
· Preference for Speedy Resolution over Extended Operations
These four "preferences" drive our approach to military operations. Raising the idea of doing a cultural IPB on oneself, consider those four longstanding American preferences from an enemy's perspective. Then you will start to see US strategic, operational, and tactical weaknesses.
Best
Tom
Gentlemen,
I think we can all agree that 4GW does not represent the advent of a new unprecedented way of war. It is more a cyclical, evolving response by weaker adversaries and nonstate actors to the development of strategic capabilities of modern states. Yet we should conceed that modern forms of insurgency are characterized by unique trends in adversarial capabilities and TTPs that have not been seen before. Part product of technological proliferation and part product of adaptive doctrine, insurgent forces are developing tailored responses to U.S. and allied (mostly Western) global dominance. In particular, insurgent adversaries are developing longterm strategies to shape the strategic environment in their favor for a conflict with the U.S. at a particular time and place of their choosing.
Theory cannot equip the mind with formulas for solving problems, nor can it mark the narrow path on which the sole solution is supposed to lie by planting a hedge of principles on either side. But it can give the mind insight into the great mass of phenomena and of their relationships, then leave it free to rise into the higher realms of action.
On War, Carl von Clausewitz
I think that one of the things that can weigh us down in dealing with today's conflicts is an unnecessary attachment to a single theory or doctrine of war, be it EBO, NCW, or 4GW. No single theory or perspective can explain the totality and all the phenomena associated with what is perhaps the most complicated of human endeavors: war. In science, no single theory can't explain all aspects of a phenomenon (e.g. general relativity, quantum mechanics); the same applies for warfare. Neither the generational warfare model, nor EBO or NCW, represent, by themselves, a "theory of everything" regarding war.
It can be beneficial to study the concepts pertaining to each theory, but getting married to a single theory can prove to be detrimental. They way I see it, as warfighters we really have no dog in this academic fight. We should be fighting the war, not the doctrine. The concepts we learn studying the different theories live in our minds (not necessarily in our hearts), but ultimately when it comes time to take action we should try what suits each occasion best, regardless of whether it conforms to a theory or another. We have all this concepts in our toolkit, and that's precisely what these concepts are: tools for understanding certain aspects of warfare. No single tool is appropriate for every job.
The generational model of war, of which 4GW is a part, is more a representation of a different viewpoint than a reinvention of the wheel. What we now call insurgency has been a part of warfare since antiquity. 4 GW looks at insurgency, and war as a whole, from a different standpoint. The 4GW proponents added another layer to the discussion of war. If nothing else, they revitalized the concept. Whether you agree with 4GW or not, the discussions generated by the theory at least are getting us to talk about a topic long neglected by the military: insurgency and unconventional warfare.
Globalization has changed many aspects of our lives; commerce, politics, and or course, the way human beings wage war. Technology also changes how we fight, whether we like it or not. Even the "low-tech" insurgents and terrorists adapt technologies to their advantage.
In his book The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Thomas Friedman talks about the democratization of technology, finance, and information: "three fundamental changes-changes in how we communicate, how we invest and how we learn about the world."
Fareed Zakaria in The Future of Freedom adds, "We often read during the roaring 1990s that technology and information had been democratized. This is a relatively new phenomenon. In the past, technology helped reinforce centralization and hierarchy. For example, the last great information revolution--in the 1920s involving radio, television, movies, megaphones-had a centralizing effect."
The democratization of technology and information along with the weakening of the state has contributed to what Zakaria calls the democratization of violence. To those factors, I add the post-Cold War resurgence of ethnic and religious conflict. 4GW is growing on fertile ground.
Peaceful and hostile non-state actors have benefited from these democratizations. You can get in touch with anyone across the world cheaply and exchange news, make arrangements for your latest cocaine shipment, or put the finishing touches on your terrorist attack. The fact that governments can intercept some of these communications will not stop a determined adversary. They have ways to go around that.
The discussion on 4GW and insurgencies will remain front and center for a long time. Neither 4GW, NCW, or EBO deserve a blanket disapproval. Each perspective offers something useful in understanding certain, but not all, aspects of warfare.