"The Cause" and "Causation" are very separate animals
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Originally Posted by
slapout9
Well sh..t,where do I start. Bob's World, What causes the cause? A person, and a person always has a motive. Until you understand that you can not prepare a Strategy to succeed. Not only that but you must have a good counter-motive to gain support for your side of things. So your objective should be to de-motivate the insurgency population(focus on their leadership). From there you can look for opportunities and select your methods. And Security Force Operations would have to play a big part in that in order to allow some type of civilized transition.
Ok, what do I mean by that? I think one good example lies within the American Revolution. Arguably one could state that "The Cause" was independence from England.
But what caused this diverse collection of colonies to unite to this common and dangerous end? Certainly there were motivating factors, such as the works of Thomas Paine, or the events in the Massachusetts Colony. But before that, what factors of causation were at work that allowed such words and actions to move a collection of individual people, and individual colonies to move as a body to throw off British rule?
I believe there are many sources of causation. One major one in this case was the simple fact that British citizens who lived in England looked down upon British citizens who lived in the colonies as somehow inferior. From what I have read this was taken as (if anyone would have even thought to ask) "of course they are inferior!" in England. But in the colonies, be it a man of means, education, and accomplishment like George Washington, denied admission to the British Regular Army due to his "status"; or a simple farmer, owning and working a plot of land that may well have qualified him for some minor title back in England; saw this as an outrage. And upon such festering sores of causation fell the cold slaps of motivation. And an insurgency is born. First of words, and then of works.
England did not need to send the most powerful Navy and Army in the world to solve this problem. A simple letter of apology and recognition of full righths of citizenship from the King would have nipped it in the bud.
But then, Kings don't do that, do they. Wouldn't be proper.
Back after a couple of days of insanity...
Hi Folks,
Sorry for the delay in responding, but the past couple od days have been nuts!
Rob, I think you're right that the Hessians where not SFA per se, although if I remember correctly (the book I got this from years ago isn't available), they were involved in some training or, at least, cadre activities for Loyalist militia units.
Bob's World made an interesting point:
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England did not need to send the most powerful Navy and Army in the world to solve this problem. A simple letter of apology and recognition of full righths of citizenship from the King would have nipped it in the bud.
Just as a matter of historical fact, the King couldn't do this.... at least in practice; this was a matter for Parliament. On the issue of 2nd (or 3rd!) class citizens, you are pretty much correct, but I'm not sure how important that actually was. A ket emotional motivator, surely, but a primary cause? Hmmm, I don't think so. BTW, the reason why I say that is that there is the rather complex example of Quebec not revolting during that time.
Where I think there are immediate lessons we can pick up is in the structures of governance; they also become crucial when we look at Upper and Lower Canada in the 19th century and, also, latter on in the other colonies that become Dominions. The evolution of socio-political thinking around governance in the 19th century, at least in Britain and the Empire, is truly fascinating - a model that really fits the currently trendy phrase of "Think Globally, Act Locally".
Part of the reason why I like to go back to the American Revolution / War of Independance is that it is one of the earliest and, in some ways, a prototype for, later revolutionary movements. We can see, at least in seed form, many of the later developments that, strangely enough, we are still struggling with: mass produced, local media (aka cheap printing presses), guerilla warfare, terrorist tactics (on all sides), and perhaps most importantly, the key to winning the conflict - it's centre of gravity - lying outside the theatre of operations (London and, to a lesser extent, Paris - shades of the Cold War!).
So, let me toss out a question.... In terms of SFA/FID operations, how would people classify (or conceive of) the French activities in that war?
Take a step back, take a deep breath ...
have a Bud Light (I'll join you virtually with a Bud high-test) - and reconsider the following statement in terms of the legal relationships (yup, I'm asking you to put on your lawyer's coif and put the green one in an honored position next to the Bud Light):
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from BW
As to the French role. Neither FID nor SFA. If anything it was UW. The American populace broke into two camps: Loyalists and Rebels. He who is the current legitimate government and works with the loyalist populace is conducting FID/SFA. He who is the outsider seeking to influence the revolution to support his own selfish ends is conducting UW. France conducted UW. England conducted FID/SFA.
Consider:
1. Legal relationship between the British Crown and the Loyalist Colonists (whose pre-rev governments still existed, albeit with some in exile) - as viewed by the British Crown and the Loyalist Colonists.
2. Legal relationship between the French Crown and the Continental Congress (starting with our beloved Declaration of Independence - although you and I have different takes on its present uses; but more importantly, the relationship after the Battle of Saratoga) - as viewed by the French Crown and the Continental Congress.
After some consideration of the above, you should conclude that Ken is closer to the mark than you are. In short, you can have two conflicting, but valid, legal (and political) views driving an armed conflict.
I am in the process of reading (half-way through; and subject to many side-tracks) George O. Trevelyan, The American Revolution (1899; yes, the last year of the 1800s), which presents the Brit legal and political views of that conflict (biased toward the Whigs, e.g., Burke & Fox); as well as the Loyalist and Rebel views. Great insight (IMO).
The bottom line, with relevance to this thread, is that, where law and politics for each side are based on entirely different constructs, their operational plans will also differ. CvC, methinks. In short, each side will be fighting a different war within the same armed conflict.
A full-spectrum planner would, in an ideal world, say: OK, here is our plan (version 1) based on our legal and political constructs and taking into account our operational capabilities. But, here is their likely plan based on their legal and political constructs and taking into account their operational capabilities. So, to meet their challenge, we have to adapt our plan (version 2; etc., what will they then do ?). Final question (version Nx) - Can we do that and still achieve our legal and political end goals ?
So far (still only half there), Trevelyan suggests that George III and his ministers never got beyond version 1.
BTW: interesting trivia from Trevelyan - did you all know that many of the Brit generals in the Revolutionary War were also MPs ?
This Colonel-ly solidarity has got to cease
or we'll get nothing done... :D
Not buying UW by the French in the American Revolution; There was nothing remotely unconventional about their entry, motives or operations. All boringly conventional. Surrogate warfare I'll accept -- though one could even quibble about that on the basis of who cajoled who to do what... :wry:
More importantly, as JMM noted:
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"The bottom line, with relevance to this thread, is that, where law and politics for each side are based on entirely different constructs, their operational plans will also differ. CvC, methinks. In short, each side will be fighting a different war within the same armed conflict."
Certainly applied to the Revolution but it has also applied to most of our wars. Most of which we got right.
Until the Department of Defense was created... ;)
"unconventional" describes the stratagem, not the tactics...
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
or we'll get nothing done... :D
Not buying UW by the French in the American Revolution; There was nothing remotely unconventional about their entry, motives or operations. All boringly conventional. Surrogate warfare I'll accept -- though one could even quibble about that on the basis of who cajoled who to do what... :wry:
More importantly, as JMM noted:Certainly applied to the Revolution but it has also applied to most of our wars. Most of which we got right.
Until the Department of Defense was created... ;)
"unconventional warfare" does not mean you dress like rambo and conduct raids from some camp deep in the swamp or jungle. It may mean you wear a $2000 suit, work in a highrise, and pick up the phone and call Fort Bragg and say : "Go see if you can get the populace of country x to make life difficult for their government."
In other words, the organization conducting UW (the French in the American Revolution with the Rebels, or the British in the American Revolution with the Indians, or the Americans in GWOT with the Northern Alliance, etc) may act VERY conventionally themselves, as may the force they are manipulating to serve their mutual objectives.
The "unconventional" part is getting the other guy to do your dirty work for you. When we say that SF conducts UW, it means that we are the middlemen between that guy in the suit and that foreign populace facilitating the transaction.
This doesn't look much like UW to me ...
"5.1 France and Great Britain on the Eve of American Independence" - at the end, but it did start that way with Beaumarchais and the trading company of Roderigue Hortalez & Co (the $2000 suit folks).
But then came Saratoga and French recognition of the new nation-state and its government:
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The Continental Army put Beaumarchais' supplies to good use. The defeat of General Johnny Burgoyne and his army on October 17, 1777, to Horatio Gates at Saratoga, was a major turning point in the American Revolutionary War. It was won by American soldiers, even if 90% of the gunpowder used had been supplied by and paid for by France, and was used in French M 1763-66 pattern (Charleville) muskets, which by then had become standard in the Continental Army. The victory at Saratoga proved to the French that the American rebellion could be sustained with a possibility of success.
News of Burgoyne's capitulation reached Paris in the evening of December 4, 1777; on the 17th Vergennes promised to recognize the independence of the Thirteen Colonies, with or without Spanish support. On January 30, the king authorized the Secrétaire du Conseil d'Etat Conrad Alexandre Gérard to sign the Treaty of Amity and Commerce and a secret Treaty of Alliance on his behalf. On February 6, 1778,Gérard carried out the order and Deane, Franklin, and Lee signed for the United States.
By these treaties, France offered "to maintain … the liberty, sovereignty, and independence" of the United States in case of war between her and Great Britain. France promised to fight on until the independence of the United States was guaranteed in a peace treaty. All the United States had to do in exchange was not "conclude either truce or peace with Great Britain without the formal consent of the other first obtained.
Not unlike Astan (USSR 1979- & US 2001-) in these respects: UW > new govt > CW. The last type of warfare turned out rather badly for the Sovs.
And looking back, by the time the French assistance, whether conventional or unconventional, had ended, France had spent livres 1,000,000,000; and was on its way to bankruptcy and the French Revolution (hmm ... similar to the USSR).
Are there some lessons for today ?
Final thought:
Since it is Memorial Day, we might want to remember the French sailors and soldiers, whether conventional or unconventional, who made the difference at Yorktown. All in the same boat together - colonialement. :)
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(from above link)
From Yorktown's ruins, ranked and still,
Two lines stretch far o'er vale and hill:
Who curbs his steed at head of one?
Hark! The low murmur: WASHINGTON!
Who bends his keen approving glance
Where down the gorgeous line of France
Shine knightly star and plume of snow?
Thou too art victor, ROCHAMBEAU!
John Greenleaf Whittier
PS: Tyrrell, somewhere (in looking at my wife's genealogy), I have William Johnson as part of the Ulster Shane O'Neills (Shane = John). If you have anything on that, drop me a PM. And, BTW, my ancestor Nick (Aubry dit Francoeur) also squared off against Johnson's troops in 1755 - Baron Dieskau's Defeat at Lake George. You won that one; but we took the Windmill.