Does anyone remember what the thread was
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Beelzebubalicious
Here's a quick and dirty google search paper related to this subject:
Insurgency--What's in a Name?
An Integrated Look at Non-violence, Terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare, Revolution, Civil War and Coups
http://paladin-san-francisco.com/inindex.htm
I haven't read it, but the author quotes Clausewitz, so it must be okay...Here's one quote:
Where we were discussing insurgencies and what they represent for a countries foriegn policy when it represents that nations underlying long term best interests.
Non-violent insurgency: a riposte
[QUOTE=Beelzebubalicious;44373] Third, any insurgency needs weapons, preferably firearms and I doubt if Tibetans have access to them.
Quote:
Forgive me if this has already been discussed previously, but to what extent can an insurgency be considered as such w/out the use of weapons? Can it be done through the media, non-violent protests, etc? Is Richard Gere a weapon of propaganda in the hand of tibetan "insurgents"?
A valid point and the examples later cited have some relevance, except when the opponent is a modern totalitarian state. Remove the available imagery, close the borders and expel foriegniers - what impact would the Tibetan rioting have then? By sheer fluke a BBC radio journalist was in Lhasa when the rioting started and did a very revealing report two weeks ago (sorry not aware a web link).
Peaceful and non-violent campaigning alone do not work. Alongside the Captain Boycott episode was a level of actual and threatened violence (see Stanley Palmer's Police and Protest in England and Ireland 1780-1950).
davidbfpo
An Analysis of Grievances: The Uyghurs of Xinjiang Province, China
The Uyghur population of the Xinjiang Province has mobilized based on three types of grievances: economic, political, and religious. The Uyghur population's grievances lie mostly with the central state government, controlled by the Han majority population. The Uyghur population has a strong identity that is distinguishable from the Han population. They speak their own Turkic language, practice Sufi Islam, and have had a cultural history distinct from that of the Han Chinese. The Chinese government has maintained strong political control in Xinjiang since 1949, when the People's Liberation Army marched in to occupy the region. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the creation of independent Central Asian states, the Uyghurs began to have hope that the independence of these countries would also help bring independence to their own country.
Uyghur-Han ethnic tensions have been exacerbated by government policies encouraging Han in-migration intended to assimilate Uyghurs into the larger Chinese framework, which existed until the 1970s. These assimilation policies have been perceived as a strong threat against Uyghur identity, culture, ethnicity and traditions. The government brought Han Chinese to Xinjiang through official policies sending transferred work units, demobilized People's Liberation Army troops, people joining family members sent to Xinjiang, and employees of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. After the 1980s, Han Chinese continued migrating to Xinjiang by their own prerogative. Accompanied by the in-migration is also the diverting of state funds to only help areas that are settled by the Han Chinese. Han Chinese now account for 95% of the population of Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Recent large government infrastructure projects have employed migrant workers, instead of local workers, in spite of preferential policies for ethnic minorities. The Xinjiang region is also natural resource rich, which keeps the region at the center of China's energy policy. The Uyghurs say that despite the economic development that is happening in the area, the profits are not staying in the region, and instead the Uyghurs are placed at a disadvantage because of unbearable tax burdens.
Hans largely dominate the government and Chinese Communist Party levels above the township. There are many concerns within the Uyghur community that the autonomy promised by the government in the 1950s with the establishment of the autonomous region have not been realized. As the People's Republic of China remains a single-party state and continues to prevent various groups from articulating demands and from organizing to pursue their interests. The Uyghurs tend to see the Han Chinese and the state government as one and the same, so the grievances and oppositions towards the Han Chinese and the government tend to coalesce.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, the Chinese government has tightened restrictions on the practicing of Islam by Uyghurs. Mosques near schools have been closed as being "bad influences on children." Fasting during Ramadan was banned in schools, hospitals and government offices. Muslim clerics have been detained for teaching the Koran. Restrictions and scrutiny on Islamic religious practices have increased after September 11, 2001, as the Chinese government aligned the separatist activities of the ethnically Muslim population as terrorism.
Based on these grievances, different groups have mobilized to assert their autonomy; however, the movement for autonomy is not monolithic. Opinions vary, from those who would like to see the autonomy of the region increased, to those would like to establish an independent state. The East Turkestan Independence Movement (ETIM), a more militant group described as a terrorist organization by the People's Republic of China and the US, has pressed for an independent Turkic state called East Turkestan to be created and populated by Uyghur Muslims in the Xinjiang region. Some have alleged that ETIM-linked groups were responsible for the Chinese bus bombings during the Olympics. Other groups, like the Uyghur American Association (UAA), has championed more peaceful means of reconciliation; the president of the UAA, Ms. Rebiya Kadeer, was nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize in 2006.