A Russian view on the Angolan War
For those interested the book IGOR ZHDARKIN - WE DID NOT SEE IT EVEN IN AFGHANISTAN is worth a read to see events through the eyes of a Russian translator/advisor during the Angolan war. (Above the photo of the book cover is a link to a word doc - We did not see it even in Afghanistan.doc - website is in Russian.)
There is a review to be found here
Two quotes from the review:
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"As the author relates, even the Russians who had served in Afghanistan had never experienced such “horrors” as the barrage of SADF artillery across the Lomba River. Under fire from the G-6 guns and the Mirage and Buccaneer aircraft, FAPLA brigades panicked and deserted the field in flight, leaving behind their Soviet equipment in a graveyard of tanks, trucks, ammunition, and other materiel. "
and
"As for the Angolan soldiers, they were “unsuitable for war.” Not only were they “afraid to take part in combat actions,” they were also unwilling to follow the “reasonable advice” of their Soviet advisors (p. 341). Consequently, it was necessary for the advisors to tell the Angolans that they were wrong and beat them up accordingly."
Fabulous stuff... the Keystone Cops in Africa.
Note: The G-6 is a 155mm SELF-PROPELLED GUN-HOWITZER
http://media.defenseindustrydaily.co...H_G6_155mm.jpg
Flying Columns in Small Wars: An OMFTS Model
The following thesis was produced by (then) Major Michael F. Morris, USMC on CSC 2000
An extract from the executive summary:
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The study also illustrates the utility of battalion and brigade level MAGTFs at the operational level by analyzing a case study, Operation Modular. In 1987 in southeastern Angola the South African Defense Force employed a three thousand man mobile strike force to defeat a combined Angolan / Cuban division size force intent on destroying the UNITA resistance movement. The campaign's military outcome convinced the Soviets and Cubans to settle the twenty-three year Angolan border war and the political future of Namibia in a diplomatic venue rather than by force of arms. Operation Modular highlights the potential of small, mobile, hard-hitting fighting columns in a small war environment.
Download here
Lesson id'd, lesson overlooked?
JMA,
A good catch and reading through it I found this - note written in 2000 by a USMC officer:
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Given the proliferation of mines throughout the Third World, all future U.S. military vehicles should incorporate similar mine protection features as a priority force protection issue.
See pgs.52-53.
The knowledge was there -- to no avail...
The US Army bought some CASSPIR Mk IIs in 1999 as a result of a Foreign Articles Test statute that had taken years to get through Congress (who are very much into a "Buy American" attitude regardless of the fact that other people make good or better stuff)...
IIRC, they had earlier -- in the early 80s -- bought a Nyala and wanted to buy some Buffels but the combination of Track-centric Armot Officers and Congressionally beloved and sponsored contractors defeated the idea of producing any here. Until... :rolleyes:
The knowledge of need was there, it got sat upon.
Cabbages and Kings of the Road...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
JMA
You can't beat the procurement system. There are too many vested interests and...Had this started in 2006/7 then by now there would have been a improvements so lets say Mark 1 to say Mark 5. You set up a rotation to allow vehicles to be recalled for an upgrade to the latest Mark as improvements are signed off.
I certainly agree I'm pretty sure we could and would do that in an existential situation. As you probably know, it was done, ad hoc, and on a unit by unit thus small scale in both theaters to an extent much as was done on a far larger scale in Viet Nam (LINK). Though the buried IED problem existed in VN, it was not as pervasive, thus no significant mine protection. Not many urban areas nor even much Bush so not that much close-in and heavyside protection either.
Still, today, I'll have to defend the Troops by mentioning the overwhelming, cumbersome US Army bureaucracy -- most of which is Congressionally induced -- is too unwieldy to do that lacking more cause than was extant in Afghanistan or Iraq. :mad:
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It is easier than it appears. All you need to find one of those hard-charging officers who won't take no for an answer ;)
Easier provided someone not risk averse has the authority to turn on the money spigot and fifty people are not looking over a shoulder to make sure it's spent 'properly.' This after all is the nation where a then sitting President, asked about a tax cut in a booming economy said "We'd give it back to you if we knew you'd spend it right..." :rolleyes:
As to the hard chargers. Hmmm. Worked for several of those. Often lot of flash and dash, brave to a fault, aggressive, forward thinkers, some good guys, some arrogant ar$#'oles...
Gotta watch 'em all though, the long and the short and the tall -- good, bad and those in between. If you do not, they tend to get a lot of people killed -- unnecessarily. ;)
Ask not for whom the bell tolls...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
JMA
I feel I need to emphasise that this local solution (being the local construction of mine and ambush protected vehicles) is really pretty simple and does not require national existential circumstances.
And I obviously need to emphasize that you have not dealt with the ponderous, inflexible bureaucracy that is the US government of which the US Army is a heirarchial, excessively conformity oriented extension. :wry:
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The solution is obvious given that these vehicles would be developed for local Afghan circumstances and not exported along with the troop draw-down (but rather handed over to the ANP/ANA).
I totally agree -- you don't have to convince me. You could probably work on convincing those members of the US Congress (and they are many...) who think the US should NOT be in Afghanistan at all and try to hobble efforts there in any way they can to include reinforcing that conformity thing... :mad:.
You may also need to work on those members of the US Armed Forces (all ranks...) who are there but either do not want to be or do not agree with their mission and are not about to risk their 'careers' by being innovative in an organization that too often punishes innovation and initiative. :rolleyes:
That kind of stuff is perfectly normal in most nations in peacetime. Only in an existential conflict do those chafing, foolish problems get significantly reduced -- they do not ever go away; they are human failings and we had them to a minor extent in WW II (which wasn't really existential for us though it was at least partly treated as such and thus was big enough to eliminate some of that idiocy...).
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The only problem (probably insurmountable) is how to side-step the formidable procurement machine the the commercial lobbyists who would see control and profits slipping through their fingers. The lives of soldiers have never been more important than "the process" or a juicy government procurement contract.
Yes. You answered your own objections. :(
Combat and Materiel Developments
In theory at least it is the "combat developments" community that writes the requirements for future military systems and products. Those elements are part of the branch schoolhouses -- U.S. Army Infantry School, Armor School, etc. The combat developers write the system requirements documents which then have to be staffed and approved by a half-dozen echelons within the TRADOC/DA bureaucracy.
It is the "materiel developers" who cut metal and develop prototypes. Those organizations belong to Army Materiel Command, except for those of the Medics and parts of the crypto Signal community.
Even after the Soviets collapsed we continued developing weapons for Fulda Gap threats until the "Transformation" net-centric initiative started. The rest is fairly recent history.