Sadly, that's all well said and I can identify with
all of it.
We're not going to change until we start training people correctly and trusting them to do their jobs; the Viet Nam syndrome is still with us...
"Train as you will fight" and "Foster Initiative" are two very important lessons we've learned over the years -- and which we routinely body slam and ignore in peacetime -- and the US Army has been at peace since 1945...
I've lately been adding "Ban Power Point" to my long standing mantra, "Destroy the Hoffman Building." Those two things are a major part of the problem; the Senior Leaders and the Per community both really need to take a long hard look internally...
Some really good points in both the above...
Couple of minor thoughts.
From Rob:
Quote:
"The Epilogue of Cobra II starts with a quote from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in response to the lessons of the Iraq War. Secretary Rumsfeld answers, “I think if I had to pull out one lesson that we’ve learned over the past four or five years, it would be that in the twenty-first century we’re going to have to stop thinking about things, numbers of things, and mass, and think also and maybe even first about speed and agility and precision.”
To which Rob said:
Quote:
That the former SECDEF would draw this as "the" lesson kind of amazes me. I would think it would be much more strategic and far less tactical - something along the lines on the consequences, responsibilities of using military force and how the use of military force changes the dynamics of the political problem and opens up a broad range of possibilities which might cause more harm then good.
Consider that his job as SecDef was the application of force and the methodologies thereunto pertaining. The calculations you cite are properly those of State, the NSC, the Intel Community and the President. Does the SecDef get an input? Sure -- but he's only one of many and his real job is insuring the force is capable of the application. SecDefs rarely have much military experience, the military aspects of the thought processes you mention are, I believe, the province of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Combatant Commander involved.
Who's to say Rumsfeld was not thinking and talking strategically? Seriously. He after all was one of those early on who was calling for metrics and may well have come to realize the fallacy of that approach. I do not read it as a tactical suggestion but as a total spectrum; tactical, operational and strategic question. Seems to me that it is applicable to all...
For Norfolk:
Vandergriff has some good ideas and he mostly makes sense -- but he's trying to sell a top down solution and that will not work unless he gets a charismatic champion for Chief of Staff, Army. He needs a Shy Meyer II and I don't see any out there. He should reorient his pitch and convince a slew of Colonels who might make some of that happen in a few years...
CJCS Trivia ... or is it?
Guys, the 7 post G-N CJCS were:
1. Navy - Crowe
2. Army - Powell
3. Army - Shali
4. Army - Shelton
5. Air Force - Myers
6. Marines - Pace
7. Navy - Mullen
The VJCS, by law, is different service. In the longer view, since 1986 four of the CJCS have been ground force guys. For 14 of the last 21 years the CJCS has been a ground guy. Final note: there was an article I read a while back (wish I could remember the author and title) that pointed out that at the highest levels of decision making, people at least partly shed their organizational identities and interact as individuals. It's a point that can be developed from Graham Allison's Essence of Decision.
Cheers
JohnT