The politicians wouldn't let us?
I concur with Uboat and would add that Clausewitz's argument that war is an extension of politics is clearly beyond the comprehension of the Israeli officers lamenting to the press about how the politicians prevented their victory. First, a military victory was not possible, the best that could be hoped for was too pressure all sides into a political agreement (you could argue that was achieved, even if it is temporary, with the UN cease fire agreement). Second, a number of other articles clearly indicated that the Israeli Army wasn't prepared for a major battle due to equipment and other logistical shortfalls, and training shortfalls. There is wisdom in Tom's reply above, and unless Israel comes up with a feasible political strategy (much easier said than done), then a military victory will remain elusive.
Israel's Military Chief Admits Failings
24 August Associated Press - Israel's Military Chief Admits Failings.
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In a letter to the troops, Israel's military chief acknowledged publicly for the first time Thursday that there were shortcomings in the military's performance during the recent fighting with Hezbollah guerrillas in Lebanon.
Israel went into the monthlong war as a united front against Hezbollah, but since the fighting ended last week, the country has splintered into a cacophony of reproachful voices.
Criticism of the military's preparedness and tactics swelled after the battles ended without a clear-cut victory for Israel. Questions about the wisdom of 11th-hour battles and reports of food and water shortages have fueled demands for a state inquiry into the war's conduct and the resignation of Israel's wartime leaders.
In a letter to Israeli fighters, military chief Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz wrote: "Alongside the achievements, the fighting uncovered shortcomings in various areas _ logistical, operational and command. We are committed to a thorough, honest, rapid and complete investigation of all the shortcomings and successes."...
Preliminary Lessons of the Israeli-Hezbollah War
17 August from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) - Preliminary Lessons of the Israeli-Hezbollah War by Anthony Cordesman.
Quote:
Instant military history is always dangerous and inaccurate. This is particularly true when one goes from an effort to describe the fighting to trying to draw lessons from uncertain and contradictory information. The following analysis is based largely on media reporting, data provided by Israeli and Arab think tanks, and a visit to Israel sponsored by Project Interchange of the American Jewish Committee. This visit made it possible to visit the front and talk with a number of senior Israeli officers and experts, but Israeli officers and experts were among the first to note that the facts were unclear and that it might take weeks or months to establish what had happened.
This analysis is, however, limited by the fact that no matching visit was made to Lebanon and to the Hezbollah. Such a visit was not practical at this time, but it does mean the lessons advanced analysis cannot be based on a close view of what Liddle Hart called the "other side of the hill."...
Much Soul-Searching Ahead for Israeli Army
27 August Los Angeles Times - Much Soul-Searching Ahead for Israeli Army by Laura King.
Quote:
Israel's much-vaunted military, which emerged bruised and bloodied from its 34-day conflict with the guerrillas of Hezbollah, is in the midst of an intensive reappraisal of the battlefield tactics, intelligence capability and weaponry it brought to bear in Lebanon.
Yet a war whose outcome veered closer to a loss than almost any in Israel's history is unlikely to result in fundamental changes in Israeli military doctrine, analysts and military officials say.
That is in part because Israel regards Hezbollah, a disciplined and highly motivated Islamist militia equipped with state-of-the-art weapons, as unique among its many enemies in the region, and strongly believes that its army remains capable of inflicting decisive defeat on any conventional force it might confront.
Most Israeli military strategists also firmly believe they could have won the conflict with Hezbollah had they not been hobbled by the missteps of a domestic political leadership untested by battle — a view that is likely to be aired repeatedly during what may be months of public inquiries into how the conflict was conducted.
At the same time, however, Israel is weighing the long-term implications of the militia's ability to inflict pain not only on Israel's military, but civilians. Israel's conclusions could have far-reaching effect on its dealings with the Palestinians, in particular with militant groups such as Hamas, the political ruling power in the Palestinian territories...
Hezbollah's ability to hold its own against the Israeli army, even for a limited time, has raised the specter of other enemies being emboldened to strike, perhaps together. But Syria, one of Hezbollah's chief backers, stayed on the sidelines of this conflict — fully aware, analysts said, that the Israeli military was capable of destroying not only its army, but its infrastructure and institutions of statehood.
Many Israeli analysts and commanders say the military's overall performance was far from the stinging defeat that Hezbollah claims to have inflicted. But they generally acknowledge that Israel's poor planning, carelessness and hubris played a part in high-profile failures at crucial moments, from the earliest days of fighting to the final hours...
Much has been made of Israel's overreliance on airstrikes to destroy Hezbollah's rocket-firing ability. The army chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz, a former air force commander, was a chief proponent of the fierce air assault that preceded Israel's last-minute, large-scale ground push into southern Lebanon.
Halutz, whose job is now in jeopardy, has acknowledged "shortcomings" in the way the offensive was carried out.
IDF Plans Massive Intelligence Overhaul
4 September Jerusalem Post - IDF Plans Massive Intelligence Overhaul by Yaakov Katz.
Quote:
As one of the lessons of the war in Lebanon, the IDF plans to ask the Treasury for an immediate budget supplement of NIS 10 billion, most of which will be invested in rehabilitating the Intelligence Corps, a high-ranking defense official told The Jerusalem Post on Sunday.
Defense officials and politicians have accused Military Intelligence of failing to predict the outbreak of violence. In addition, it is also blamed for failing to adequately penetrate the Hizbullah command, as could be demonstrated by the failure to assassinate any of the group's top leaders or destroy its main nerve centers.
"There will be a massive investment now in Military Intelligence," the official said...
The war, he said, was a "wake-up call" for the country and showed the public and the government that the budget cuts over the years had created a military that was not ready to meet its challenges.
"They need to ask themselves what type of military they want to have," he said of the government and specifically the Treasury. "If they want the IDF to protect the country, then they need to allocate the necessary resources and funds."
The defense official said he was not concerned about being summoned to testify before an inquiry to investigate the IDF's level of preparedness and management of the war.
"For years we have warned that this would happen," he said. "Now that it has happened, it is time to fix things."
Israel: Winograd Committee Report Released
From today's VOA - Lebanon War Inquiry Could Topple Israeli PM. Reposted here in full per USG guidelines.
Quote:
An Israeli inquiry into last year's Lebanon war could topple Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. As Robert Berger reports from VOA's Jerusalem bureau, Israel is in political turmoil after the commission of inquiry declared that it is taking aim at the national leadership.
The commission of inquiry into the war in Lebanon announced that it will include "personal findings" on Prime Minister Olmert. Israeli politicians and the media believe that means Mr. Olmert will be condemned for the way he handled the war, which is widely seen as a failure.
Despite a 34-day air and ground assault, the Israeli army failed to defeat some 5,000 Hezbollah guerrillas in South Lebanon. In addition, reserve soldiers returning from the battlefield complained of poor preparations and a lack of food and ammunition.
The interim report is due out next month and the final one at an undisclosed date. There is broad speculation that a critical report could force Mr. Olmert to resign under the pressure of public opinion.
Former Israeli general Uzi Dayan expects the report to come down hard on the prime minister, the defense minister and the commander of the Israel Defense Forces who already resigned.
"They made their mistake in the war by decision making, not knowing how to use, how to operate a big military force like the IDF, and finally the neglect of the home front," he said. "Their big failure is no leadership, no strategy."
But officials in Mr. Olmert's Kadima party are adopting a wait and see attitude.
"It's all speculation," Cabinet Minister Roni Bar-On told Israel Radio. He said there is no indication that the commission will blame the prime minister for the failure of the war or recommend that he step down.
But just a year after Mr. Olmert won a landslide election victory, it is very unlikely that he will complete his four-year term. Israeli media say the collapse of the government and early elections appear inevitable.
Flipside of the COIN: Israel’s Lebanese Incursion Between 1982 – 2000
US Army Combat Studies Institute Occasional Paper 21 - Flipside of the COIN: Israel’s Lebanese Incursion Between 1982 – 2000 by Captain Daniel Helmer, US Army.
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In view of the adoption of the term “The Long War” by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff to describe US operations against terrorism and state sponsored terrorism, we have decided to change the title of our long running series of studies on irregular warfare – from the Global War on Terrorism Occasional Papers to the Long War Occasional Papers.
This CSI Occasional Paper is the fi rst in the renamed series. The purpose of the series, however, remains unchanged. That is, to provide short historical monographs on topics of doctrinal and operational relevance to the US Army and military professionals for an Army at war.
We are therefore pleased to offer Long War OP #21: Flipside of the COIN: Israel’s Lebanese Incursion Between 1982-2000, by Captain Daniel Helmer. Captain Helmer’s study, written while studying at Oxford University, addresses the Israeli view of the threat posed by various armed factions in southern Lebanon over an 18-year period. This was a period during which Israeli used air strikes, ground invasions, and border operations to contain or defeat the military threat to its national security.
Among the key points the author makes in this study is the inability of Israel to use military force to secure a lasting political end state in Lebanon that was favorable to its security needs, despite some stunning battlefield victories.
Helmer also notes that both Palestinian and Hezbollah leaders recognized they could not militarily defeat Israeli military forces, despite occasional tactical success, but that this was not their political objective. Rather, they needed only to survive and to maintain their forces in the field to achieve their long-term objectives. Weaker powers have often employed this strategy against their stronger opponents. He also notes the steady dwindling of political and public support in Israel for the occupation of Lebanon and the role this played in Israel’s decision to withdraw from Lebanon in 2000.
As the recent 2006 Israeli attack into Lebanon against Hezbollah terrorists has shown, however, these strategic challenges and dilemmas remain unsolved. In the fi rst decade of the 21st century, it is clear that these dilemmas are not unique to Israel and that the United States might draw some insights relevant to our own situation.
The Combat Studies Institute also plans a future study on the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah conflict. We at CSI hope this Occasional Paper will contribute to the Army as it conducts operations in the Long War. CSI -- The Past is Prologue!