Whither Peace Operations?
USIP, Oct 08: Whither Peace Operations?
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Summary
- Much progress has been achieved over the last decade and a half in the development and use of peace operations as a tool to quell conflicts, but there are limits to how much more progress can be expected.
- The number of troop contributors and troops deployed to peace operations has recently reached unprecedented highs, but the bulk of troops came from a limited number of states.
- The relationship between the United Nations and non-UN peacekeepers seems for the most part complementary. Nonetheless, the rise in non-UN peace operations has probably led to the United Nations becoming too dependent on too small a base of lesser-developed states.
- The characteristics of most troop contributors (e.g., type of governance, national quality of life, ground-force size) correlate with their level of contribution, but even politically willing nations with the “right” characteristics can likely deploy only a small percentage of their troops to operations at any one time.
- While Europe and Africa have achieved the most progress in developing institutional capacities, each continent confronts problems of interinstitutional relations and resource shortages.
- Russia’s hegemonic role in Eurasia and the United States’ historical legacy in Latin America have hindered development of comprehensive institutional capacities for peace operations in each region.
- East Asia may slowly be moving beyond ideational strictures that crippled efforts to develop regional capacities.
- Institutional progress is not expected in South Asia and the Middle East, and states of each region should not be expected to send military units to intraregional operations. Nearly all South Asian countries, however, will be major players in UN operations. A few exceptions aside, Mideast states will remain bit players on the world scene.
- Demand for easy or moderately challenging operations will generally be met, but the hazardous missions most apt to occur will be called for by states possessing the wherewithal to take them on and bring others along.
UN peacekeeping operations (catch all)
For obvious reasons, discussion at SWJ tends to focus on the ongoing missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, threats to homeland security, broader military and strategic issues, COIN debates, CT issues, and occasionally conflicts elsewhere.
I don't particularly have a point to make with this thread, but I did think it might be useful to flag the very substantial amount of peacekeeping and stabilization that is going on elsewhere. There are currently (as of 31/7/09) more than 93,000 personnel deployed on UN PKOs, representing a very subtstantial growth over the past 20 years.
http://paxsims.wordpress.com/files/2009/08/pko.jpg
What's more, the composition of UN contingents has changed markedly over the years, with Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, and Nigeria contributing over one third of all personnel, and only two Western countries (Italy and France) among the top 20 contributors. The Chinese contribution has steadily grow too, from almost nothing to over 2,000 troops now (ranking them 11th).
http://paxsims.wordpress.com/files/2009/08/graph.jpg
Now, it can be argued that the UN is inefficient, that UN PKOs are insufficiently robust, and that the quality of individual contingents can be weak, and the peacekeeping operations often fail. That is undoubtedly true, but rather misses the point: its not as if anyone in the West is lining up to do DR Congo (etc) these days, nor can the failure of peace agreements necessarily be laid at the UN's feet, nor is it clear that deploying no PKO would better help consolidate peace. Moreover, it needs to be remembered that the United Nations is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the international community, which often finds it convenient to blame the organization for what are really the failures of its member states.
As I said, I didn't have a major point to make, other than to welcome comments. Like it or not, UN PKOs remain a significant part of the global architecture for peace and security, and it might be useful to think how they might be better used or made more effective.
Two barriers to effective PKO
I agree with all that has gone before, and would add that as I see it there are two major barriers that are overlooked when dealing with PKO. First is the fact that Blue Helmets come from all over the world, have different missions, different rules of engagement, and most importantly speak different languages. The second problem is that because of the way that the UN creates Blue Helmet "armies" creates and incentive structure whereby countries who cannot afford to equip and train their militaries are the ones who have the most to gain by sending them on Peace Keeping mission, to get them equipped and at least a little trained, not on their dime.
The illustration to this problem is the Eastern front of WWI. The Austro-Hungarians, who basically commanded a large coalition of Armies made up from the various Hapsburg holdings were creamed by the Russians, who mostly spoke Russian, and were far more unified in comparison. The Russians, in their turn, we trounced by the Germans, who were not only more unified than the Russians, but also well trained and well equipped.
I know that this is a simplification of WWI, but the analogy holds.
The UN is less than the sum of its parts.
I make this observation not to criticize the UN; it is, as Rex says, a wholly owned subsidiary of the member states. Thus a UN PKO can only be what its members want it to be. As Jon says, UNOSOM II was a case in point although I disagree as to the reasons it failed. Created under UNSCR 814, it had the most robust C2 structure of any Peace Op to date (and maybe ever). At US insistence the SRSG was an American, former Dep NSA VADM Jonathon Howe, the FC was a NATO general, LTG Cevik Bir from Turkey, and the Dep FC was again US MG tom Montgomery, dual hatted as COMUSFORSOM. From may until June 93 the major problem was that DPKO was unable to either negotiate sufficient force contributors or get them deployed in time so the UNOSOM II force which was to have been 28,000 strong at handover on 4 May was only 14,000 at it peak. Then came Aideed's attack that kileed several peacekeepers.
At Admiral Howe's insistence, with the concurrence of USUN Rep, Madelaine Albright, the UNSC passed over the weekend, UNSCR 837 which authorized operations to capture Aideed and any others who assisted him putting UNOSOM II on the side of his opponents. This brought into play the problem of Terms of Reference (TOR) - the agreements signed by DPKO with the force Contributors specifiying the rules of engagement and precisely what they agreed to do under the terms of UN "Operational Control" (which, at best, is the equivalent of US tactical control - TACON). Italy, which both contributed forces and provided the U2 - intel staff officer - had long standing relationships with Aideed and said flat out that 837 was not what it had signed up for; Italy had only agreed to enforce 814. Hence conflict.
I won't go into the US C2 fiasco other than to say that it violated our own doctrine in every possible way.
If interested see Chapter 12 of Max Manwaring and my book, UNCOMFORTABLE WARS REVISITED and/ or Chapter 9 of my edited volume, THE SAVAGE WARS OF PEACE (thesource of the other chapter written with Tom Daze who was XO to Montgomery).
Cheers
JohnT
India and UN Peacekeeping: Declining Interest with Grave Implications
India and UN Peacekeeping: Declining Interest with Grave Implications
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Diggers look back at their roles
Two articles from the Australian Lowy Institute:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/...-Cambodia.aspx and:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/...cognition.aspx
I noted in the first:
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Retired General Mike Smith, Director of the Security Sector Advisory & Coordination Division in the UN Support Mission in Libya
In the second:
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Peacekeeping is not alchemy. There are no magic transforming 'bullets' in communities serious enough to warrant deployment. Despite the best hopes of fast turnarounds, it is typically full of the painstaking negotiations and compromises that pock-mark nations rife with conflict, poverty and fear.
Peacekeeping - well only 20% of the time
Classic under-statement warning:wry:
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United Nations peacekeeping missions routinely avoid using force to protect civilians who are under attack, intervening in only 20 percent of cases despite being authorized to do so by the U.N. Security Council...
"There is a persistent pattern of peacekeeping operations not intervening with force when civilians are under attack....Peacekeepers are absent from many locations when civilians come under attack, and when they are present, are unable or unwilling to prevent serious physical harm from being inflicted..
Link:http://mobile.reuters.com/article/id...40516?irpc=932
Darfur: The Genocide the World Got Tired of
A rare article on events in Darfur, I'd forgotten there was a UN mission there, known as UNAMID (a hybrid with the AU) and in place for six years:http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-r..._5683453.html?
The author ends with:
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It's difficult to escape the conclusion that Darfur is the genocide that people got tired of. A terrible epitaph in the wake of so many impassioned declarations of "never again."
Facts & figures for UNAMID:http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/mi...id/facts.shtml
New Study Suggests Reforms to UN Peacekeeping Operations
New Study Suggests Reforms to UN Peacekeeping Operations
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The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping Operations
An open access article from the RUSI Journal, by Mats Berdal & David Ucko. The Abstract:
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Although the demand for UN peacekeepers shows little sign of abating, a sense of uncertainty and malaise continues to colour discussions about the future of UN peacekeeping. Of the many issues facing the UN High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations that was set up in 2014, the use of force by UN peacekeepers is likely to attract particular attention. It is also likely to prove divisive, both among member states and within the Secretariat. While steps can be taken to strengthen the capacity of the UN to mount and conduct field operations, Mats Berdal and David H Ucko argue that the way forward does not lie simply in entrusting UN forces with ever-more ‘robust’ war-fighting mandates. Instead, more systematic attention needs to be given to strategically linking UN peacekeeping activities to political processes aimed at bringing violent conflict to an end. This will require far greater honesty from member states regarding their own responsibility in enabling the UN to do what they ask of it.
Link:http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03071847.2015.1016718#abstract
Top US General Urges Countries to Bolster UN Peacekeeping
Top US General Urges Countries to Bolster UN Peacekeeping
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As UN Peacekeeping Veers Toward Counterterror, US Steps In
As UN Peacekeeping Veers Toward Counterterror, US Steps In
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U.S. to Provide More Support to U.N. Peacekeeping Forces
U.S. to Provide More Support to U.N. Peacekeeping Forces
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