Al-Qaeda Masters Terrorism On the Cheap
Al-Qaeda Masters Terrorism On the Cheap
Financial Dragnet Largely Bypassed
By Craig Whitlock
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, August 24, 2008; Page A01
Quote:
LONDON -- Since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, al-Qaeda has increasingly turned to local cells that run extremely low-cost operations and generate cash through criminal scams, bypassing the global financial dragnet set up by the United States and Europe.
Although al-Qaeda spent an estimated $500,000 to plan and execute the Sept. 11 attacks, many of the group's bombings and assaults since then in Europe, North Africa and Southeast Asia have cost one-tenth as much, or less.
The cheap plots are evidence that the U.S. government and its allies fundamentally miscalculated in assuming they could defeat the network by hunting for wealthy financiers and freezing bank accounts, according to many U.S. and European counterterrorism officials.
I don't know anyone in the CT business who thought that they "could defeat the network by hunting for wealthy financiers and freezing bank accounts" — it is all part of engagement on many, many fronts, to which AQ (and others) naturally have countermoves of their own. Still, an interesting article.
The illicit goods trade and it's links to crime/terrorism
For my undergrad poli sci class we have to write a final paper and my prompt is on the worldwide illegal illicit goods trade. Which deals with everything from knockoff parada bags, sunglasses and pirated movies to bogus medinces, auto/aircraft parts, as well as illegal arms, and even humans themselves. Now in my paper I want to deal with this particular trade's links to organized crime and terrorism. However I haven't been able to find many useful sources in the academic library here at the college and the same goes for the internet also.
So I was wondering if someone would mind pointing me in the right direction in terms of finding sources?
Thank you,
STRATEGY TO COMBAT Transnational Crime
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/defa..._July_2011.pdf
Quote:
In years past, TOC was largely regional in scope, hierarchically structured, and had only occasional links to terrorism. Today’s criminal networks are fluid, striking new alliances with other networks around the world and engaging in a wide range of illicit activities, including cybercrime and providing support for terrorism. Virtually every transnational criminal organization and its enterprises are connected and enabled by information systems technologies, making cybercrime a substantially more important concern. TOC threatens U.S. interests by taking advantage of failed states or contested spaces; forging alliances with corrupt foreign government officials and some foreign intelligence services; destabilizing political, financial, and security institutions in fragile states; undermining competition in world strategic markets; using cyber technologies and other methods to perpetrate sophisticated frauds; creating the potential for the transfer of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to terrorists; and expanding narcotrafficking and human and weapons smuggling networks. Terrorists and insurgents increasingly are turning to criminal networks to generate funding and acquire logistical support. TOC also threatens the interconnected trading, transportation, and transactional systems that move people and commerce throughout the global economy and across our borders.
While researching documents to better understand the potential links between terrorism and transnational organized crime I came across our relatively new TOC National Strategy.
Kidnapping: Why AQ Needs Donations More Than Ransoms
An article by Clint Watts (CWOT) which opens with:
Quote:
I discuss the trade offs and disadvantages for al Qaeda affiliates such as AQIM that are dependent on illicit funding schemes, namely kidnapping, to sustain their operations. I conclude with the opinion that al Qaeda needs donations more than ransoms if they intend to orchestrate a comeback.
(He ends)...Another detractor of illicit revenue generation for al Qaeda groups is the scrutiny brought on terrorists by law enforcement and the military when they conduct illegal activities like kidnapping and drug smuggling. An important point that I overlooked in the FPRI post.
Link:http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=975
Pursuing terrorist finance: UK perspectives
Within the linked document - written evidence given on 'Pursue', part of evidence presented to the House of Commons Select Committee on Home Affairs (HASC) - are several contributions on terrorist finance and counter-action. It includes officials and others, including charities. On a quick read some "gems" lie within.
Link alas no longer works:http://www.parliament.uk/documents/c...20Evidence.pdf
A "blind eye" to supporting Syrian insurgents
I recently heard an open source analyst comment that the Syrian insurgents were receiving financial support, up to US$600m, from rich families and others in the Gulf who move the cash to Kuwait ostensibly to donate to Kuwaiti charities. Kuwait and the Gulf states have legislation on countering terrorism finance, but being charitable donations prefer to "look the other way". Plus a Salafist faction is present in the Kuwaiti parliament, who would not support an official response.
A partial support comes in this Kuwaiti newspaper report:http://alhayat.com/Details/568664 The Google translation is not perfect.
A "blind eye" to supporting Syrian insurgents Part 2
More on the role of Kuwaiti individuals and others in raising funds for the violent Jihad in Syria:http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.c....MqY5DsXo.dpbs
Curious to learn some support President Assad and of course there is now a law about to counter terrorism financing. Clearly working well.:wry: