evolution, generation, asymmetry
I definitely don't think the so called 4th generation of war has much to do with weapons technology, but as you stated the way the war is waged. Supposedly 3rd generation war was primarily waged against armies, under the assumption if you defeat the Army you defeat the nation's will indirectly. Yet WWII is usually demonstrated as the 3d generation example, especially the Germans strategy of rapid deep attacks (maneuver warfare). However, this is another example of a definition that can't hold its water. We not only defeated Germany's and Japan's military, we used conventional warfare to destroy their industrial base and indiscriminately target their population.
4th Generation Warfare, which emerged after WWII starting around Mao's time (though Mao actually started prior to WWII) is generally described as a more of a political war, where the actions are primarily directed to achieve political objectives, whether terrorist acts, or major offensives such as the Tet Offensive, or holding Fallujah and fighting to the death. With the exception of the Tet offensive the intent isn't to defeat the military, but rather defeat the political will of the target audience.
I guess you could also call this asymmetric warfare, but I don't think that fits, because we could do the same, we choose not to (an error in my opinion).
4th Generation Warfare isn't so much tactics, but rather a strategy change, and of course the strategy provides the frame work for your tactics. Technology enables a wider range of tactics, and so on.
Again I don't like the term generation in this context, but looking beyond that the 4th GW theorists make some good arguments. I think we're in the midst of great social/political upheaval, which is close to the clash of cultures, but I think more a redefining of the nation-state's role in the world. We (the human race globally) are rapidly developing new economic models that transcend the control of the state. Who butters your bread the state or your mulitnational Corporation? Individuals who wouldn't have a voice previously beyond their immediate social sphere, can now influence global communities. For example, Al Qaeda doesn't have to recruit directly, they provided a vision (we validated it with our response), an umbrella strategy, and Muslims worldwide can opt in if they choose. In other words they mobilize cadres/armies in every nation where there is a Muslim population vulnerable to this type of exploitation. This strains the nation state over time to the point it becomes incapable of maintaining control (in theory).
So far our response to this threat has been to go out and beat up a couple of Armies (Taliban and Iraq), which in my opinion simply made the situation worse, because we played into Bin Laden's hands, and provided a wealth of propaganda material. They appear to be getting stronger, while we are getting weaker in the sense of the moral and political will.
It isn't a generation of warfare, but we better wake up and realize that there are changes in the wind, and adjust to them accordingly.
4GW as a misleading theory
Just to throw this out there, but about a year ago I threw together a response to 4GW. I really liked Hammes book, but I had problems w/ 4GW in ways mentioned here on this list. My biggest complaint with xGW is it really doesn't tell us anything new. In fact, one proponent of it, when pressed to really define its distinctions that accords it as a theory kept dancing around and suggested I was trying to nail jello to a wall.
Here's the ending of my critique:
Quote:
The theory of Fourth Generation Warfare fails when applied to reality and as a theory itself. It fails to prescribe, predict, describe, or explain behavior. Its explanations of relationships and ideas do not connect when exposed to historical realities. Ultimately, the analysis of past and present conflicts with this theory is of little value.
Fourth Generation Warfare is based on a false reading of history and a faulty understanding of the nature of conflict. The role of economic, ideological, and political ideas and efforts have always co-mingled with military might. The quantity of each would vary as required, resorting to military might as an extension of politics if necessary. At best, 4GW reminds us public diplomacy is more important than ever because of the need to interact at alternative levels. That is the best 4GW can contribute.
Generational warfare is based on technology and tactics. The Napoleonic shift a radical change in how and why wars were fought. With his destablizing impact on the nature of the state system at the time, how was what he did not 4GW? Generations of warfare are best described through technological and tactical changes. The Revolution in Military Affairs of Napoleon is remarkably similar to the RMA today, but with some aspects in reverse (professionalism -> amateurism -> professionalism). Fourth Generation War has 'happened' before and throughout time. It is how and why wars are fought. It simply does not offer anything new.
The critique, posted here on my blog, started an interesting discussion. If you do read the blog post, I apologize in advance for typos and grammar.
When was war non-political?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
4th Generation Warfare, which emerged after WWII starting around Mao's time (though Mao actually started prior to WWII) is generally described as a more of a political war, where the actions are primarily directed to achieve political objectives,
4th Generation Warfare isn't so much tactics, but rather a strategy change, and of course the strategy provides the frame work for your tactics. Technology enables a wider range of tactics, and so on.
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Bill,
Clausewitz 101. All warfare is political. States / Kingdoms / Religions / Societies do not wage war because they bored or have nothing better to do- they have a political end in mind.
Regarding a 'strategy' change - 4GW advocates are really chasing ground here.
I think folks are getting confused between operational method and strategy. I think some of this is a legacy from some people (predominately in the US I suspect) buying too much into Huntington's The Soldier and the State type thinking.
In Western democracies, despite what many of us in the military might think, politicians and national leaders decide strategy. Generals pick the operational method to achieve the strategic end they are given. If you doubt this, try and imagine the US military pursuing the war in Iraq if US political will changes and the President calls 'game over'...
The sort of 'strategy' change your refer to is nothing new. Any examination of the historical record regarding classical Greece, Persia and Rome shows similar /identical 'political' responses from people who opposed those hegemons. Was that 4GW?
I am firmly in the 4GW is 'bunk' camp. (We have a better word in Australia beginning with "W' , and rhyming with 'tank', that politeness prevents me from using). I think Mountain Runner is spot on regarding the utility / veracity of it as a 'theory'.
Mark
Not entirely random comments
What seems to me to be particularly pernicious about 4GW is its claim to be something new. This thread is interesting for, among other reasons, its relevance to the whole subject of Small Wars. Reminds me of a slide that Bill Flavin of the Army PKSOI uses that he adapted from Bill Olson (now at the NESA Center of NDU) called ,in one iteration or another, "The 100 Names of LIC."
The trouble with the notion that the US focuses on high tech war to the exclusion of things that are not necessarily high tech is that it is ahistorical. The US military has always wanted to fight conventional wars v small wars even when its primary mission was the protection of the Western frontier. So, I submit that this reluctance is not only a function of a fascination with technology but a more deep seated desire to fight the wars GEN John Galvin called "comfortable."
conventional and unconventional approach
John I agree with your points, but I'm not sure that LIC is the right definition, but it is definitely close (I stole this one from Wikipedia because I'm too lazy to get up and look through my old FMs).
... a political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low-intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of the armed forces. It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low-intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications. (Actually this one is pretty good)
Unconventional Warfare: defines UW as a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of short duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. (DoD definition, and it falls way short because it restricts the definition to military and paramilitary operations)
Wikipedia: (I like this one) is the opposite of conventional warfare. Where conventional warfare seeks to reduce an opponent's military capability, unconventional warfare is an attempt to achieve military victory through acquiescence, capitulation, or clandestine support for one side of an existing conflict. On the surface, UW contrasts with conventional warfare in that: forces or objectives are covert or not well-defined, tactics and weapons intensify environments of subversion or intimidation, and the general or long-term goals are coercive or subversive to a political body.
This is the point I was trying to make when I said 4GW is more focused on the political and moral, and the counter argument (from Clausewitz, oh my stomach hurts) is that all wars are political, but my counter is supported in the definition above, where it states conventional warfare seeks to reduce an opponent's military capability.
I still think (though there are changes in many DoD circles) the focus of our military is focused on defeating the enemy's fielded forces, and even elements of our Special Operations espouses a find, fix, finish mentality (a hyperconventional approach). While we have doctrine for COIN and UW, our decision making process (MDMP) generally applies to generally linear phased operations to "defeat" an opponent's armed forces. I will write more on this later, but I think it is our limited vocabulary that leads us down this path. You can't counter UW threats with a conventional war strategy (you're just punching into the air and having no effect, or worse in most cases creating a counterproductive effect by providing volumes of narrative to support the enemy's psychological campaign). I'm not saying conventional forces don't have a role, I am focusing on how they are employed.
Even in Special Forces, our historical doctrine (its evolving quicker than they can capture it in print) is "primarly" designed to facilitate guerrilla warfare (one subset of UW) in support of conventional forces (the fifth column approach), which means we to were somewhat stuck in the cold war paradigm.
How do we develop a real UW or irregular warfare capability?
More later, just something to dwell on over your morning coffee.
Comfortable Wars, Comfortable Training
what is the difference between a 'comfortable' and an 'uncomfortable' war?
Is it defenition based: Comfortable = Clausewitizian: war is a competition between two opposing armies/nations. With each side wearing uniforms, operating similiar weapons, exercising similiar tactics and strategies. A clean battlefield where civilians don't exist or can be ignored or relocated without much complaint or issue.
And uncomfortable = muddy wars without set sides, enemies with no uniforms, no rules, dissimilar tactics and strategies etc.
Training: as a platoon and company commander I always thought we missed the boat in training, we executed the complex HIC training very well: in my case we roamed the swamps of Lejeune, the pine forests of Bragg and the Desert of 29 Palms and the Sierra Mountains unopposed by civil populations, gloriously assaulting the uniformed OPFOR with every conceivable high explosive. At our school houses we wrote OPORDS assaulting the Blue Ridge Mts to defeat Centralians and the people in the surrounding towns and villages better get out of the way. FASCAM sure why not, Cluster Munitions no problem. It was easy, it was relatively cheap. It was argued that HIC was the prefered form of war to train to because it was always 'easier' to ramp 'down' to LIC versus ramping 'up' to HIC. Those that argued the other point where looked on as people who missed the boat.
Look at the training of SF and SF type units. What do they prefer? CQB, direct action. Why? I argue that a regular infantry company with the proper CQB training can do this job at about 80-90% efficiency. (Delta force and the other high end units exist for a reason this is not a bash on them). But a regular infantry company struggles when training to conduct FID and the associated missions. FID requires maturity, and levels of initiative that are extremely difficult to teach an 18 year old Lance Corporal. This same LCpl can be taught to shoot the eye out of a gnat with much less effort.
The difference between 'comfortable' and 'uncomfortable' wars runs along the same line. It is much easier to teach warfighting in a sanitized environment than it is to teach in a chaotic one. My opinion on 4GW (and other theories of 'modern war') is that it reflects the introduction of human factors beyond the mano y mano of total war.
The perfect war (comfortable) is reflected in the Desert Campaigns of Rommel and Montgomery in WWII. Every weapon, limited to no civilian population, wide open desert terrain, two distinct sides and clearly deliniated front and rear areas.
The imperfect war (uncomfortable) a major metropolitan area with large suburbs, population in the millions, weak to non-existent infrastructure, intense factionalism, rampant lawlessness, multiple state and non-state actors influencing the decisions, multiple agendas and no set, or unclear sides.
Maybe James Bond's Enemy?
S.P.E.C.T.R.E.
Special Executive for Crime and counter-intelligence,Terrorism,Revenge,and Extortion:wry: