Heh. Agree on the "know it when they sees it."
I never cease to be amazed at how that competitive spirit shows itself -- and at the absolute wisdom of the collective in most cases.
In fairness to the Robert C. Byrd State of West by God Virginia, it's the system and they just take advantage of it because if one does not, another will. The tragedy is that the Feds take in over 60% of all revenue and expend less than 40%. The difference is made up with grants and transfers to the States, Counties and Cities who are really responsible for most government functions.
Aside from the sheer waste and inefficiency and the bureaucracy supported at all levels to request, process and massage the grants and transfers; it wrongly puts local government which is most responsive to the populace in the supplicant mode and, even worse, the surplus allowed the Feds in the system encourages profligate spending by Congress and, far more importantly, encourages a lot of sloppiness in the federal government. The Federal government used to do most of its jobs fairly well, today it does not do most of its jobs at all well because it is too busy sticking it's nose into too many voter buying things that are not its business.
I've long believed that a part of the failure of the Armed Forces to lose their WW II mentality is an excess of money that allows too much to be spent on the wrong things and the political meddling that keeps it that way. The system is at fault.
Change in Anbar Predates Surge
Point of order:
The transformation in Ramadi was underway well before the surge (Snowballing as of Sept 06)
Two companies of Marines from a MEU (approx 300 marines) were added into Ramadi AO in November 2006. They increased our ability to "clear, hold, build" in a few more areas. Most of the troops went elsewhere in Anbar.
While the initial surge forces certainly expanded our options, they were by no means decisiive. Arguments claiming Anbar was because of the surge are false, in my opinion, but it is true the surge has left the units better able to exploit the gains and expand them than would have been possible before.
Metric lovers unite! I'm fully aware that the US
is metric-happy and that COIN doesn't provide the instant hard knowledge that HIC provides. I'm equally aware that due to those factors there will be metrics. That doesn't change the fact that most of them will be flaky, will prove little, will change frequently, will be manipulated by each side in the argument and that they really will prove little.
Also suggest the the neat graphs prove that polls are metrics. Not to mention that they 'prove' the "1/3 and two year rules." Again.
The public is fickle but they want rapid results. When they do not get them, they get surly. No news there.
Quoth Tequila:
Quote:
"...Most of this has been BS, quite a bit of it propagated by spokesmen in military uniform. That the American people now distrust messengers bringing what looks like more of the same happytalk should hardly be cause for dismay --- frankly it is reassuring that the American people are not willing to shut up and sing at whatever the government hands them."
Regrettably, BS is a fact of political life -- and not just in the US, it's worldwide. If people are dumb enough to pay much attention to it, I'm not terribly sympathetic. Interestingly, it is my sensing that most Americans do NOT pay much attention to it, only the politically attuned seem to do so.
In essence, I think the American people have pretty good BS detectors and that they have never, in my lifetime, been willing to sing the government tune. No news there...
Some definitions on the Levels of War
RTK:
Quote:
2. The Surge isnt' the strategy. Clear, Hold, Build is. What 1/1 AD was doing in Anbar that set the stage for the Anbar Awakening is a macro level of Tal Afar. People are missing the big picture here. The strategy has changed significantly in the last year. The surge has only accelerated progress with a new strategy.
Tequilla:
[QUOTE]As noted by David Kilcullen, success in Iraq has come largely by surprise and counter to expectations by surge planners. The surge was presented by the President and others, especially principle architects like MG Keane and Fred Kagan, as a means to secure Baghdad through an increased troop presence. This would, in turn, "buy time" for or spur national reconciliation. "Clear-hold-build" is nothing but a slogan, and a pretty meaningless one at that given that it has supposedly been the plan since 2005. Getting off FOBs and into neighborhood patrol posts has delivered tactical success in many places, but this is tactics, not strategy, and has certainly not been a cornerstone Iraq-wide policy until Petraeus & Co. arrived.[/QUOTE]
Maybe its a given, but lets start with some common definitions. I'll use Colin Gray's (from "War, Peace and International Relations: an Introduction to Strategic History - 2007 pg. 40), but most others are pretty close - and he is pretty well known and respected:
Quote:
-Tactics refers to the actual use of armed forces, primarily, though not exclusively, in combat. In essence, tactics are abut how to fight, about military behavior itself. Rob's note: I heard another one I liked a bit better which was - " the thinking human application of technology on the battlefield to achieve a purpose"
-Operations refers to the use made of tactics for the conduct of a military campaign.
-Operational Art is the skill with which forces are maneuvered so that they are well positioned for tactical advantage. But it refers also to the ability to know when to accept or decline combat, with a view to advancing campaign wide goals. Operational Art uses the threat and the actuality of battle to win a campaign.
- Strategy refers to the use made of operations for their impact upon the course and outcome of a war. Strategy is the bridge between military power and policy.
As stated many times - although it has become synonymous to the point where it has entered the record - a surge in BCTs is an increase in the means available to implement a strategy - the strategy was already being implemented - but it required the additional means to do it on a larger scale - so yea - there was lots of places where it may have started early because some CDRs understood that is what needed to happen, had the freedom to implement it, and then fed the results back up the Chain of Command.
The big shift in the strategy then came with a focus on securing populations - vs. infrastructure, or institutions - call it a different way of looking at the problem - but that led to operational and tactical consequences. As mentioned it also required the means (a surge in available units) to make it happen on a large scale. The shift at all three levels of war has offered up opportunities and MNF-I is doing the right thing - they are identifying success on the different LOOs and LLOOs and trying to exploit it for long term gain.
So yes, there is a big difference - the current leadership is more recognitional in terms of how it fights. It picks up on what is working, considers it in respect to policy objectives and makes decisions to retain the initiative vs. trying to pursue things that won't work just because that is how it was written - it realizes that this is a non-linear (not to be confused with non-contiguous) fight and does not necessarily conform to linear equations. Because people are dynamic, emotional, not always rational you can't operate on that an equal input will result in a guaranteed output.
All of that to explain what I thought RTK said in a very simple and concise manner.
Best Regards, Rob
-for a good article on the non-linearity of war, check out Alan Beyerchen's "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War" International Security, Vol 17, No. 3 pgs. 59-90 - pub. MIT