Totally true in my observation...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
...Good armies can do both. This COIN-v-Conventional is utter BS. This is what is so dangerous about the COIN avant-garde, who seem to want to force the choice.
It takes less training to adapt a conventional force to COIN that it takes to turn a COIN force to conventional.
One just needs to concentrate on the basics and get them thoroughly inculcated. Then it all becomes relatively simple; it's not nearly as complex as some seem to assume.
This is more a question, from the peanut gallery ...
than an assertion of fact.
What I glean, from such as Nagl's and Krepinevich's books, is that COIN operations require a smaller logistics tail than conventional operations. This seems intuitively logical (e.g., helicopters, tanks and arty are maintenance and support-intensive).
If this be true (Wilf, Ken and everyone else ?), logistics would be another reason why shifting from COIN to conventional would be more difficult - and, perhaps, impossible in a limited timeframe for that shift.
PS - FV, you now know that there are some rough edges here; but Wilf does call them as he sees them. :)
Just MHO but from everything I've seen
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Schmedlap
That may be a paper truth. As you point out, it certainly does seem intuitively logical. But with the decentralized nature of COIN or SASO (is that still a doctrinal term?), and with the requirements to "hold and build," logistics in terms of bullets and arty rounds may get a little simpler, but the other stuff can get out of hand (humanitarian supplies, T-walls, jersey barriers, etc). Also, when a force is stationary, suddenly it starts building stuff (chow halls, barracks, entertainment facilities, etc) and those things require upkeep and supplies. It would not surprise me if COIN turned out to be more of a logistical challenge than fighting against a conventional opponent.{Emphasis Ron}
That actually seems to be the case. Of course haven't seen studies to back it up yet. Sure somebody is getting paid to look at it:wry:
Schmedlap and Ron Humphrey are correct IMO.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Schmedlap
That may be a paper truth. As you point out, it certainly does seem intuitively logical. But with the decentralized nature of COIN or SASO (is that still a doctrinal term?), and with the requirements to "hold and build," logistics in terms of bullets and arty rounds may get a little simpler, but the other stuff can get out of hand (humanitarian supplies, T-walls, jersey barriers, etc). Also, when a force is stationary, suddenly it starts building stuff (chow halls, barracks, entertainment facilities, etc) and those things require upkeep and supplies...
Exactly.
That is true on all counts. The logistics of bullets, beans and repair are mind boggling -- but the system is designed to cope with that and does it well. When all the Class X items (Aid supplies and civilian construction materials for example) are introduced, it does not cope well -- witness all the projects in Iraq that were terribly slow in starting and even slower in being completed. The contracting system is a big part of the problem; in a major war it can be ignored, in the small wars of peace it will not be. Schmedlap ends:
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...It would not surprise me if COIN turned out to be more of a logistical challenge than fighting against a conventional opponent.
I'm no Loggy but from watching it over the years, my perception is that he's quite correct.
An additional consideration is that in a COIN environment, too many people have too much time on their hands to worry about odds and ends and the little nice to have things which they then ask for * -- in a conventional war, such luxury is not available. There would be no barrack huts with A/C and flat screen TVs would not be a consideration; the PXs would be rudimentary if they were even around (Heaven knows what out Cl VI transport bill is...).
A COIN operation presents strange and unusual demands on the system; conventional war just places heavy but fairly consistent and constant demands on it. Most people engaged in the fight do not have time to worry about the exotic -- or troop comfort; just surviving becomes the issue.
The shift from one type to another should not be traumatic (except for supplies enroute if the shift is during an ongoing operation. Could be disconcerting to receive a pallet of coca-Cola instead of one 7.62 linked...) or really even troublesome. All the war fighting stuff gets shipped to COIN ops, just in far smaller quantities. So it would be a matter of less troop comfort and aid material while sending more war materiel. We can ramp up pretty well, we prove that over and over. The biggest problem would be getting the right combat service support unit mix in the right place in a timely fashion, I think...
As an aside, my perception is that Nagl and Krepinevich get several things wrong on several levels -- or skew things to make their points -- either way, neither they nor I are logistically qualified to state categorically which is likely to place the most heavy demand and, more importantly, I get to again point out that the ol' METT-TC intrudes on the answers (plural). :D
* That is not to denigrate anyone or anything so save the flames; MRAPS, Ballistic glasses, Camelbacks or PEQ2s and such like for everyone are great and I'm all for them. Most of that stuff is desirable, no question. If I were to go off to war again, I'd like to have much of it. However, whether most of it is necessary for combat is an entirely different matter.
The one form of reasoning I'm not sure I've ever been able to swallow whole
It is commonplace that it is asserted forces trained to fight conventionally can be re-trained to fight COIN easier than the other way around.
While I see the reasoning behind the argument it still sticks in my craw a little.
Soldiers- taught to fight //then soldiers taught how to fight what they fight.
If I were an enemy I think I'd be a lot more reluctant to fight someone if they're really good at fighting the close fight. In that case I have to worry about them in large formations but even if I managed to convince myself I could take out every bit of their heavier weaponry I would still have to be worried about how well my forces could handle them on the ground.
Doesn't seem to ring quite so true if you reverse it. :confused:
Ken, re: quote - Wilf in post #21,...
which was quoted by you in post # 22. No claim made that you agreed with the quote - I thought it summed its position well.
After looking through "The Other End of The Spear", it focuses on three categories of components that would have to be compared in a switch from CONV to COIN, and vice versa: Combat, HQ-Admin, Logistics-Life Support (he often separates these last two, which would make 4 categories).
Thou shalt not kill has no bearing, most people are at least mildly amoral
Quote:
Originally Posted by
jmm99
If I get it (from above), "adapt" is a more limited adjustment - "turn" is taking off on a new bearing. Agree that, for most people, "thou shalt kill" is a harder nut for them to swallow than returning from that state to "thou shalt not kill". To me, all of that (what you say above) is adaptation down to Willie and Joe.
Well, those in most armies, anyway. That issue is skill and reaction time. The real issue, whether you call it adaptation or retraining and reorienting is the time factor. One can shiftdown pretty quickly; shifting upward takes a little more experience, time or training, not just a philosophical shift in the leadership echelons approach to problems but a refocusing of the entire unit into less often or never used skills....
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Whether a soldier doing COIN for a year has less killer instinct than one doing CONV for a year is outside my experience. I'm being observational of possible issues and disconnects - not judgmental.
Of you're being judgmental -- else you wouldn't insist on adapting as opposed to turning. ;) That's fine, call it what you wish and as for the 'killer instinct,' compare any period of months or years in Iraq with a like period from WW II, Korea or even Viet Nam which was half COIN. It's really an ROE acculturation problem.
Adapting from ROE that insists upon a ten digit grid for minimum collateral damage and be careful what or who you shoot to HIC ROE where collateral damage is far less an issue, a six digit grid will be the norm because no one has the time to work for constant tens and a maneuvering Army will not have all the electronic aids available today because the log system won't provide 'em in adequate quantity due to the cost, loss and replacement volumes which no one in either theater today has had to cope with. In that HIC environment, the issue is not be careful how and at whom you shoot but finding people in the wrong clothes at which to shoot. Once you see 'em, IF you do, you're encouraged to shoot them, no probable cause required, front, back -- immaterial.
CavGuy is right that these kids today can flip the switch psychologically -- that's because they were trained initially for HIC and their leaders geared them down for COIN; in that case, rapid shifting is possible as I said. I have pointed out several times that 1MarDiv did that in Korea and the Airborne Brigades did it early on in Viet Nam -- it is the purely COIN trained crowd who will have the 'adaptation' deficiency.
Again, the Pro can play in any League, the less experienced (or trained) will not be able to shift up without work -- and time.
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As to the other three categories, "Why would we want to compare them?". Because they are possible variables - whether they turn out to be relevant and material is another issue, which can be answered only if you look.
They aren't possible variables, they are certain variables; what's important is that they will differ from each other as well as type to type and within types from one episode to another for many reasons.
Relevant or material to what, may I ask? I might be more helpful if I had a clue what you're trying to do. :confused:
People who need people...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Cavguy
...The reverse, however, is not true to the same level. Learning to switch it on and off is the challenge when you have to return to "soft".
My observation is that varies with people. The "Kill 'em all and let god sort 'em out" types will use any excuse to pop a cap...:D
There is a gear down pause and hiccup, no question but firm leadership can usually handle it. However, my observation has also been -- and folks who are out there now confirm it's still a big problem -- that the small arms fire discipline in the US Army (and the Marines) is, uh, less than stellar. That contributes to shifting problems both ways. It's because we don't train 'em well in IET.
Though that may be changing, the use of Outcome Based Training in Basic and at OSUT is producing better trained, more capable and disciplined shooters so we may get rid of a problem that's been around in US forces since WW II.
Quote:
Tactical proficiency between HIC and COIN missions is a different matter, but I haven't sensed a psychological one.
True, I'm sure. HIC kids can shift the gears with just a little push. Good leaders enable that.
You stated some parameters,
for relevance and materiality, here
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from Ken
Yes, all four (separation of log and life support is logical) of those categories differ in a (or any) COIN / Conventional comparison -- but they'll also likely differ significantly in some cases in comparing any two COIN theaters (Viet Nam / Afghanistan / Iraq / Philippines...) or two conventional Wars (WW I or WW II / Korea) or even small operations (Dominican Republic / Grenada / Panama). They all differ considerably in all parameters we've discussed.
Is there a difference (quantitative or qualitative) between, say, Life Support in two situations (one CONV; one COIN) ? Is the difference due (in whole or in part) to one being COIN, the other CONV ? If so, the difference is relevant. Whether it is material (important enough to be concerned about) is a matter of judgment (quantitative or qualitative).
If the other factors you mention obscure the picture ("due to what" or "how much is due to what" cannot be determined), relevance and materiality cannot be determined. That's the best I can "do" on this topic.