Yes, Wilf and Uboat, "murder mile" ....
stuck in my craw as well. But, since I didn't know what it might mean to a Brit, I found its Wiki:
Quote:
The Murder Mile was an informal nickname for Ledra Street, in Nicosia, Cyprus. It was called thus by British forces during the EOKA campaign of the late 1950s, due to the hazards presented to patrolling British troops by nationalist fighters.
The term has since been used to describe various dangerous areas, normally characterised by high crime, such as the streets surrounding Lower and Upper Clapton Roads in Hackney in East London, or a section of North Belfast in Northern Ireland. It is mentioned in this context in the Elvis Costello song Oliver's Army.
So, translating from the Brit:
Quote:
The US Army is a [hard row to hoe (or a tough walk)] away from either being the best or the most professional military organisation on the planet.
I'll take that as Wilf's meaning (which is another thread).
In the present context (where US troops are being accused of murder), "murder mile" was a poor choice of wording for a US audience unfamiliar with Brit slang.
If one decides to analyze media reports ...
the Stern article of 2 Apr (?) is not the article to analyze. The article to analyze is the Institute for War & Peace Reporting (IWPR) report of 16 Apr 2009, which I probably should have discussed more fully in post #4.
The problem with discussing this particular case is that the evidence is one-sided. What we have here is a problem in Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH), where the Golden Rule is:
Quote:
Analysis of competing hypotheses (ACH) requires an analyst to explicitly identify all the reasonable alternatives and have them compete against each other for the analyst's favor, rather than evaluating their plausibility one at a time.
In this case, ACH (whether formal or informal) requires two sets of evidence - one each for the conflicting hypotheses. We have one (the IWPR report), but require the after-action reports and reviews for any reasonable ACH analysis - or, at least an unclassified executive summary as in the case of the May bombing investigation.
The truth may be ...
Quote:
from Ken
...the truth is almost certainly somewhere between the poles.
but so far, only one pole has been presented - we may never see the other pole. So goes Infofare vs OpSec.
To beat this Donkey one more time...
Having been accused to my face of being a murderer by Americans, Brits, Canadians, French, Germans and sundry Arabs (Surprisingly, no Iranians -- they're too polite) as well as a few unidentified folks a couple of dozen or so times to the point where anyone joining that crew is no big thing and being aware of the 'Murder Mile' connotation -- plus being firmly convinced that the US Army is not the most professional by a long shot, I didn't take umbrage at the comment.
There are a lot of folks that are more professional than we are -- mostly because they do not have to put up with the US Congress. There are some that are more competent -- not many but a few, very few (competent and professional are not the same thing). There are some things we can do that no one else on the globe today can do and that plus our size and wealth gives us an awesome capability; we can do things others cannot do. However, anyone who thinks we're the most professional or even the most competent is, IMO, not really paying attention to the little things that count.
Fuchs, you have a habit of making ....
sweeping assertions without any linking to any source, as in this and what follows:
Quote:
from Fuchs
M4 carbines ("rifles" for civilians) of SOCOM are afaik often silenced.
Have you been a member of an ODA or SMU recently; interviewed team members; been a part of SOCOM, etc., etc. ? - or, if you read that, good manners in discourse suggest you provide the source.
Note Bene: You still haven't supplied a link to the 2 Apr Stern article - some folks here do read German and just might be interested in going to your source.
And, yes, this civilian does know the difference between a carbine and a rifle.
Not to interupt but I have an idle thought...
Take the Article at face value. Most of us agree it will, in the west, affect few and is likely to be transient in that limited effect. It's accuracy is a least questionable and some will realize the discrepancies, some will not. Disregard the west.
Use this article as an example. Look at at it from the Operational (i.e. in Afghanistan) IO stand point and from the Afghan standpoint, both locally and nationally. What could we do to preclude erroneous reporting (not saying it is present but that it may be or certainly could be in another situation)? How do we handle it locally, IO - wise? Nationally in Afghanistan?
I think I mentioned one time that the Colombians fly in a team rapidly after every strike or operation to do two things, take pictures and gather evidence if needed and, more importantly, tell the local folks what happened and why. Could we do that? Should we?
Anyone have any ideas? Fuchs? Schmedlap? Entropy? Surferbeetle?
For the Schmedlapian view ....
as a work in progress, see here starting with this post (last paragraph).
The importance of words...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
jmm99
Anyway, Steve (and others), here's a German strudel for you - 10.04.2009, 10:00 Uhr, Krieg in Afghanistan:
Strategie des Scheiterns:
Mike,
Strudel's are great and I always enjoyed the weissbier, brochen, and wurst for breakfast as well.
Back to our topic, this was a nice catch. Scheiterns: Fail because of negotiations, break down, be stopped. Versagen: Refuse, deny, forgo, fail, breakdown, misfire. It saves me a trip to my university library to see the Stern hardcopy.
I'll echo what most here have noted, the article does not 'smell' right, but bad things do happen in war, and it does harden the participants. We will see.
I'll also note that I appreciate Fuch's posts and enjoy watching the interplay between two cultures meeting. Now add 125F, a language barrier, hard feelings and weapons and you have some insights into why Civil Affairs work is so interesting...and why we will always need barristers and judges ;)
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
I think I mentioned one time that the Colombians fly in a team rapidly after every strike or operation to do two things, take pictures and gather evidence if needed and, more importantly, tell the local folks what happened and why. Could we do that? Should we?
Anyone have any ideas? Fuchs? Schmedlap? Entropy? Surferbeetle?
Ken,
On the CA side of things we did some of this in OIF1, but approached it more from a property damage standpoint in order to try and level the playing field in terms of payments. From a practicality standpoint it was not always possible and more akin to trying to bail the ocean...lots of things were happening on the battlefield and not everybody was focused upon it. My friends in the JAG section sure did appreciate it however...
With training this TTP could be done if it was a priority...from a lawfare standpoint, this is of course a two-edged sword. Speaking of which lets think about troops to task: MP's are scarce, the JAG section is light on people, CA-bubbas are rarer than hens teeth (and some would say just as useful), soooo.... will our company commanders be thanking us for another FRAGO?
Best,
Steve