The science behind Isil's savagery
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Carrying out beheadings and other extreme acts is unthinkable for most people, but the right cocktail of factors can make anyone an extremist, says neuroscientist Prof Ian Robertson
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/1...-savagery.html
The Islamic State’s Vulnerability
An analysis 'The Islamic State’s Vulnerability' by:
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Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and an adjunct assistant professor in Georgetown University's security studies program.
Link:http://warontherocks.com/2014/09/the...lnerability/#_
He ends with:
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The Islamic State’s many weaknesses will soon become apparent, if they aren’t already. This doesn’t mean that the group will inevitably collapse; and even if it does, its collapse might just mean that its fighters are driven back into the hands of an old familiar foe, al-Qaeda, or other Syrian and Iraqi non-state actors. The United States should approach this fight strategically, understanding both the Islamic State’s weaknesses and also the broader context of the fight.
Ten Things to Watch for in the ISIS War
A reasonable check list on The American Conservative, by former DoS "whistle blower" Peter van Buren:
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A guide to the spin, empty gestures, and behind-the-scene players that will determine the fate of America's re-entry into Iraq.
Link:A guide to the spin, empty gestures, and behind-the-scene players that will determine the fate of America's re-entry into Iraq.
Elsewhere I've read comments by ret'd US military leaders that it will take up to three years to rebuild the Iraqi state forces and the FT has an excellent article (behind a reistration wall) using the fall of an army base as an illustration:http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/ceb48014-4...#axzz3EoJ2hviA
How Not To Understand ISIS
A short,, thoughtful article by Alireza Doostdar, an Assistant Professor of Islamic Studies and the Anthropology of Religion at the University of Chicago Divinity School:https://divinity.uchicago.edu/sighti...ireza-doostdar
A few passages:
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We see ISIS as a unitary entity because ISIS propagandists want us to see it that way. This is why it is problematic to rely on doctrines espoused in propaganda to explain ISIS’ behavior....Focusing on doctrinal statements would have us homogenizing the entirety of ISIS’ military force as fighters motivated by an austere and virulent form of Salafi Islam. This is how ISIS wants us to see things, and it is often the view propagated by mainstream media.... But ISIS emerged from the fires of war, occupation, killing, torture, and disenfranchisement. It did not need to sell its doctrine to win recruits. It needed above all to prove itself effective against its foes.
Pakistan: The Allure of ISIS
Ahmed Rashid has a short review of the impact of ISIS in Afghanistan and Pakistan:http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog...6/allure-isis/
He ends with:
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If the war in Afghanistan drags on without a decisive victory or a political solution, the danger grows that younger Taliban will become more attracted to ISIS. And the possibility of ISIS wielding growing influence among the Pakistani or Afghan Taliban is heightened by the generational shift taking place among the Taliban themselves.
Unless Pakistan and Afghanistan are able to quickly end the extremism by Taliban groups that has plagued them for years they are likely to find themselves facing a far more militarized, radicalized, and extremist youth movement. The danger then is that these countries could find themselves ceding major territory to extremist groups, in a repeat of what ISIS has done in Iraq and Syria.
A diabolical marketing strategy
A fascinating article, the headline 'The Making of the World's Scariest Terrorist Brand', although the sub-title is quite telling:
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ISIS mixes new-media savvy with medieval savagery. It’s a diabolical marketing strategy that led us right back into war—and one that future terror groups will surely copycat. Or try to top.
Link:https://medium.com/matter/the-making...d-92620f91bc9d
It ends with:
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We can bomb them one truck, one convoy, one Levant at a time. But even if the Islamic State is scoured from the face of the Earth, no future terrorist army will forget its media. Its innovations in branding and marketing will live on, only imprinted with different logos, different actors. After all, it’s just an ad campaign. Just a bloody ad campaign. And we’re buying.
The Hybrid Ideology of the Islamic State
An interesting, pessimistic assessment of the two component parts of ISIS from The Soufan Group:http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrie...islamic-state/
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IS is now a chimera of Ba’athist and takfiri ideologies, with the organizational skills of the former helping channel the motivational fervor of the latter. The result is an extremist group unlike any other. It’s the merging of Usama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein, with the strengths of one helping negate the weaknesses of the other.
Zealots for the apocalypse
Will McCants (Brookings) explains the motivation of both Sunni and Shi‘a fighters drawn to the Levant battlefield by a common apocalyptic belief:
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They fight in the vanguard of the Mahdi, the Muslim savior whom the Prophet Muhammad prophesied would appear in the Levant (the coastal Mediterranean region that includes Syria and Lebanon) at the End of Days to wage a final great battle against the infidels’ armies.
(Later) With the entry of the United States into the field, jihadis anticipate that the ultimate showdown in Dabiq is drawing ever closer. One might expect that the recent entry of infidel armies into Iraq and Syria would lessen the internecine tone of the prophesying and focus attention on the Mahdi’s battle with the infidels. But it has only heightened the sectarian apocalyptic fervor as each sect vies to destroy the other for the privilege of destroying the infidels.
Link:http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/10/t...an-apocalypse/
I have heard Muslims explain this, but Will's explanation is best.
Interview with an Islamic State Recruiter
IFII and IFIS are more appropriate terms than ISIS
Mindset often determines a choice of words. For example pseudo progressives and fellow travellers are especially fond of referring to peoples parties and to liberation.
Rational humans are expected to use less colourful names and terminology but sometimes fail to do so. That is aggravated by the would-be popular media which invariably includes some who will jump on any bandwagon. One result today is the fairly commonplace use of the term ISIS. More appropriate would be IF for Islamic Fascists or interchangeably Islamist Fascism, and IS referring to in Syria.
Hence IFIS in Syria but IFII in Iraq. IFII sounds appropriate even though some might suppose it refers to Yemen. And IFII seems doubly appropriate because swarming as a form of auftragtaktik is unlikely to succeed at the operational level of conflict.
ISIS’ fighting doctrine: Sorting fact from fiction
An Arab website has this interesting analysis, it is in English:
Starts with:
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A careful and specialized examination of the strengths and weaknesses of the fighting doctrine and the military performance of suicidal salafi jihadi groups, such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), is yet to be done. Such a study has not been carried out by official military authorities in countries directly affected, such as Iraq and Syria, or by scholars specialized in studying these groups. Nevertheless, it is possible to review some of the information on the issue found in different publications.
Note the emphasis on "technicals" and the aggressive use of snipers.
Citing Justin Bronk, a RUSI analyst:
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A particular speciality is outflanking defensive positions and then mopping up defenders who attempt to retreat. The tactic is as much psychological as it is kinetic, and is greatly magnified by the horrendous and public brutality ISIS has systematically exhibited wherever it has gained control.
Link:http://english.al-akhbar.com/content...g-fact-fiction
Link to the article by Justin Bronk, written two weeks ago:http://edition.cnn.com/2014/10/17/op...las/index.html
Why the Islamic State is Winning.
A pithy commentary by John Schindler of the US strategy and approach to countering Daesh / ISIS. Try this:
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To be blunt, we kill very effectively but we have precious little understanding of how to transform Muslim societies by force.
Link:http://20committee.com/2014/11/14/wh...te-is-winning/
Here are some tasters:
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The U.S. military is quite capable of defeating almost any adversary on the battlefield, even Da’ish, though that is not the same thing as producing lasting political outcomes that Americans will like. This is particularly true in the Greater Middle East, where the politico-cultural barriers to Westernization delivered by the barrel of a gun are steep and strong.
It is now time, indeed long overdue, to dispense with magical thinking about what the application of American military power might achieve in any lasting strategic or political sense in the Middle East.
I'd forgotten the Italian pacification of Libya (1928-1932):http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pacification_of_Libya
Which today is not an option for the USA or its allies.
Yes there is a thread 'Watching ISIS' into which this will be merged one day. It is worth a thread to alert readers and perhaps respond.
Finally:
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A necessary first step is having a genuine debate about what our military can — and cannot — achieve in Iraq and Syria.
Dissecting Daesh (ISIS) propaganda
In a joint investigation TRAC and the Quillaim Foundation take apart a recent Daesh video of a group execution - all is not what it seems. Shadows added for example and the time track shows gaps.
From TRAC's introduction:
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Since its inception, the Islamic State (IS) propaganda machine has repeatedly demonstrated its sophistication and complexity. IS has abandoned the often ramshackle methods of international outreach common to its rivals (e.g. bin Laden's cassette tapes) in favor of meticulously planned, high-quality videos. In one of its most recent releases, Although the Disbelievers Dislike It, IS attempts to provide a graphic cinema-quality experience to its viewers. Nevertheless, upon close examination, it becomes apparent that discrepancies were overlooked in the editorial process, leading to telling anomalies.
There is a video on the TRAC site, which will be graphic.
Link to TRAC:http://www.trackingterrorism.org/art...ry-expansion-0
Link to Quilliam, which is a PDF report (no video, just photos):http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp...anda-video.pdf
One wonders how such a forensic, if not technical analysis can be exploited within the areas Daesh control, shown to those who watch such videos on their radicalisation route and as evidence to support a war crime investigation.
Why the fight against IS is not the success we're told it is
Professor Scott Lucas has a commentary:https://www.opendemocracy.net/open-s...7re-told-it-is
It starts with:
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Is John Kerry right to be so gung-ho about military successes against Islamic State? Not really—as the fundamental political challenges in Iraq and Syria remain unaddressed.
As he notes where is there progress, excluding the increasing Iranian influence, if not power:
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The blunt reality is that, with the exception of Kobanê, there can be no effective campaign against IS without the support of a local ground force.
What is needed? Well it is not SOF and bombing, that is just about containing the Daesh. He advocates:
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There are alternatives that could really challenge IS: an Iraqi Kurdistan with real international recognition and support, an Iraqi government answering to all communities, a Syrian opposition supported in a political vision that overcomes not only the jihadists but the Assad regime.
A book for MG Nagata and a few more
In August 2014 MG Nagata, Centcom SOF commander, stated 'We do not understand the movement...'. Well there is a book coming that aims to do so. The linked article gives a glimpse into ISIS:http://www.theguardian.com/world/201...raining-camps?
The article is worth reading, the sub-title is shorter:
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We reveal how the terror group recruits and retains its members through zealotry, rhetoric and obscure theology
Back to MG Nagata:
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We do not understand the movement, and until we do, we are not going to defeat it We have not defeated the idea. We do not even understand the ideaa...There is a magnetic attraction to IS that is bringing in resources, talent, weapons, etc., to thicken, harden, embolden IS in ways that are very alarming.
Link:http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/arti...ecruiting.html
The book is due to be published February 17th 2015. From:http://www.amazon.com/ISIS-Inside-Te.../dp/1941393578
In the UK:http://www.amazon.co.uk/Isis-Inside-.../dp/1941393578
Dozen former French soldiers, including elite troops, join ISIS
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A dozen former French soldiers, mostly from special forces and the Foreign Legion, have joined jihadists fighting in Syria and Iraq, a defense ministry source confirms, as the government readies a new multimillion anti-terror plan.
http://rt.com/news/224983-french-mil...ome-jihadists/
The Islamic State’s model
A review article by ICSR's Aaron Zelin that compares the 'wilayat' strategy of Daesh (ISIS) and the 'franchise' model used by AQ. Alongside a quick summary of what is happening where jihadists operate.
Link:http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/...-states-model/
His article was presented at a POMEPS conference this month alongside three others see:http://pomeps.org/2015/01/27/islamis...c-state-memos/
“Jihadi-Salafi views of the Islamic State,” by Joas Wagemakers, Radboud University Nijmegen
“Brotherhood activism and regime consolidation in Egypt, ” by Steven Brooke, University of Texas at Austin
“The ISIS-ification of Islamist politics,” by Khalil al-Anani, George Washington University and John’s Hopkins University SAIS