Hospitality or a "living cemetery"?
A lengthy article 'Osama bin Laden’s family on the run: ‘I never stopped praying our lives might return to normal’, based on a new book by Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy’s book 'The Exile: The Flight Of Osama Bin Laden' is published on 23 May by Bloomsbury (London)' and it has several passages on how Iran treated their guests.
First time I have seen mention of the role of General Qassem Suleimani:
Quote:
In January 2002, George Bush included Tehran in his “
axis of evil”. After this, Iran’s secretive Quds force, a clandestine division of the country’s Revolutionary Guard, led by Major General Qassem Suleimani, went out of their way to assist al-Qaida. They set up a refugee camp in the no man’s land just beyond the Iranian border with Afghanistan.
Link:https://www.theguardian.com/world/20...run-after-9-11
Second review of 'The Exile' by Bruce Hoffman
Hat tip to WoTR - a review by Bruce Hoffman of the book by Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy’s book 'The Exile: The Flight Of Osama Bin Laden'. It deals with the Iranian and Pakistani links. The first was Post 51.
Here are two passages:
Quote:
Gen. Qassem Suleimani, the commander of Iranian and Shia forces deployed against ISIL in Syria and Iraq today, was Gul’s Iranian doppelgänger. As commander of the elite Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp’s (IRGC), Suleimani was similarly responsible for the safekeeping of bin Laden’s family and the al-Qaeda leaders and their families who had fled from Afghanistan as a result of the American invasion. Reverentially referred to as “Hajji Qassem” by bin Laden’s sons, Suleimani provided accommodation for them, their siblings, and mothers as well as their father’s closest confidants and their families at a clandestine Quds Force training headquarters in Tehran.
This tale of Iranian connivance provides additional evidence debunking the popular misconception that extremists do not cooperate across sectarian lines. Rather, it demonstrates how when interests overlap, they have repeatedly shown a remarkable ability to cast aside their otherwise rigid differences to work together. The ancient proverb that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” has long characterized the shifting and sometimes inexplicable alliances formed across the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia since the war on terrorism commenced 16 years ago. In this instance, the intensity of the shared enmity between Salafi-Jihadi Sunnis and Shia militants against the United States can never be prudently forgotten.
Link:https://warontherocks.com/2017/06/abbottabad-revisited/
What do the Bin Laden files reveal then?
Taken from an article by FDD's Long War Journal, on the documents released today by the CIA, from the Abbottabad raid on Bin Laden's villa:
Quote:
One never-before-seen 19-page document contains a senior jihadist’s assessment of the group’s relationship with Iran. The author explains that Iran offered some “Saudi brothers” in al Qaeda “everything they needed,” including “money, arms” and “training in Hezbollah camps in Lebanon, in exchange for striking American interests in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.” Iranian intelligence facilitated the travel of some operatives with visas, while sheltering others. Abu Hafs al-Mauritani, an influential ideologue prior to 9/11, helped negotiate a safe haven for his jihadi comrades inside Iran. But the author of the file, who is clearly well-connected, indicates that al Qaeda’s men violated the terms of the agreement and Iran eventually cracked down on the Sunni jihadists’ network, detaining some personnel. Still, the author explains that al Qaeda is not at war with Iran and some of their “interests intersect,” especially when it comes to being an “enemy of America.” Bin Laden’s files show the two sides have had heated disagreements. There has been hostility between the two. Al Qaeda even penned a letter to Ayatollah Khamenei demanding the release of family members held in Iranian custody. Other files show that al Qaeda kidnapped an Iranian diplomat to exchange for its men and women. Bin Laden himself considered plans to counter Iran’s influence throughout the Middle East, which he viewed as pernicious.
However, bin Laden urged caution when it came to threatening Iran. In a previously released letter, bin Laden described Iran as al Qaeda’s “main artery for funds, personnel, and communication.” And despite their differences, Iran continued to provide crucial support for al Qaeda’s operations.
In a series of designations and other official statements issued since July 2011, the US Treasury and State Departments have repeatedly targeted al Qaeda’s “
core facilitation pipeline” inside Iran. Sources familiar with the intelligence used to justify those designations say they are based, in part, on the Abbottabad files. It is likely that still more revelations concerning al Qaeda’s relationship with Iran remain to be found in the cache made available today.
Link:https://www.longwarjournal.org/archi...dens-files.php
One brick added to the wall
A long piece by Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy authors of 'The Exile: The Flight Of Osama Bin Laden' who cite one of the Abbottabad papers as reinforcing their book:
Quote:
Against all odds, and despite the most costly counter-terrorism campaign ever waged by the West, al-Qaeda has flourished—its comeback assisted by a remarkable pact with Iran.
Link:http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2017...s-help/142484/
Is this significant: an Iranian politician discusses helping AQ?
An update:
Quote:
A prominent Iranian politician discussed Iranian facilitation on the passage of al-Qaeda members who later carried out the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, potentially confirming allegations in the 9/11 Commission report. Mohammad-Javad Larijani, a former diplomat, member of a politically influential Iranian family, and current international affairs assistant in the Iranian judiciary, made the comments in an interview with Iranian state TV on May 30, according to an Al Arabiya
report. The interview translation was independently confirmed by The Daily Caller News Foundation.
Link:http://dailycaller.com/2018/06/08/ir...rs-politician/
What did he actually say?
Quote:
The al-Qaeda members asked the Iranian authorities not to stamp their passports because the Saudi government would prosecute them if it knew they traveled to Iran, he said.“Our government agreed not to stamp the passports of some of them because they were on transit flights for two hours, and they were resuming their flights without having their passports stamped,” Larijani said. “However their movements were under the complete supervision of the Iranian intelligence.”
One of the pilots who passed through Iranian airspace before September 11 was responsible for carrying out the attacks, and a Hezbollah military leader sat next to him, Larijani added.
Link:https://townhall.com/tipsheet/timoth...ckers-n2489052
Al-Qa'ida's Contested Relationship with Iran The View from Abbottabad
A report from New America by Nelly Lahoud, a SME, which is based on the Abbottabad documents:
Quote:
This study canvasses nearly 300 declassified documents recovered in May 2011 by U.S. Special Forces during the raid on the compound of Al-Qa‘ida leader Usama bin Ladin (UBL) in Abbottabad, Pakistan. By focusing on Al-Qa‘ida’s voice — in the form of its own communications — this report avoids much of the challenge of politicization that occurs when discussion of Iran’s relationship to Al-Qa‘ida is based on commentary by Iran’s rivals.
There are two links, the first comes complete (41 pgs):https://s3.amazonaws.com/newamericad...-20_151707.pdf
The second is part by part:https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/al-qaidas-contested-relationship-iran/introduction
Iran & AQ: a safe haven or holding cell?
A "long read" by Ali Soufan in CTC's 'The Sentinel' on this remarkable opponent, at times it is painful reading. There is a chunk on The Postponed Enemy: Al-Qa`ida, 2001–present, so cross-posted to that thread.
Link:https://ctc.usma.edu/qassem-soleiman...ional-strategy
Al-Qaeda’s Iran Dilemma: Evidence from the Abbottabad Records
Yes,another article on the Abbottabad Records from the journal 'Studies in Conflict and Terrorism' by Bryce Loidot, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, DC, USA. I have not read this.
The Abstract:
Quote:
Through a comprehensive review of documents recovered from Usama bin Ladin’s Abbottabad compound, this study provides a new periodization of al-Qaeda’s relationship with Iran. The analysis reveals that al-Qaeda often had to reconcile conflicting operational and ideational pressures in its interactions with the Islamic Republic over time. Beyond offering insight into the trajectory of this important relation-ship and direction for future scholarship, the analysis suggests someways through which the United States might expand the strategic wedge that exists between these unlikely allies and highlights the need for a more flexible understanding of state sponsored terrorism.
Link:https://sci-hub.tw/10.1080/1057610X.2020.1780011