Ab so lutely. IF the current personnel and rank system remains in place.
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Originally Posted by
82redleg
The problem is that these very senior NCOs exist outside of where they are needed. CSMs can do a lot of good at the BN level. Above that, they probably don't need to exist. If a COL hasn't figured out leadership issues by the time he is selected for BDE command, having someone to whisper in his ear isn't going to help.
I totally agree. I've been both a Bn and a Bde CSM in peacetime in and in combat; three Bns, two Bdes. The Bde CSM is a totally wasted slot. A Bde CSM has a lot of negative influence but very little positive capability unless many factors hit just right. I had more positive influence as a Bde Ops SGM --also both in peacetime and in combat -- than I did as a Bde CSM -- and in both Bdes I was fortunate in being able to work for very fine Colonels and in both I was the Ops guy who became the CSM (that worked often for many people until the number of CSMs grew to its current proportions. I'm old... :D).
A Bn Ops Sgt (I also disagree with making them SGMs) is too busy so at Bn the CSM makes sense. At Bde, with the larger (too large?) staff, the Ops SGM has adequate time to counsel COLs who are about to step on something and they can also arrange troop help stuff better than can their counterparts at Bn.
The CSMs are generally a waste at Bde; above Bde they literally have no function and some have a terrible propensity to concentrate on eyewash and little else -- except their next job...
I'll caveat all that by saying that a portion of that relative lack of merit is in many senses a function of how the guy is employed; the Army has not directed adequate responsibilities to and for the job, so in most cases, the guy or gal writes his or her own job description. Some do that better than others. Some Commanders give them far more to do and place far more trust in them than others. I have literally been directed to take command of a Company in a fire fight and OTOH, been barely listened to (in peacetime by a fair LTC who was an Aviator on a ground tour and who almost certainly had a really poor Platoon sergeant when he was a 2LT...:o).
It can be fixed and improved significantly. First and easiest by making those guys (and 1SGs) the unit trainers. Not responsible for training, that's the Cdr -- but trainers; doers and subordinate directors. That's still a band-aid. The entire personnel system still reflects 17th century practice and WW I methodologies. It and the pay system are in need of major overhaul. We need to be able to reward or pay people more without applying the Peter Principle and promoting them past their optimum level. That and moving them too often contribute to a lack of trust up and down the chain...
Yes. Even better -- don't do fixed bases in bad places...
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Originally Posted by
Fuchs
100 instead of 50 men in that base wouldn't have changed much. The enemy would have massed against another base instead.
Double outpost strength everywhere won't cut it either - still not enough outposts...
All true.
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Better ANA ... attack on ANP ... better ANP ... larger concentration ... larger ANP ... attacks on civilian authorities ....
That's why there's so much written about initiative in all those old-fashioned field manuals.
Yes...
Fuchs, finish your thought
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Originally Posted by
Fuchs
And even if you somehow managed to deter each and every attack by strength (or turn it into a hopeless action), you would still not come much closer to mission accomplishment.
The enemy could turn his attention on the ANA.
Better ANA ... attack on ANP ... better ANP ... larger concentration ... larger ANP ... attacks on civilian authorities ....
Fuchs, I love the idea but you didn't take it far enough. Attacks on civilian authorities...leads to alienation of the local population...alienation leads to spontaneous uprising called Sunni Awakening...Awakening leads to better intelligence...better intelligence leads to much more effective search and destroy missions...government establishes a strong foothold.
Now in Afghanistan, it obviously wouldn't be a Sunni Awakening, it would be something else. But right now, the Taliban and their ilk don't have to threaten the local populations to live off of them. They get to do so willingly. Now, if they had to attack local populations with force to survive, the population would be driven into our hands.
As to the attack at FOB Keating compared to the luxury life at BAF. Don't just look at the numbers, look at the amount of ordinance dropped. Something like 1 percent of all ordinance expended in Afghanistan occurs around BAF. Basically, when historians write the history about failure in Afghanistan it will be a history of greed, gluttony and sloth by upper leadership (division level and up).
Clarity is my muddle name...
I think COPs are dumb mostly because I've never seen them accomplish the goals usually stated for their existence (with the exception below) and due to the fact I spent a lot of time in 1966 as a member of the USARV Fire Brigade running about all over I, II and II Corps Tactical Zones rescuing ODAs in strange places (ably assisted by the far more productrive Mike Forces, I might add). ;)
Having said that, I agree that COPs in the right places are a net benefit in a COIN support operation -- my gripe is they are frequently put in dumb places where there is no one is going to win the first heart or mind and are there to simply draw flies and be RPG Magnets -- the exception I mentioned. That works. It worked in Viet Nam more often than not and I suspect it's worked in Afghanistan more often that not. For that matter, it worked at Wanat last year and at Keating last month real small friendly casualty count and massive bad guy killed count. Yay!
For what?
Didn't change a thing. It works but it is operationally a waste of time and effort. In COIN ops, killing bad guys doesn't do you that much good -- so why bother?
Then let's address your poor design issue. Yep, it was. If I had the money, I'd hire a team to go take Hesco® out of business -- they are making it too easy to learn some really bad habits -- and we are doing that. You say:
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I don't think COPs in themselves are a flawed concept, I just think we're executing them incorrectly. We're pushing them into the middle of enemy terrority, instead of expanding out from neutralized zones, so in effect as stated they're not focused on protecting the populace, they're focused on protecting themselves (out of necessity). That doesn't achieve much from an operational and strategic view.
Exactly. Add to that tactically inept design, really poor tactical placement and you have a recipe for screwups...
You also say:
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We have forces that can execute deep patrols (much like the SAS did during Malaysia) to disrupt the enemy in the outlying areas. No new ideas here, just haven't seen them discussed yet.
I totally agree -- but I betcha we differ on who ought to be doing those patrols while the Cadillacs do Cadillac things... :D
Video of an attack on a U.S. COP
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GuZd5X11Ow8
Allegedly this is a video of an attack on a U.S. COP in N. Afghanistan. In my opinion it supports Ken's comments about the Hesko mentality. It "appears" that our guys were basically being hammered by mortar and rocket fire (then a large VBIED), while being forced to wait on air support to hopefully locate and neutralize their attackers, so from my armchair watching a video it seems like a terrrible way to fight, thus I can understand the frustration that the troops expressed.
It doesn't mean it wasn't there, but I didn't see any artillery or mortars returning fire from our camp?
No secret to anyone this terrain is very advantageous to the guerrilla fighter. I'm not sure what a perfect COP would look like in Afghanistan.
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I totally agree -- but I betcha we differ on who ought to be doing those patrols while the Cadillacs do Cadillac things
Ken, not so sure we would disagree, the best trained for the unilateral disruption patrols are probably Marine Recon and good U.S. Army light units. For the more serious deep targets (deliberate raids) the more specialized SOF. For the combined disruption activities I would push for SF, as you suggested indirectly there are some good lessons from the Vietnam era on what SF could do (Mike Forces being one of them).
The larger percentage of SF Cadillacs could be well suited to work the consolidation operations after larger forces cleared the area of larger enemy combat units. SF would then work with local security forces to root out the underground and provide security to development efforts as combat forces extend the oil spot. This would be the decisive phase. The younger studs would (this is missing 'not' I think) like it, but years later looking back on it with grayer hair they would realize their role was critical.
I can agree with all that, Bill
Noting that you had to specify Marine recon and 'good' US Army light units. I'd only suggest that Marine Rifle Companies and average or even poor US Army Light Units ought to be able to do that mission, they did it really pretty well only 40 years ago -- with a few draftees to boot. That you had to specify is an indicator of just how poor our current training regimen in a supposedly professional force happens to be. :(
Further, the fact that many turf battles intrude on too many things added to your comments on the front page re: the personnel system are also adverse factors that need to be changed... :mad:
Can we learn from the Faqir of Ipi?
Yet again an Imperial (British Empire in India) lesson to be read and hat tip to the UK blogsite (again): http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.co...re-before.html
There are links to other sources within. maybe worthy of a new thread, but for once left here - as the current Afghan thread.
I do wonder whether the Pakistani military remember this too? Imperial history is still part of the tradition and army units have kept their old Imperial names, head dress and more (not the consumption of alcohol).
Moved to a new thread for discussion: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=8665
davidbfpo
Report Public Summary from USFOR-A PubAff
All releaseable COP Keating report material, obtained straight from from USFOR-A Public Affairs, downloadable here (HONKIN' 2.63 MB .zip file containing 16 PDFs). Feel free to share as well.
Training on Field Fortification
Do infantry lieutenants get any training on on the basic principles of the design of field fortifications during their Basic Course? How about infantry NCOs during their NCOES? I don't remember any training on the subject in my field artillery schools, except for how to dig the DePuy fighting position when I was enlisted. I doubt that engineers or contractors will always be there when these positions need to be constructed. The most recent version of Field Manual 5-103, Survivability, that I've been able to find is from 1985, and I doubt it has anything about Hesco barriers or some of the other prefabricated stuff now in use. It may be one of the manuals that few people read. Field fortification used to be quite an art during the Vauban days of the 19th century and earlier.
Sorry to speak the obvious but
I think you to have differentiate two things here.
a.) Placing a position to protect something that has no choice as to where it is. -Vehicle check point, Police station, power plant, etc.
b.) Positioning a FOB/COP in a way that not only makes it defendable and useful, but also means it supports the operations it is part of. The requirements for a well defended position and a patrol based that actually supports part of Formation level patrol plan, are not the same.