CALL Handbook 03-04 Small Unit Leaders Guide to Urban Ops
Gents,
I am lookig at updating Handbook 03-04 the Small Unit Leaders Guide to Urban Operations in the next year.
I have asked on of the OC divisions to take it on. But I would love to get direct input from the field. Vignettes are great, especially if tied to TTPs.
If you have something send me a PM and I will send an email address.
Best
Tom
Vignette and second guessing-Listen to the audio
I'm reflecting this weekend...
On the Job with Operation Minotaur
This segment was done 72 hours prior to us discovering the rigged house. As for the reporting, we considered her a "one-night stand" reporter. She shows up, indulges you, and leaves never considering a long-term relationship.
This NPR segment cost me a Senate Armed Forces investigation so I'll put it into the appropriate context...
1. We did not torture anyone...Jamie states the detainees were interviewed out of view. While accurate, it is misportrayed. We handed over the detainees to the MPs.
2. "Let's get Rocky and beat these guys up." Rocky is a 110lbs kurdish iraqi. On patrols, he would scream, "STOP!!!" We'd immediately halt our convoy assuming that he identified an IED or ambush. Instead, he would be concerned with a dog being run over...During an interrogation, Rocky's emotional intelligence disarmed detainees in a way that often provided accurate intelligence.
3. As per my earlier post, we found the rigged house days later.
For additional context, we were penetrating into the denied areas of the Islamic State of Iraq. Moreover, for security reasons, we conducted a major deception operation with the media, Iraqi government, and Iraqi populace. Unfortunately, NPR choose not to leave before understanding the entire operation.
What she failed to document was that we bypassed over 100 deep-buried IEDs and secured an area devestated with sectarian violence, genocide, and terrorist training camps pushing fighters to baqubah, baghdad, and possibly Saudi Arabia.
I suppose those are minor sound bites within the grand scheme of things.
After she left, I felt bad for the curfew that I enforced on the populace. I lifted it to allow them to grab food, water, and electricity....Hours later, four of my soldiers were killed by a suicide bomber.
I never made that mistake again. I still had to write the letters to the families of my fallen.
v/r
Mike
I'm not getting exactly ...
what you are driving at with this:
Quote:
from STS
The ROE is usually THE definitive variable on what is allowed, which has the unintended effect of causing escalation with regards to a situation. If others find themselves in that situation, then the transition from precision (or surgical) MOUT to hi-intensity must be trained on or else they will quickly find themselves out of their depth when that situation arises.
Could you illustrate what you mean re: ROEs in the three intensity levels, transitions, etc. Draw me a word picture - like the SWAT vs INF vignette. :)
Or attach a Powerpoint :D
Best
Mike
PS: welcome to the shop.
Jon, I presume most of that rant is a quote and those are not your thoughts.
I have a comment on only three items in it, cleaning up the language a bit:
Quote:
I see soldiers doing things today that absolutely amaze me, but I also see them f***k up a guard roster, drive under NODs like s***, and not take care of their equipment too!
Since the person that stated this is apparently an NCO, my questions are why did he allow those things to happen and what did he do about it?
Quote:
How many of you here have ever made breach into a hallway with a sand bagged machinegun at the end?
If we're still here, obviously none of us was stupid enough to try that.
Quote:
You REALLY want to trust an E-2 with making the decision on how best to seek cover and supress this threat ?
I've had several E2s, even more E3s and a slew of SPCs that were more capable of doing that than their team leaders of the time were...
We have an Army that rewards time in service and time in grade -- the cream doesn't rise because the system is skewed against it.
Lot of nonsensical bluster and noise in that post. He may be a gem and a super soldier but in my observation most of the kill 'em all and let god sort 'em out / hooray for me types are more noise than competence and substance. The really good guys don't need to do that stuff. Most won't tolerate those that do it.
P.S.
Got so busy sneering at the 'Gee Look at me' business I forgot to say that I broadly agree with his point which was, I think, after removing all the not beneficial to him or the Army and unnecessary chatter:
Room clearing and SWAT techniques are dangerous and misapplied, don't establish a pattern, use host nation forces where possible and take sensible care of your troops.