CSI Interview: BG (Ret.) Shimon Naveh
Printable View
Naveh has accurately characterised Hezbollah, and in a way I would agree with, but the rest of this article is, I suspect, about promoting his agendas - which appear fairly obvious and are in line the gossip doing the rounds in IDF military thought at the moment. EG- How were we so stupid as to buy into "Effects Based Operations?"
The idea that the IDF was "unprepared" - which it obviously was - does not, in my view validate his other opinions.
I'm not entirely sure how one distinguishes between the two. After the failure of quite ambitious Israeli efforts to establish a compliant Lebanese government in 1982-83, they certainly gradually fell back to a buffer zone strategy in south lebanon.
However, that buffer zone strategy involved support for a local political-military ally, the South Lebanese Army. Surely combat operations in aimed at supporting the preservation and power of a local (albeit de facto rather than de jure) administration are COIN operations? It certainly involved everything from counter-guerilla operations to financial aid, engineering assistance, intelligence support, PSYOPS, economic integration strategies (the "Good Fence"), engagement (and intimidation) of community leaders, etc. Indeed, Israel was far more involved in the administrative functioning of south Lebanon than it is in contemporary Gaza (in which case, are the IDF's Gaza operations not COIN either?)
I'm not trying to see how many COIN definitions can dance on the head of a pin here. Rather, it seems to me that there are real challenges in learning lessons (or assessing effectiveness) if we can't be clear what cases count as relevant, or what the criteria for "success" are.
I don't think you can. Your final point is exactly right. In my own writing COIN is a word or abbreviation I try and avoid using. I consider it expedient for conversing here, but also intellectually lazy - as I have said many times before, in relation to other bumper sticky definitions that cast about.
The only purpose of the invading and occupying the Lebanon was to make the state of Israel safer from armed aggression. That's it. Fact. It had no other purpose. Call it COIN, call it a better Fence, call it war. In IDF eyes, the desired end state is absolute and not negotiable, and that alone creates pressures and realities that most other armies know absolutely nothing of.
Quite simply that the UK and or the US has had the option of disengagement as a course of action. In the case of Israel that option is not there. For years there was the territory for peace option and in some cases--Egypt for one--it worked albeit with a very large US checkbook for both sides.
The difficulty for Israel is that while it can win decisively in a large scale conflict, its options are strictly short term. The longer term solution as in the case of the 82 invasion proved unsustainable as indeed did the longer term occupation of southern Lebanon and the emergence of Hizballah.
So there is Israel's conundrum: decisive defeat ala 67 is very short-lived thing. Longer term solutions are cast in doubt by demographics. I liked the Israeli general's description of hizballah because he keyed on something most outsiders miss. Hizballah is a nationalist organization with a religious charter. That means that it often operates purely in what it sees as Lebanese interests. Where it really constitutes a threat to Israel is in its ability to absorb punishment and remain intact.
As for the West Bank, the IDF does use limited responses but again what is the objective? They have been in the past to sustain Israeli settlements in the territories and limit Palestinian threats toward the settlements and Israel proper. COIN ultimately has an objective of creating or sustaining some sort of government. The IDF has used a one-sided approach to intimidate and undercut Palestinian leadership for decades. To a certain degree that has worked in that the IDF still has the West Bank. On the other hand it faces a much more robust and threatening enemy.
Tom
Territory for peace? Everywhere the IDF withdraws from becomes a base for attacking Israel.
The objective is essentially peace. Easy to say, almost impossible to do, and the goal posts in the occupied territories are pretty fast moving. It's to create an acceptable level of violence, so as other measures can work.
You would be perfectly safe driving around most of the West Bank today, indeed access to most of the West Bank is in no way restricted. Just don't climb over the Road Fence, and slow right down at checkpoint and open your windows.
...undercut the Palestinian Leadership? What Leadership? I agree there is a certain amount of pretty unproductive "divide and rule" but when the leadership is mostly corrupt and ineffective and cannot deliver on an agreement, then what else is there?
This is hardly the case: every major Palestinian population center in the West Bank is ringed by checkpoints. Vehicular traffic is so restricted that the norm is to exit the taxi on one side, line up at the barrier, and grab another taxi on the other side (I've done it more times than I care to count). Good are rigorously searched. Access to Jerusalem is barred to most of the West Bank population.
There are Israeli-only roads in the West Bank, largely reserved to Jewish settlers. The local population can't use them. Indeed, in some areas (the Jordan Valley) there are movement and permit systems in place for local residents on all roads.
You'll find extensive information on the scope, nature, and impact of Israeli mobility restrictions in the West Bank at the UN OCHA website. World Bank analysis on the economic and social impact of these restrictions can be found here.
"The most pious among them believe that God wants them to have these rocky hills. History has shown that when God becomes involved in politics, guns are brought in while tolerance and compromise are left outside."
What you call failure, is the inevitable result of the most pious getting what they want.
Sure it is. I also drive around the West Bank, and specifically the Jordan Valley on a regular basis. Sure, Israeli number plates make a huge difference, and there are some areas off limits, but it is not Afghanistan or Iraq (or even Gaza!). If you know what you're doing, and you're there for the right reasons, then you are pretty safe. I feel a heck of a lot safer on the West Bank than I ever did in Algeria or Sierra Leone, during their security problems. There are parts of Thailand and the Philippines I'd stay the hell away from as well.
Yes, I've seen whole families of Arabs, standing in the winter rain, while their car is ripped apart and I read the Marsom Watch reports and I know members of that organisation, so I am in no way suggesting that there are not substantial problems. A lot of what is done is coercive, unjust and even cruel and unnecessary, but a certain amount contributes to security. How much? Give me a crystal ball, and I'll tell you.
At least some people want the Israeli government in control.
"It would be far more accurate to describe the West Bank and Gaza Strip as "disputed territories" to which both Israelis and Palestinians have claims."
Israel cannot be characterized as a "foreign occupier" with respect to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Fundamental sources of international legality decide the question in Israel's favor. The last international legal allocation of territory that includes what is today the West Bank and Gaza Strip occurred with the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine which recognized Jewish national rights in the whole of the Mandated territory, including the sector east of the Jordan River
In some ways they are.
In 1967, Israel nationalized all West Bank water.
Yep
The Israelis considering the source of your post
The US government position is that the West Bank is occupied territory. That is why US policy was and still is againstthe settlement program.
In any case, the thread was IDF COIN.
Tom
I would also call Judea and Samaria, the occupied territories, and not Judea and Samaria. - and so would more Israelis than most US and UK media would ever want to admit.
Which settlement program? The illegal settlements are illegal. No debate, but there are Moshav, and Kibbutz which are perfectly legal. There are also Jewish Communities in the territories that have lived there 100's and even 1,000 of years
Wilf,
The settlements I refer to are the settlements initiated by Sharon and other hardliners.
Let's agree to disagree and move on.
Tom
If we were really opposed to them, we wouldn't pay for them.
And an auditing bait-and-switch in which U.S. aid was used to free up billions of dollars for spending on the settlements formally opposed by the United States.
Anyway, IDF COIN is achieving somebodies objective, therefore it is - in my opinion - successful. Though, of course, it's fair to say that the objective is highly controversial. I'd also say it is a lot closer to Dr. Metz's Roman COIN than British COIN, but I tend to agree with the good doctor's thesis that Roman COIN is more successful, especially short term.
We wouldn't be giving them and the Egyptians a couple of Bil + a year -- but we are and have been probably since about the time you were born... :D
Good luck finding a US politician who will express any real and meaningful opposition to that aid and the known chicanery that goes along with it. Either party... ;)
There is some common misconceptions at play here. British COIN, prior to Ulster, was characterised by a brutality and severity that most would find hard to stomach. Almost every measure used by the IDF for COIN was a measure previously used by the British during the mandate, including home demolition. Trying to draw parallels between the West Bank and Ulster is idiotic - as proved by Basra.
Yes, IDF COIN is pretty harsh, and even unnecessarily so, but not compared with 99% of other nations on earth (Columbia, India, Sri Lanka, Burma, Indonesia, Syria, Iran, Russia, Georgia, Turkey, Lebanon, Pakistan, etc etc.) and some of the COIN practices in Iraq and Afghanistan are nothing to be too proud of.
British COIN/Roman COIN aren't my terms but I believe that they are metaphorical for Humane/brutal. I probably should have put them in quotation marks. i.e. The British used "Roman" techniques before adopting "British" techniques.
I've been thinking about starting a thread on that but fear of "the graveyard of the banned" has prevented me from doing so.
That's my point. If the powers that be are happy, it's meeting objectives. Of course, you can create a lot of destruction and mess up a lot of things while achieving objectives, but then the problem isn't the strategy or the tactics, it's the objectives. I'm not going to debate the objectives.
Debate the objectives, I mean. I'd also suggest the no strategy or tactics are involved in that bit -- it's pure politics.
I don't think that should deter you. Unless you get deliberately provocative, that shouldn't be a problem. Only thing I'd suggest is be real sure of your facts and avoid quoting inflammatory and suspect sources -- or blogs. I think you should post a thread if you wish.Quote:
I've been thinking about starting a thread on that but fear of "the graveyard of the banned" has prevented me from doing so.
Thanks for the link - this was a very eye-opening read. I was particularly interested in Naveh's analysis of Hezbollah, because I think the abilities and powers of nonstate actors, particularly in the Middle East, are going to continue to grow, and I'm not sure anyone has figured out an acceptable political endstate for a conflict with a Hezbollah or Hamas.
I was confused, however, by Naveh's claim that the original idea was to "create conditions which will force him to give up the militant [role of Hezbollah], to stop this duality," yet not focused on decapitation attacks or other forms of leader-elimination campaigns. How would this work? Does anybody have a better idea of what he's talking about? Or did I completely miss something?
Matt
I think the concept was to totally destroy Hizbullah's military wing on the battlefield, kill off the fighters and battlefield leadership, and essentially leave Nasrallah with nothing but politics as an option in the ongoing struggle in Lebanon. The Israelis are smart enough to know that killing Nasrallah, as charismatic as he is, or other Hizbullah senior leadership would not destroy Hizbullah as a movement because it has achieved the level of a genuine social movement/party within the Lebanese context as the overall representative of the Shi'i, especially the pious middle and lower classes.
I know Hezbollah less resembles an insurgency movement than a nonstate, private army, but doesn't it enjoy popular legitimacy to the point where an effort to destroy their military wing is going to take on the hydra-killing characteristics of counterinsurgency? Or does Hezbollah resemble an army enough in its organization and fighting characteristics to make this a viable concept?
Matt
It is far easier to rebuild military potential than political legitimacy. Hizbullah has the latter in Lebanon. Even if every single Hizbullah commander dropped dead and every supply dump exploded tomorrow, Hizbullah could train new leaders and rearm with Syrian and Iranian aid. The overall strategic picture would not change even given a militarily crippled Hizbullah, because unless its ideology or backers changed, it can always rebuild its military capabilities.
I think Israeli strategy (such as it was) in 2006 was to tip the party's cost-benefit analysis, in the hope that the Lebanese population would exert pressure on Hizballah to cease activities that brought Israeli retaliation —-or, otherwise, risk increasing alienation from its popular base.
This worked quite well in the 1970s against the PLO, which went from immensely popular to immensely unpopular in Lebanon. However, Hizballah is an indigenous actor with great reservoirs of goodwill in the Shiite community, and Israeli actions were in any case poorly calibrated to achieve this effect. When Israel started bombing gas stations or bridges in northern Lebanon, for example, many Lebanese bought into Hizballah's position that this was a preplanned Israeli war of aggression, and that Hizballah was once more defending the country as the "national resistance."
I suspect a sustained and extensive ground operation would have backfired in similar ways, and would have likely ended with Israel withdrawing under fire (again).
Right - this is essentially what I meant. You're saying that this idea was a flawed strategy, then? And, just to be clear, what I was referring to was Naveh's idea of the strategy he and other "heretics" had considered, not what was actually implemented in 2006. You are referring to the same, correct?
Yeah, I'm disagreeing with Naveh on his concept for a "forcible disarmament" of Hizbullah. As long the Shi'i of Lebanon feel (1) disenfranchised and aggrieved (2) threatened, rightly or wrongly, by Israel, there will always be a constituency in that population for an armed party of their own capable of fighting both Lebanese and Israeli foes. There will have to be a sea change in the strategic context for this to work long-term - either by removing Hizbullah's foreign backers and arms suppliers, or by altering the political calculus of the broader Lebanese Shi'i community. Anything else is blowing smoke and kicking the can down the road, even if successful in the short term.
Guys, none of this is rocket science.
The Israelis made a bad plan, based on no other objective than trying to convince the Lebanese Govt. and people to turn against HezBollah by second order effects. When the plan didn't work, they tried to fix it, by not doing properly what they should have done. Read Ron Tira, Read their own commission of enquiry.
EBO strays dangerously from proper military thought. Hezbollah can be suppressed and even defeated by methods everyone understands.
Nasrallah saying "we won," means about as much as George Bush declaring victory.
If someone can be suppressed (does not act through fear of harm) then he can be defeated because sufficient fear will lead to withdrawal.
So the "methods" used to suppress (which you understand) just have to exploited to their logical conclusion. Obviously they would have to applied within a political context,(as all methods do) and would probably only be successful as a result of other activities - eg: loss of isolation from outside support and funding. Recognition of opportunity remains the key to success.
Sorry to sound vague, but simplistic or erroneous interpretations this type of activity could be misquoted or misused.
Ok, I completely agree with that. It seems Naveh's touted alternative was really just a tactical shift from what was actually done. The questions that raises, about how to combat a group like Hezbollah or its ilk, seem damn near insurmountable to me.
And Wilf - I see 2006 as nearly as big a victory as Hezbollah could possibly score. The invincible Israelis withdrew, Hezbollah stood and fought in the villages in the south, and then helped clean up the country after Israel (again) devastated the infrastructure, gaining popularity and legitimacy through both their military and political wings. They may not have decisively defeated the IDF on the ground, but they fought very well and the strategic and IO gains for Hezbollah were quite large, IMO. I'd be interested to hear why you (or others) think otherwise.
Matt
Having talked to several men who actually fought, i would dispute that Hezbollah fought well or successfully. They were never able to hold ground against the units I have talked to. It would be like suggesting the Somalis fought well in Mogadishu or that the Taliban fought well during OP Anaconda.
They lost lots of equipment and about 5-600 dead. On the one occasion I know of where they cornered an entire IDF Platoon (Golani) they killed 6 and wounded everyone except 2, and still the platoon broke contact and recovered to their own forces. I have yet to see anything that would indicate Hezbollah as being widely skilled at the tactical level. - I would judge them to be as tactically proficient as the the Somalis in Mogadishu or that the Taliban fought during OP Anaconda.
Withdrawal isn't defeat.
The Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, has described the "miracle of deliverance" from Dunkirk
Aren't they holding all the ground that Isreal used to occupy now?
That is true to western eyes -- it is true to middle eastern eyes as well insofar as the conduct of operations and combat are concerned. In western terms, your statement is totally correct. In terms of the ME today when the announced goal is to force westerners and zionists out of the area; then western or Israeli withdrawal in the eyes of the opposition becomes a victory for them and thus a defeat for the west. Even the hint of a withdrawal will be seen as weakness. Given the fact that our perceived weakness is very much why we are there today, withdrawal is bad ju-ju and would bode badly for the future...
They're already winning the info war, they don't need any help... ;)
A) I wouldn't limit our ability to maneuver based on UBL's opinion.
B) We already withdrew our troops from Saudi Arabia. I don't think that caused any major geopolitical problems.
C) Isn't it better to be perceived as weak and to be strong than to have our forces physically weakened?
To disparage any irregular force because of their inability to "hold ground" against a professional army is to completely miss the point.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
Hezballah was able to inflict casualties on the IDF, take out some armor, and continue to launch rockets into Israel until the very end of the conflict. And since Israel withdrew once again - without achieveing its objectives, in the end, that's all that matters.
Regarding the "defeat" of Hezballah, I think Tequila put it quite clearly:
The statement "Nasrallah saying "we won," means about as much as George Bush declaring victory." is really a false analogy: President Bush has been roundly mocked for his statement, both here in the US and abroad, while a significant chunk of the region's populace perceives that Israel was humiliated during their summer excursion.Quote:
Originally Posted by tequila
FYI, there is quite a bit of discussion on this subject in the Hezballah TTP thread and the Hezbollah: A Win For 'The Best Guerrilla Force in the World'? thread.
Thanks, Jedburgh. I agree with that completely. Although a couple sources I read (some in the info you gave me for my RFI) said that, particularly for a irregular force, Hezbollah stood and fought rather effectively in some villages with a Chechen-type decentralized defense effort.
My question, then, from this, is what is the larger strategy against Hezbollah, Hamas, and other nonstate actors who in many cases have more popular legitimacy and power than weakened states in the regions they operate. If kinetic action (even if better planned and executed than the IDF's in 2006) is non-decisive, and may actually further their political popularity and strength (leading to more military potential in terms of manpower and potential outside support), and the indigenous government is too weak to reign them in - i.e., Lebanon - then what is the approach? Attempts to moderate them or co-opt them diplomatically? A combination?
This seems to lie outside our current COIN thinking. Or at least MY current COIN thinking. . .
Oh, and can we please agree on a universal spelling for Hezbollah? Drives me nuts. Just tell me how to spell it and I'll do it. . .
Matt
I am not disparaging Hezbollah for an inability to hold ground. I am correcting the perception that they successfully defended any villages - and when they did try, they were unable to do it, according to the men I have talked to. There may have been certain areas where they did conduct a successful defence, but I have yet to see that reported by sources I trust.
I am not in any way trying to suggest that the IDF won. The War was a mind numbing fiasco, because of the stupid EBO plan. - and war was only 30 days long!
..how ever the idea that the IDF somehow lacked tactical or operational skill, and was out fought by Hezbollah is also a gross distortion. I do understand that it aids some folks agendas to suggest that.
No offense, but I think that the men you've talked to have too short of a time frame. Isreal isn't occupying any villages now.
I don't think that is the suggestion.
That is the suggestion
To me, it appears as though Hezbollah inflicted sufficient fear to cause withdrawal. Like I said, that isn't necessary defeat, but if the war ends after one side withdraws, it certainly looks like defeat to me. Germany withdrew from France. WWI ended. Germany was defeated.
Lets cut to the chase here. In the collective opinion, of those on this thread, what should the IDF have done?
Well if that was the case it could be said that the IDF caused sufficient fear to halt rocket attacks from the Lebanon. The fighting may have stopped but the war is ongoing.
IMO withdrawal does not define any aspect of defeat. The sole criteria I use to define defeat is permanent, collective, physical, and psychological withdrawal from combat. And that stands for COIN as well as larger conflicts.
IMO
1) Realize that Hezbollah can't invade and hold Isreali territory
2) Repel cross border attacks without panic, because Hezbollah can't invade and hold Israeli territory .
3) Retaliate with bombings. (Objective: cause more pain to Hezbollah than Hezbollah inflicted on Israel.)
4) Accept the fact that Hezbollah can't be destroyed.
5) Enjoy the nice weather. Israel is a beautiful country.
I agree, but IMO when the attacker withdraws it does indicate that the defenders have successfully defended their territory.
I fully admit that I don't know the official definitions of many terms, and I appreciate being allowed to contribute even though I don't, but I think there's some problems with the word permanent. Germany's withdrawal from France in 1918 wasn't permanent.
1.) No but they can throw rockets and kidnap your people.
2.) Repel, OK, but how about killing them before they rocket and kidnap your people.
3.) What do you bomb? You can't bomb the Insurgents in Iraq so why would you bomb Hezbollah. Besides, the evidence is that this does not work. Other things work much better.
4.) That's asking a lot of the average Israeli, and their physical destruction is not required. Their consistent suppression is.
5.) Can't enjoy the weather if you spend all day in the shelters while the Arabs shoot Kasam at you. Ask the populations of Haifa, Kyriat Shimona, and Sderot.
I think we rarely have a collective opinion ;) I'll give it a shot, though.
From the perspective of Israeli national security interests, a very much shorter air campaign, with much less targeting of civilian infrastructure (power station, bridges, gas stations, etc.), and possible a few well-aimed heliborne raids in "rear" areas. Then stop, declare victory, and let it wind down the way it usually winds down.
Hizballah's original snatch-and-grab was something of an uncharacteristic political blunder, which generated little enthusiasm in Lebanon. Indeed, it was striking how much political capital the first few days of the war cost Hizballah, even in the Shi'ite community.
However, as things dragged on and the target set grew, Lebanese opinion shifted almost 180 degrees. The party was thus saved from the folly of its own mistakes by even bigger Israeli blunders (the scope and nature of the IDF response), as well as Hizballah's ability to ride out the punishment.
Complicating things further now--and this properly belongs in a different thread--there are indications that UN cartographic reexamination of the "blue line" (to which Israel withdrew in 2000) has found that Hizballah may have been right, and the Israeli-occupied Shaba Farms area really is Lebanese (and not Syrian) territory. Oops.
Let's say this is true. Under present political circumstances, I don't foresee Israel acknowledging this or offering a Shaba withdrawal for fear that it will look like a Hizballah victory. Yet it also means that Hizballah will remain political resistant to anything the IDF might throw at them.
I have no real quibble with that, except I would exclude all and any targeting of any civilian infrastructure. I'd have also left the International Airport alone.
...but how would have "declaring victory" stopped the clouds of rockets that would have occurred in the face any direct action - or how would you assess the "rocket threshold"
Salem Aleikum, and Shalom Abujnoub.
Before we get into your post (and we will) go to his this link, http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=1441 and give us all some details about who you are and where you are coming from.