US and Pakistan Military Cooperation?
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Originally Posted by
Pragmatic Thinker
[R]eal issues need to be addressed and the first one is defining who really is our enemy? If Usama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are the leaders of the enemy organization we wish to defeat then why do we allow them sanctuary in Pakistan?
For the US to cross into Pakistan unilaterally would be perceived (rightly, I think) as an overt act of aggression and would lose us even more of the little international public support we have for our anti-AQ efforts. It would also undercut the internal support Musharraf has in his own country. Do we really want a nuclear-armed Pakistan to lose his rule? His replacement may be far worse.
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Why do we ally ourselves with Musharraf after he publically states, 1) he believes Al Qaeda's top leaders are in his country but he claims he is supposedly powerless to do anything about it, and 2) he would rather see anyone else BUT the United States be the ones that capture/kill Usama Bin Laden within Pakistan should he be found....
Musharraf (or his handlers) is pretty astute IMHO. Regarding your question 1), see my point above--he at least provides some stability in the government of a predominantly Islamic nation state member of the "nuclear club."
Regarding 2), I submit that having any nation other than the "Great Satan US" capture/kill UBL would lessen UBL's future "Martyr" status. Were the forces of a Moslem nation to effect the kill/capture, I believe that could be used to send a strong message to show that the efforts of the terrorists are wrong in the eyes of Allah and the Prophet.
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I am no genius (militarily or otherwise) but there lacks basic logic in our policies and actions that I find too easily dismissed by the people who are supposedly "great leaders" and "no nonsense types"....
Logic has very little real play in the world of international diplomatic affairs. If you want to discuss whether we need more consistency in our policies and actions, that might very well be a topic worth exploring more fully.
Asia Times Online - Taliban a step ahead of US assault
Asia Times Online - Taliban a step ahead of US assault
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KARACHI - The ongoing three-day peace jirga (council) involving hundreds of tribal leaders from Pakistan and Afghanistan is aimed at identifying and rooting out Taliban and al-Qaeda militancy on both sides of the border.
This was to be followed up with military strikes at militant bases in Pakistan, either by the Pakistani armed forces in conjunction with the United States, or even by US forces alone.
The trouble is, the bases the US had meticulously identified no longer exist. The naive, rustic but battle-hardened Taliban still want a fight, but it will be fought on the Taliban's chosen battlegrounds.
Twenty-nine bases in the tribal areas of North Waziristan and South Waziristan on the border with Afghanistan that were used to train militants have simply fallen off the radar.
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The death in May of Taliban commander Mullah Dadullah in Afghanistan during a coalition raid set in motion a major change within the Taliban's command structure.
The loss of the heroic commander was a huge blow for the Taliban in southwestern Afghanistan, as a major symbol of success had been killed - and there was no one of his stature to replace him, as another top Taliban commander, Mullah Akhtar Osmani, had earlier been killed in Helmand.
Amid the demoralization, the entire Taliban leadership left Helmand, Urzgan, Zabul and Kandahar and sat idle in Satellite Town in Quetta, Pakistan, for several weeks.
Finally, in June, Taliban leader Mullah Omar outlined new guidelines, which included:
No members of the central military command would work in southwestern Afghanistan.
Group commanders would be given control of specific districts and be allowed to develop their own strategy.
This strategy would be passed on only to the Taliban-appointed "governor" of the area, who in turn would relay it to the Taliban's central command council. From these various inputs, the council would develop a broader strategy for particular regions.
The Taliban would discourage personality cults like Dadullah's, as the death of a "hero" demoralized his followers.
Four spokesmen were appointed to decentralize the Taliban's media-information wing. Each spokesman would look after only a specific zone so that in case of his arrest, only information about that zone could be leaked. They also have all been given the same name, at present it is Qari Yousuf Ahmedi.
CSIS - A Perilous Course: U.S. Strategy and Assistance to Pakistan
CSIS - A Perilous Course: U.S. Strategy and Assistance to Pakistan (pdf)
Over $10 billion in aid to Pakistan since 9/11, and what to show for it?
Recommendations include shifting aid from a purely short-term military counterterror strategy focused on the western border to more state-building and internal stability for Pakistan itself. Sounds good on paper, and I can see the temptation, but how to avoid watching funds disappear into what is essentially a massive development project?
A guide to a Pakistani strategy
A good, short read on what is happening and what could be done:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/16/op...on&oref=slogin
davidbfpo
Risks in peace agreements in NWFP and FATA
And from the Pakistani Paper The International News
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The federal government has begun the process of negotiating a peace agreement with the Tehrik-e- Taliban (TeT) in South Waziristan. There are certain important reflections on this matter which need consideration.
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Earlier this month, the NWFP government signed a peace agreement with the TNSM, which is a religious movement in Malakand division, where the TNSM is demanding the implementation of Shariat. In the agreement, the TNSM promised to abandon violence and to propagate its views peacefully. It also condemned the recent militant violence in Swat. Although, the agreement was signed by the TNSM, its fighting rank and file, led by Maulvi Fazlullah, has condemned it! There is a danger that this agreement will wither away without having accomplished much.
The NWFP government has thus opened itself to criticism for failing to include an enforcement clause based on indemnities, as well as the absence of any mechanism through which the agreement can be monitored and enforced.
On the other hand, the proposed agreement with TeT of Baitullah Masud is in a totally different category. Firstly, this agreement, though not yet finalised, is the responsibility of the federal government as it relates to tribal areas. Secondly, it is not understood how the government can sign an agreement with TeT, when it is not a tribe but an armed organisation. Thirdly, TeT is signing the agreement in South Waziristan. How will it, for example, be effective in Mohmand agency, which is different from South Waziristan? How will it be monitored by the federal government in the NWFP, where TeT is also active? If the government signs the agreement with the Mahsud tribe it will not be with the TeT, who could ignore it and continue to fight. There are thus so many technical bottlenecks in the signing of an agreement with TeT that it is unlikely to materialise.
US bombs Pakistani border post
Under the headline 'Tensions rise....' the UK Daily Telegraph reports: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...bing-raid.html
I know other websites have commented upon events in Pakistan recently, I cannot recall much on SWC.
davidbfpo
More reporting on Pakisani reliability
Found in today's UK The Observer: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008...an.afghanistan
Refers to a RAND report which touched upon the Frontier Corps; which may have appeared here before?
davidbfpo
Strategy Targets Pakistan Ties
Strategy Targets Pakistan Ties - Sara Carter, Washington Times
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The new U.S. military commander in Afghanistan, Army Gen. David D. McKiernan, said he will visit Pakistan in the next few weeks to coordinate strategy amid a deteriorating relationship between the two U.S. allies.
As a NATO command, the mandate for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) "does not extend across the border to Pakistan," Gen. McKiernan told The Washington Times in an exclusive interview. "So we do have a right to self-defense, but we do not have any ISAF military operations in the sovereign territory of Pakistan."...
Another Canadian discovery
Found on the Kings of War blogsite, a Canadian journalist based in Kandahar reports on interviewing a Taliban prisoner who alleges being trained by the Pakistani Army: http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/War_Terr...996761-cp.html
davidbfpo
I think the non-response was not due to what you seem to attribute
rather it was due in part to the fact that such an initiative would require getting a fractious Congress to agree to put up the money and most of us would deem that a highly unlikely prospect for several reasons. Those reasons, ranging from simple bias in a few cases to the long term impact on US spending in the view of most are compounded by the India - Pakistan relationship conundrum.
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I supposed it would be surprisingly cheap in comparison to military actions & sanctions.
Arguable at best but a part of the problem is the US Congress view of spending money -- it is generally predicated on very short term efforts that will realize a benefit for the incumbents. Long range thought is, very regrettably, not in the makeup of too many in Congress.
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The members of this forum/board are so proud about their "non-kinetic" approaches...
Most also are in favor of other approaches that will work and are not prone to favor those that come equipped with obvious difficulties that may not be overcome; to wit (from your original post)
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...Even the military aid is expensive and equals just consumption, not investment.
True, however, you're asking us for an investment and like most investors, we'd prefer that there be a guarantee of no harm and a good expectation of some small profit. Lacking that, the desire to invest is reduced. Another factor leading to non-response is, I think, that in dealing with other Nations since 1945, we've discovered that spending massive amounts of money will not buy love and indeed can often be counterproductive. You may have noted that our net government to government foreign aid has declined considerably over the years -- lack of return for the investments involved is a significant contributor to that.
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The result would be that the youth migrates from the backwardish tribal areas into the cities. The population in the cities would be busy with business/jobs and with the exploitation of their new wealth.
In an ideal world -- indications lead me (and, I suspect, most observers) to believe that the Imams would fight that tooth and nail and it would not happen. That too is, IMO, a reason for the lack of response.
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Pakistani parents would more often than ever before consider (free!) secular schools as important for their youth instead of religious schools.
Possible but also highly improbable in the near term -- which, as sadly stated above, is Congress' focus.
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Poverty isn't the reason for terrorism, but it sure helps to recruit jihadists and it helps populists of all political wings.
True -- but so is this;
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A major problem of such a project would be the relationship to India, though.
India is a bit large and difficult to influence. Well, unless you look at it from the perspective of U.S. national security spending...
Now, back to your most recent post:
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As I said, it represents a mainstream reply from European peace & conflict studies, a whole academic field.
It would also represent the thoughts of many in this country; mostly those that lean a little to the left and who oppose conflict on principle. Fortunately or unfortunately, viewpoint dependent, the fact is that the majority of people in the US do not lean that way, they're pretty well centric in their views -- and they're very pragmatic. Moderate centrists far outnumber both left and right leaning persons in the US; those folks tend to be pretty thoughtful and realistic (they also tend to be quiet; that old 'silent majority'). Your suggestion would be nice in an ideal world and it would have great merit were it proposed for a nation with a western orientation. Pakistan is not such a nation -- and most Americans are well aware of the subtle differences therein involved. Yet another factor in no responses, perhaps.
Another pair of very minor factors are your noted "European peace & conflict studies, a whole academic field." Rightly or wrongly, that mass of moderate American is suspicious of anything emanating from Europe and anything from the vales of Academe. Neither font of knowledge and rectitude has proven to really have all the answers. Au contraire... :wry:
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Are we so hard-wired to consider force (even "non-kinetic" one) as answer to international security concerns?
No, I don't think so. History since 1945 and most particularly in the last 30 years seems to point away from that. Recall that we would not be in Afghanistan or Iraq lacking the attacks on the World trade Center and the Pentagon.
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(Or is the English-speaking countries bias here so overwhelming and the understanding of rather foreign approaches to security concerns too small?)
Pragmatic versus dogmatic, I think.